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ABSTRACT 
 
Psychopathy is a personality disorder that can be defined by profound disturbances in 
empathic response to others and repeated engagement in immoral behaviour. This thesis set 
out to investigate how individual differences in psychopathic traits in the general 
population are associated with variability in distinct components of empathy and morality. 
This thesis endeavoured to answer five outstanding research questions: 1) Given the 
complexity and multidimensionality of empathy and morality constructs, which 
components of these constructs are associated with psychopathic traits at the behavioural 
level? [Chapters 2-3] 2) Are behavioural correlates of empathy and morality in 
psychopathic traits specific to affective-interpersonal traits/lifestyle-antisocial traits, or 
common to both? [Cs. 2-3] 3) Are these correlates consistent across genders? [Cs. 2-3] 4) 
Are associations between psychopathic traits and empathic [C. 4] and 5) moral processing 
reflected at the neural level [C. 5]?  
This thesis’ findings suggest that: 1) individual differences in psychopathic traits are 
associated with lesser empathic response to emotional stimuli, lesser propensity to feel 
moral emotions and atypical moral decision-making; 2) empathic atypicalities are driven by 
the joint variance between affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial facets, but those 
related to affective aspects of moral cognition seem to be driven by variance in affective-
interpersonal traits; 3) empathic and moral atypicalities seem to be similar in men and 
women; 4) atypical amygdala and anterior insula function may represent neural markers of 
disrupted empathic processing for individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits; and 
5) atypical functioning of the vmPFC/mOFC during moral processing may contribute to the 
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disordered lifestyle and antisocial behaviour exhibited by individuals with high levels of 
psychopathic traits. These findings contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of 
the empathic and moral processing impairments that underlie psychopathic traits. 
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1.1. What is Psychopathy?   
 
1.1.1. Psychopathy as a constellation of affective, interpersonal, lifestyle and 
antisocial characteristics  
 
Psychopathy is a personality construct that involves a constellation of personality and 
behavioural characteristics, including lack of guilt, remorse and empathy, callousness, 
manipulativeness, impulsiveness, sensation-seeking, and frequent engagement in antisocial 
and immoral behaviour (e.g. Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005; Cleckley, 1941; R. D. Hare, 
2003; R. D. Hare & Neumann, 2008). 
The modern conception of psychopathy derives from Hervey Cleckley’s work “The 
Mask of Sanity” (1941). Based on his clinical experience, Cleckley described sixteen 
“common characteristics” of the psychopath. These included superficial charm and good 
“intelligence”; absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking; absence of 
‘nervousness’ and psychoneurotic manifestations; unreliability, untruthfulness and 
insincerity; lack of remorse and shame; inadequately motivated antisocial behaviour; poor 
judgement and failure to learn by experience; pathological egocentricity and incapacity for 
love; and general poverty in major affective reaction. Cleckley’s seminal work has had an 
important influence not only on clinical settings but also on the empirical research of 
psychopathy. Based on Cleckley’s description of psychopathy and on his own clinical 
observations and extensive empirical work, Robert Hare developed a formal tool for the 
assessment of the disorder, the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; 1980) and later the PCL-
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Revised (PCL-R; 1991, 2003), which is currently considered to be the standard instrument 
for the formal assessment of the disorder in forensic settings. 
Based on formal assessment with the PCL-R, the syndrome of psychopathy can be 
diagnosed in forensic settings when a person scores high on two dimensions, that can be 
further divided in four facets (R. D. Hare, 2003; R. D. Hare & Neumann, 2008). The first 
dimension traditionally referred to as Factor 1, can be divided in affective and interpersonal 
facets. The affective facet includes characteristics such as lack of remorse or guilt, shallow 
affect, callousness and lack of empathy, failure to accept responsibility for actions; whilst 
the interpersonal facet includes characteristics such as glibness/superficial charm, grandiose 
sense of self-worth, pathological deception, and manipulation of others. The second 
dimension, Factor 2, is comprised of lifestyle and antisocial behaviour facets. Lifestyle 
characteristics include need for stimulation/proneness to boredom, parasitic lifestyle, lack 
of realistic long-term goals, impulsivity and irresponsibility; whilst antisocial behaviour 
facet records poor behavioural controls, early behaviour problems, juvenile delinquency, 
revocation of conditional release and criminal versatility.  
Evidence from forensic and community male samples suggest that the two dimensions 
of psychopathy (i.e. affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial behavior) present 
distinct associations with various criterion measures of personality, emotionality and 
behavior, particularly when their shared variance is controlled for. For example, the 
affective-interpersonal dimension presents negative associations with emotional correlates 
such as fearfulness, distress and emotinal reactivity, whlist the lifestyle-antisocial 
dimension presents positive associations with these correlates (e.g. Hicks & Patrick, 2006; 
Uzieblo, Verschuere, van den Bussche, & Crombez, 2010). This suggests that, although co-
18 
 
occuring, the different dimensions of psychopathy might tap into two separable, distinctive 
underlying constructs (Patrick, Hicks, Nichol, & Krueger, 2007) and present distinct 
contributions to psychopathy. Affective-interpersonal traits are thought to represent the 
distinct personality traits defining psychopathy in that their presence distinguishes 
individuals who are psychopathic from those who manifest antisocial characteristics but 
who are not psychopathic (Blair et al., 2005).  
 
Figure 1.1. Four-factor model of psychopathy, based on items of the PCL-R 
 
Note: Reproduced from Hare and Neumann (2008), with permission of the copyright owner.  
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1.1.2. Psychopathy as a dimensional construct 
 
There is now good evidence that the structure of psychopathy is dimensional in nature, 
whether it is measured by the PCL-R or by its derivative self-report measures normally 
used in non-forensic contexts (see Hare and Neumann, 2008, for a review). The strength of 
the dimensional perspective has led to a growing number of community studies on 
psychopathy (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). In fact, findings from these studies often mirror 
those observed in clinical/forensic samples. Recent evidence suggests that individuals with 
high levels of psychopathic traits in college and community samples show some similar 
deficits to psychopaths in incarcerated samples, including reduced startle potentiation 
(Benning, Patrick, & Iacono, 2005; Justus & Finn, 2007) reduced autonomic responses to 
aversive images (Benning et al., 2005; Osumi, Shimazaki, Imai, Sugiura, & Ohira, 2007), 
reduced amygdala reactivity to negative emotional faces (Gordon, Baird, & End, 2004; 
Carré, Hyde, Neumann, Viding, & Hariri, 2013),  and poor decision-making during 
gambling tasks (Mahmut, Homewood, & Stevenson, 2008). These findings are also in line 
with data from neuroimaging studies of adult psychopathy and children with psychopathic 
tendencies (e.g. Birbaumer et al., 2005; Jones, Laurens, Herba, Barker, & Viding, 2009; 
Kiehl et al., 2001; Kiehl, 2006; Marsh et al., 2008; Sebastian et al., 2012; Viding et al., 
2012), which further strengthens the view that there are continuities between community 
and forensic participants in the mechanisms underlying psychopathy. 
If psychopathy is a dimensional construct, and its traits vary in a continuum, than we 
can expect to be able to find variation in its underlying processing atypicalities to be 
associated with its normal variation within the general population.     
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1.1.3. Measurement of Psychopathy in the General Population 
 
     The most commonly used measures of psychopathy in the general population are 
Levenson’s Primary and Secondary Psychopathy Scales (LPSP; Levenson, Kiehl, & 
Fitzpatrick, 1995), the Psychopathic Personality Inventory Revised (PPI-R; Lilienfeld & 
Widows, 2005) and the Self-Report Psychopathy measure and its revisions (SRP; e.g. 
Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, in press; Williams & Paulhus, 2004).   
The LPSP scales were created in an attempt to provide a measure of psychopathic 
traits based on Factor 1 (i.e. affective and interpersonal facets) and Factor 2 (i.e. lifestyle 
and antisocial behaviour facets) of the PCL-R in the general population. However, several 
studies have shown that the LPSP is more related to antisocial behaviour in general, making 
the discrimination and identification of the affective-interpersonal features of psychopathy 
difficult using this scale (Lynam, Whiteside, & Jones, 1999; Marcus, John, & Edens, 2004) 
and calling into question its construct validity. The PPI yields eight subscales measuring 
“lower order” factors of psychopathy that combine to give a global index of psychopathy. 
Although it was not originally designed to do so, some researchers have demonstrated that 
the PPI somewhat conforms to model that can be likened to the PCL-R, with one factor 
indexing an affective-interpersonal features, a second factor indexing lifestyle and 
antisocial behaviour, and a third non-related factor indexing fearless dominance (Benning, 
Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen, & Krueger, 2003).  
The PPI has been found to correlate moderately with the PCL-R (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 
2006). However, recent critiques have emerged about its apparent lack of statistical 
scrutiny, stating that it has remained relatively immune from modern model-based analyses, 
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and that there are serious issues with respect to the psychometric properties of the PPI and 
PPI-R (Neumann, Malterer, & Newman, 2008; Neumann, Uzieblo, Crombez, & Hare, 
2013).  
 
1.1.3.1. The Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 
 
The Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP) has been developed to overcome the 
shortcomings of other self-report measures of psychopathy. The SRP was specifically 
developed by Hare and colleagues as an extension of PCL-R to identify psychopathic traits 
in the general population. Importantly, the SRP mirrors the latent structure of the PCL-R, 
allowing a more direct comparison with forensic/clinical findings. Like the PCL-R, the 
SRP assesses four facets of psychopathic traits – interpersonal, affective, lifestyle and 
antisocial – which can also be modelled in terms of the traditional two-factor dimensions. 
The SRP and its short-form have been shown to have a clear latent structure (Carré et al., 
2013; Mahmut et al., 2008; Neumann, Schmitt, Carter, Embley, & Hare, 2012; Williams & 
Paulhus, 2004; Williams, Paulhus, & Hare, 2007), and to be strongly positively correlated 
with both the PCL-R and the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory (Andershed, Hodgons, 
& Tengstrom, 2007; Neumann & Pardini, 2012; Paulhus et al., in press), as well as with a 
psychopathy self-report scale based on the five-factor model of personality (Lynam et al., 
2011). The traits measured by the SRP are associated in the expected theoretical directions 
with relevant external correlates, such as criminal offenses and externalizing 
psychopathology (Neumann & Pardini, 2012), as well as reduced amygdala activation to 
fearful faces (Carré et al., 2013). The construct validity of the SRP has been further 
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supported by studies examining the association with related personality measures (Williams 
et al., 2007), measures of deviant and antisocial behaviour (Fite, Raine, Stouthamer-Loeber, 
Loeber, & Pardini, 2010; Nathanson, Paulhus, & Williams, 2006) and cognitive functioning 
(Mahmut et al., 2008). For the reasons outlined here, this measure was employed in this 
thesis to assess psychopathic traits in community samples of adults. The items comprising 
the SRP-SF can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Four-factor model of psychopathy, based on items of the SRP 
 
 
Note: Reproduced from Neumann et al. (2012), with permission of the copyright owner.  
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1.2. Psychopathy as a disorder of empathy and morality  
 
Psychopathy can be considered as a disorder associated with empathy and moral 
dysfunction, as the capacity to inflict serious harm to others repeatedly can be an indicator 
of profound disturbances in appropriate empathic responses to the suffering of others 
(Blair, 1995) and in appropriate moral behaviour. However, empathy and morality are 
complex and multidimensional constructs, and although lack of empathy and immoral 
behaviour are considered core features of the psychopathic personality (Blair, Mitchell, & 
Blair, 2005), little is known about how behavioural and neural substrates of specific 
dimensions of these constructs are associated with variation of psychopathic traits in the 
general population. 
 
1.2.1.  What is Empathy? 
 
Despite having its linguistic roots in ancient Greek (ἐμπάθεια [empatheia, literally 
“passion”] formed from ἐν [en-, “in, at”] + πάθος [pathos, “feeling”]) the term “empathy” 
was first introduced into the English language in 1901 by the British psychologist Edward 
Titchener, as a translation of “Einfühlung” a German word that literally means “feeling 
into” (Stüber, 2008). The term “Einfühlung” was originally used in a technical sense in 
1873 by Robert Vischer, a German philosopher, but was Theodor Lipps, also a German 
philosopher, who came to promote the word and to study empathy in the most thorough 
manner. Lipps conceived empathy as a psychological resonance phenomenon, a 
phenomenon of “inner imitation”, where one’s mind would mirror the mental activities or 
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experiences of another person, through the observation of his or hers bodily movements or 
facial expressions (Stüeber, 2008). 
 
1.2.1.1. Empathy and its related constructs 
 
Although theorists are not in complete agreement regarding the precise definition of 
empathy and its constitutive components (see Batson, 2009), most agree that empathy is a 
multidimensional phenomenon, which involves the understanding of another person's 
experience through the vicarious experience of their emotional states (Davis, 1983; Decety 
& Jackson, 2004; Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009; Hoffman, 2000). At present, 
and mostly due to the critical contribution of the field of social neuroscience (e.g. Adolphs, 
1999; Blair, 2005; Decety, 2011; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Singer, 2006; Singer & Lamm, 
2009), much of the empathy literature distinguishes between cognitive and emotional 
aspects of empathy and further distinguishes emotional empathy from emotional contagion, 
sympathy and empathic concern.  
Emotional empathy, affective empathy or, simply, empathy is normally understood as 
an affective state, caused by sharing the emotions of another person. It is thought to be 
defined by the subject’s emotional state resulting from the observation or imagination of 
the other person’s state. However, although the observer’s emotional state is isomorphic 
with the other person’s, the subject is aware that his or her own affective state is vicariously 
elicited by the emotional state of the other person (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). This 
definition of empathy will be adopted throughout this thesis. Cognitive empathy, also 
referred to as perspective taking, mentalising or Theory of Mind, on the other hand, is 
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regarded as the ability to understand other people’s intentions, desires or beliefs, through 
cognitive reasoning (Frith & Frith, 2003).  
Concepts such as emotional contagion, sympathy or empathic concern, although often 
occurring concurrently with emotional empathy, should be distinguished as different 
phenomena (Eisenberg, 2000; Hein & Singer, 2008; Singer & Lamm, 2009a). Emotional 
contagion refers to the subject’s state resulting from the observation of another person’s 
emotional state but without self-awareness and self-other distinction. It denotes the 
predisposition to “catch” other people’s emotions and has been described as “the tendency 
one has to automatically mimic and synchronise facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, 
and movements with those of another person and, consequently, to converge emotionally” 
(Hatfield, Rapson, & Le, 2009). Emotional contagion is considered to be a potential 
precursor of empathy (Hatfield et al., 2009).  
The terms sympathy, compassion, or empathic concern, are used interchangeably to 
denote that a person feels sorry for someone else. These terms refer to affective changes 
that are induced in the observer in response to the perceived or imagined affective state of 
another person, but these affective changes are not necessarily isomorphic with those 
experienced by the other. Sympathy (or compassion or empathic concern), is therefore an 
emotional response stemming from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s 
emotional state or condition, which is not the same as what the other person is feeling (or is 
expected to feel) but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for the other (Eisenberg, 
2000). According to Eisenberg (2000), further cognitive processing is necessary to turn the 
initial empathic response to another person’s distress into empathic concern. 
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In sum, there are several processes that form components of, or are closely related to, 
empathy. It is therefore critical that the precise processes under study are carefully defined, 
particularly when ‘empathy’ is related to other constructs, such as moral behaviour or 
psychopathy. 
 
1.2.2.  What is morality? 
 
Morality is an ambiguous word. Dictionary definitions of Morality state that it refers 
to “a personal or social set of standards for good or bad behaviour and character, or the 
quality of being right, honest, or acceptable” or to “principles concerning the distinction 
between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour” (Oxford Dictionary). The term 
“morality” can be used descriptively, and refer to codes of conduct that are put forward and 
accepted by a society, a group or an individual (“what is”); or normatively, and refer to a 
universal code of conduct that all rational persons would put forward for governing the 
behaviour of all moral agents (“what ought to be”) (Bernard, 2012). According to a 
descriptive perspective of morality (e.g. John Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory; Haidt & 
Graham, 2007) there are multiple moralities which are specific to each society, group, or 
even individual. These moralities can therefore include different elements. One element, 
however, seems to be present in all guides of conduct, all moralities: avoiding and 
preventing harm to others. Nonetheless, in a descriptive perspective, there are no universal 
morals. Whilst all guides of behaviour might include avoiding and preventing harm to 
others, they can also include other elements such as respect for authority, loyalty and 
sanctity. Causing harm to another person can thus be morally acceptable if, for example, it 
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is the result of an act of loyalty. In contrast, in a normative perspective, morality (e.g. 
Immanuel Kant’s Categorical imperative “Act only on that maxim through which you can 
at the same time will that it should become a universal law”; c. 1800) refers to a universal 
code of conduct that all rational persons, under plausible specified conditions, should put 
forward for governing the behaviour of all moral agents. In a normative perspective, 
avoiding and preventing harm would be considered the most important element of morality, 
and as such should never be overridden. It is a universal code, and to disrespect it is always 
morally inacceptable (Bernard, 2012). Nevertheless, despite different perspectives on what 
morality refers to, the one feature they have in common is that they refer to guides of 
behaviour which involve avoiding and preventing harm to other persons (e.g. Bernard, 
2012; Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1995). 
 
 
1.2.2.1.  The nature of human morality 
 
The nature of human morality, and in particular the interplay of emotion and reason, 
has long been the concern of moral philosophers (e.g. Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, 
David Hume). In psychology, the studies of morality begun with Piaget (1932) and 
Kohlberg (1969), and their rationalist developmental theories have dominated moral 
psychology until recently. However, during the past decades, a growing number of 
researchers have focused their attention on experimentally investigating the nature of 
human morality. These studies have focused, for example, on the role of basic emotions in 
moral judgement (e.g. Haidt, 2001; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & 
Haidt, 2005), the neural basis of moral judgment (e.g. Greene, 2009; Greene, Sommerville, 
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Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007), or neural basis of moral emotions 
(Green et al., 2010; Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger, et 
al., 2002). This increased attention on the study of morality, and its neural correlates, has 
not only advanced our understanding of the processes involved in moral cognition, but also 
contributed to a paradigm shift in moral psychology whereas human morality is no longer 
conceptualised as a product of pure reason but rather as emerging from the sophisticated 
integration of rational, emotional and motivational mechanisms (Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-
Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005). 
 
1.2.2.2. Moral judgement, moral emotions and moral behaviour 
 
The precise role of emotion in moral judgement per se (i.e. in evaluations, good 
versus bad, of actions or character of a person that are made with respect to a moral code) is 
still under debate (see Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009). But emotions, in particular moral 
emotions, do seem to play a critical part in moral behaviour (i.e. the expression of the 
interpretation of what is acceptable, of the moral code). Moral emotions can be defined as 
those “that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of 
persons other than the judge or agent” (Haidt, 2003, p. 276), in contrast to basic emotions 
that spring from ideas or perceptions endowed with personal relevance. Guilt and 
compassion (also referred to as sympathy or empathic concern) are considered moral 
emotions, guilt being experienced when we recognise ourselves as the cause of another 
person’s misfortune, and compassion when we witness someone being hurt (Moll & de 
Oliveira-Souza, 2007). Guilt is considered to be the quintessential moral emotion 
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(Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000) as it refers to regret over wrong-doing and can motivate 
one to help one’s victim, or otherwise to make up for one’s transgression.  
Moral emotions are thought to provide the motivational force to do good and avoid 
doing wrong, and therefore to play a central role in the guidance of social behaviour in 
everyday life (Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007). Tangney et al. (2007) believe that moral 
emotions function as an emotional ‘moral barometer’, providing immediate and salient 
feedback on our behaviour, by giving immediate punishment of the behaviour. Actual 
behaviour is not be necessary for this barometer to have effect. People can anticipate their 
likely emotional reactions as they consider behavioural alternatives. As a result, moral 
emotions can exert a strong influence on moral choice and behaviour by providing critical 
feedback regarding both anticipated and actual behaviour. Indeed, research suggests that 
guilt is negatively related to hostility and aggression (Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & 
McCloskey, 2010); is positively linked to empathy (Leith & Baumeister, 1998); and that 
guilt-proneness promotes prosocial and is protective against antisocial and risky behaviour, 
be it in adolescents, children or adults (Stuewig et al, 2010; see also Tangney et al, 2007 for 
a review). 
 
1.2.3.  Psychopathy, empathy and morality / Individual differences  
 
Based on what is outlined above, it is possible to draw clear conceptual links between 
affective empathy and moral behaviour. Affective empathy is thought to be preceded by 
emotional contagion and, with further cognitive processing, to give rise to feelings of 
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empathic concern and/or guilt. These moral emotions, in turn, would function as moral 
barometers motivating moral behaviour (or inhibiting immoral acts). 
The relationship between empathy and moral behaviour has also been more formally 
described in terms of a Concern Mechanism (Nichols, 2001) or a Violence Inhibition 
Mechanism (VIM; (Blair, 1995, 2005). These models share a central tenet that, in typically 
developing individuals, observing other people’s distress cues automatically leads to 
emotional processes like empathy and empathic concern. These, in turn, increase the 
likelihood of prosocial behaviour (as specified by the CM model) and decrease the 
likelihood of antisocial behaviour (as specified by the VIM model). Ultimately, the absence 
of a robust empathic response to the distress cues of others would lead to a failure to inhibit 
aggression towards others and impair a normal moral socialization (Blair et al, 2005).  
In fact, previous research has shown that the ability to correctly identify fearful and 
sad facial expressions seems to predict individual differences in prosocial behaviour (Marsh 
& Ambady, 2007; Marsh, Kozak, & Ambady, 2007). Furthermore, both adults with high 
levels of psychopathic traits and children with psychopathic tendencies seem to show a 
selective impairment in the recognition of others’ distress, particularly fear and sadness 
(e.g.Blair, Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 2001; Blair et al., 2004; Blair et al., 2002; 
Fairchild, Van Goozen, Calder, Stollery, & Goodyer, 2009; Marsh et al., 2007; Montagne 
et al., 2005). However, this impairment does not appear as consistent in community 
samples (Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008). Adults with psychopathy and children with 
psychopathic traits also seem to present deficits on their affective response to the distress of 
others. They show reduced autonomic response to stimuli associated with distress in others 
(Blair, 1999), and adults with high traits of primary psychopathy (analogous to affective 
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and interpersonal features) show blunted affective empathic responses to the emotional 
displays of others (Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009).  
In respect to moral processing, previous research has shown that both adults with 
psychopathy and children with psychopathic tendencies show a diminished capacity to 
distinguish between moral and conventional distinctions (Blair, 1995, 1997; Blair et al., 
1995). Although there is no consistent evidence that adults who score highly on measures 
of psychopathy show a different pattern of responses to moral dilemmas when compared to 
controls (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010; Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009; Koenigs, 
Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2011), it has been shown that they do seem to show different 
neural activation when responding to these dilemmas, namely activity in the amygdala 
activity medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and angular gyrus (Glenn, Raine, & 
Schug, 2009). Some researchers (Cima et al., 2010; Hauser, 2006; Huebner et al., 2009), 
believe that these results support the thesis that psychopaths are able to distinguish what is 
right and wrong but do not care. Their moral judgement abilities would be intact but their 
moral emotions are damaged and that reflects in their behaviour. In face of that, it has been 
predicted that the clinical problem observed among psychopaths does not come from 
damage to their moral reasoning abilities, but rather from damage to the emotional systems 
that lead to action. However, this theory is yet to be validated by solid experimental data. 
In sum, while empathy and morality seem to be conceptually linked, and there is 
increasing evidence that they are impaired in psychopathy, we still known little about how 
behavioural and neural substrates of specific dimensions of these constructs are associated 
with variation of psychopathic traits in the general population. Understanding the specific 
deficits on the basis of this disorder is extremely important if we are to understand, prevent 
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it and possibly minimise its consequences. In this respect, it is important not only to 
identify and understand possible deficits that constitute the disorder but also the possible 
biological vulnerabilities that contribute to it. Investigating variability in these correlates 
along the continuum of psychopathic traits in the general population, using methods from 
experimental psychology and neuroimaging, can be valuable for furthering our 
understanding of psychopathy and the underlying processing atypicalities that give rise to 
such traits and behaviour.  
 
1.2.4. Neurobiology of empathy and morality 
 
1.2.4.1. Neurobiology of empathy 
 
As described above, empathy is a complex phenomenon that likely involves both 
cognitive and affective components. Given its complexity, it is necessary not only to 
carefully define the phenomenon in study but also to break down its distinct (but 
interrelated) components if we are to understand it.  
In recent years, the field of social neuroscience has begun to shed light on the neural 
underpinnings of affective empathy, i.e. the ability to share another person’s affective state 
(but with the awareness that the source of our affective state is the other person). These 
studies suggest that observing or imagining another person in a particular emotional state 
automatically activates a representation of that state in the observer (e.g. Decety & Ickes, 
2009; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Singer, 2006; Singer & Leiberg, 2009).  These studies 
though have also suggested that experience of empathy is not necessarily purely automatic 
33 
 
and sensory-driven, but that top-down cognitive processes, such as contextual appraisal, 
can also play a role in the empathic experience (e.g. Decety, 2011; Singer & Lamm, 
2009b). For example, Decety et al. (2011) proposed a neurocognitive model of empathy 
that includes both bottom-up and top-down processing. This model explains the experience 
of empathy through a number of distinct and interacting components: 1) affective arousal or 
sharing, a bottom-up process grounded in perception–action coupling in which the 
amygdala, hypothalamus and orbitofrontal cortex play would play a critical role; 2) 
emotion awareness and understanding which involves the anterior insula cortex (AI), 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and ventromedial PFC (vmPFC); and 3) emotion 
regulation which depends on executive functions instantiated in the intrinsic cortico-cortical 
connections of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), mPFC and dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC). These 
latter networks (mOFC, mPFC and dlPFC) are proposed to operate as top-down mediators, 
regulating emotions and enhancing flexible and appropriate responses. These top-down 
factors can, for example, inhibit or amplify representations that have been activated via 
sensory channels and mechanisms associated with perception-action coupling. Or they can 
generate empathic responses through imagination or anticipation of the other’s state in the 
absence of any bottom-up stimulation. This top-down generation of feelings can be 
particularly important when minimal sensory information about the other is available, 
requiring the use of context, affective memory, and self-to-other projection to infer and 
empathise with the affective condition of the other person (Singer & Lamm, 2009b). 
The majority of social neuroscience studies on empathy so far, has either used the 
observation of pain (e.g.de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2009; Decety & 
Porges, 2011; Singer & Leiberg, 2009) or disgust ((Jabbi, Swart, & Keysers, 2007; Wicker 
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et al., 2003) in other people as paradigms to evoke empathic responses. Recent meta-
analyses (Fan, Duncan, de Greck, & Northoff, 2011; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011) of 
these studies have shown that empathy recruits robust activation in anterior insula (AI), 
extending into the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex / anterior 
medial cingulate cortex (dACC/aMCC).  
Although emotional facial expressions constitute important cues to others’ emotional 
states that can be readily perceived, the neural basis of empathic response to facial 
expressions of basic emotions remains elusive. Emotional expressions are fundamental to 
the empathic experience. Moreover, they are thought to act as reinforcers and have specific 
communicatory functions, conveying specific information to the observer (Blair, 2005) and 
it has even been suggested that emotional empathy should be defined as the translation of 
the communication of the emotional expressions by the observer (Blair & Fowler, 2008). 
Identifying the neural basis of emotional empathy for faces, in particular for fear and 
sadness, might be particularly important for the understanding of psychopathic traits and 
antisocial behaviour. As described before, it has been hypothesised that psychopathy is 
underlied by the absence of a robust empathic response to the distress cues of others. 
Indeed, precursors of psychopathic traits in children (i.e. callous-unemotional traits) 
have been found to be associated with functional deficits consistent with low emotional 
responsiveness to others’ distress and poor ability to learn from reinforcement information. 
Aberrant neural functioning (as compared with typically developing children) has been 
observed for children with high levels of callous-unemotional traits in the amygdala, 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior insula and 
caudate (e.g. Jones et al., 2009; Marsh et al., 2011; Marsh et al., 2008; Sebastian et al., 
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2012; Viding et al., 2012; White et al., 2012); brain areas that are involved in processing 
basic emotional salience, reinforcement learning, and emotion regulation. Children with 
high levels of  psychopathic traits show reduced amygdala response to other’s distress (e.g. 
Jones et al. 2009; Marsh et al. 2008; White et al. 2012) and reduced functional coupling 
between amygdala and OFC when viewing fearful facial expressions (Marsh et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, in a recent study (Lockwood et al., 2013) it was found that, callous traits in 
children with conduct problems were negatively associated with responses to others’ pain 
in AI and ACC during the observation of pictures of others’ in pain (vs. no pain).  
In adults, there is so far less evidence with regard to empathic processing impairments 
at the neural level. Although a recent study has shown a negative association between 
psychopathic traits and amygdala reactivity to fearful faces (Carré et al., 2013), to our 
knowledge, only one other study has addressed empathic processing directly in adults with 
psychopathy. In that study, contrary to findings in children with high levels of callous traits 
(Lockwood et al. 2013; Marsh et al., 2013), Decety et al. (2013) found that, when observing 
body parts in painful situations and when observing facial expressions of pain, the neural 
activity of incarcerated men with high levels of psychopathy (score of >30 on the 
Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003) was significantly higher in a number 
of regions, including bilateral anterior insula, dACC and IFG, from the neural activity of 
incarcerated men with low levels of psychopathy (score >20 on the PCL-R).  The increased 
activity in these regions was associated with both dimensions of psychopathy (affective-
interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial). The source of inconsistency between these studies 
remains to be investigated, but could reflect differences in developmental stage, task 
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variables, as well as differences in samples (no healthy comparison group was included in 
the adult study).  
In sum, despite the role that empathic processing of emotional expressions is thought 
to have in psychopathic traits, to our knowledge, no study so far has investigated how 
atypical empathic response to distinct basic emotional facial expressions is observed at the 
neural level. 
 
1.2.4.2. Neurobiology of morality 
 
During the last decades, neuroscientific research has started to provide important clues 
to the knowledge of fundamental aspects of human morality. Past neuroimaging studies of 
moral cognition have focused mainly on the identification of what parts of the brain are 
recruited during moral judgement, i.e. evaluations (good vs. bad) of the actions or character 
of a person. These studies have employed a number of different paradigms such as: 
evaluation of moral vs. non-moral statements (e.g. ‘We break the law when necessary’ vs. 
‘Stones are made of water’ (Moll, Eslinger, & De Oliveira-Souza, 2001); ‘A admires a car’ 
vs.’ A steals a car ‘ (Heekeren, Wartenburger, Schmidt, Schwintowski, & Villringer, 2003); 
of moral vs. non-moral visual stimuli (e.g. pictures of physical assaults vs. pictures of body 
lesions (Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002); or of ethical moral 
dilemmas (e.g. trolley dilemmas (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene 
et al., 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007)). These studies have consistently identified an extensive 
network of brain regions involved in moral cognition. This functional network includes the 
dorsolateral, ventromedial and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dlPFC, vmPFC and dmPFC), 
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orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior temporal lobes (ATL), insular cortex, amygdala, 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), precuneus, temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) (see Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Young & Dungan, 2012, 
for recent reviews). This extensive network of regions is consistent with the engagement of, 
not only higher-order cognitive abilities including prospective evaluation, cognitive control, 
and strategic decision-making, but also the recruitment of emotional and social processing, 
including detecting emotional saliency, monitoring outcomes related to reward and 
punishment, and Theory of Mind abilities (i.e. reflecting about other people’s beliefs and 
intentions) during moral judgement (Bzdok et al., 2012; Moll & Schulkin, 2009).  
Unfortunately, many of these studies have been limited in their interpretability as they 
have not included unambiguous contrast conditions matched for important design 
parameters such as: participant perspective and consequent experience of agency; clarity 
about the intentionality and causality of the action in evaluation; recruitment of ToM 
representations; emotional arousal; order of presentation of relevant information; 
vocabulary (which can cause expression style and word framing effects); and word number 
count (Christensen & Gomila, 2012). Controlling for these factors is important to allow us 
to more precisely identify brain regions specific to different components involved in moral 
cognition. Furthermore, the majority of these studies has focused mainly on moral 
judgment and moral deliberation, through the manipulation of highly theoretical and 
abstract scenarios which might not translate accurately how one processes everyday first-
person moral transgressions.  
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Figure 1.3. The “Moral Brain” 
 
Notes: a) Cortical regions
 
include anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC), medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex 
(mOFC and lOFC), dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), anterior temporal lobes (aTL) 
and superior temporal sulcus (STS). b) Subcortical structures include amygdala, hypothalamus and septal 
area; c) Brain regions that have not been consistently associated with moral cognition and behaviour 
(including parietal and occipital lobes, large areas of the frontal and temporal lobes, the brain stem and basal 
ganglia). Reproduced from Moll, Zahn, et al. (2005) with permission of the copyright owner. 
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A small number of studies has also focused on the identification of the neural 
subtracts of guilt, the feeling of regret thought to follow a moral transgression, using scripts 
of hypothetical personal transgressions. Guilt responses deriving from personal 
transgressions are thought to depend on the engagement of several cognitive processes, 
including action and conceptual knowledge, emotion and motivation, also requiring 
integration among cortical and limbic circuits (Moll et al., 2007; Moll & Schulkin, 2009). 
Studies focusing on guilt processing have consistently identified a smaller subset of brain 
regions (as compared with neuroimaging studies of moral judgment), including 
subgenual/medial PFC, superior ATL and frontopolar cortex (Moll et al., 2007; Moll & 
Schulkin, 2009; Takahashi et al., 2004; Zahn et al., 2009). Studies of moral guilt, although 
employing more realistic and first-person scenarios, also present some of the design issues 
common in moral judgement studies, the most important being related to intent. In these 
studies, the scripts used to elicit guilt were mainly comprised of unintentional actions (e.g. 
Kédia, Berthoz, Wessa, Hilton, & Martinot, 2008) or actions that lacked context to 
ascertain unambiguous intent (e.g.Green et al., 2010; Moll et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 
2004; Zahn et al., 2009). Intent is a key factor for judging the morality of an action 
(Cushman, 2008) and including scenarios that lack clear intent renders a certain level of 
ambiguity in regards to their moral content and consequently in the emotion that they are 
supposed to elicit. 
The majority studies on human morality thus have been limited in elucidating 
everyday moral processing of personal transgressions in at least three respects. First, they 
have typically employed extreme scenarios and/or a third-person perspective (e.g.Greene et 
al., 2004; Heekeren et al., 2003; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, et 
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al., 2002), making it difficult to generalise findings to one’s own moral transgressions in 
everyday life. In everyday life, we are seldom faced with the dilemma of sacrificing one 
person’s life to save many. But we might be tempted to behave immorally when facing 
situations where doing what is morally correct comes at a cost to the self, as in when 
inflicting harm to another person is necessary to achieve our desired goal. Second, even 
when more realistic first-person scenarios have been employed (to identify the neural 
correlates of personal transgressions and of moral guilt) these studies have been 
problematic to interpret either because the emotional content of experimental and control 
scenarios has not been equated (e.g.Sommer et al., 2010), or because the intention to 
transgress has not been clear – yet, intention is a key factor when judging the morality of an 
action (Cushman, 2008). Specifically, previous studies have utilised scripts comprising 
actions that are either unintentional (e.g. Kédia et al., 2008), or where the intent is difficult 
to ascertain unambiguously (e.g. Green et al., 2010; Moll et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 
2004; Zahn et al., 2009). It is important to control for factors such as emotional content and 
intentionality if we are to disentangle neural substrates that are specific to moral cognition 
(Christensen and Gomila, 2012). Third, the structure of the tasks employed in these studies 
precludes the separation of different processes that are likely involved when we process the 
morality of our actions. These likely include an initial appraisal phase during which we 
make meaning out of  and understand the morality (or otherwise) of a particular course of 
action; as well as processes involved in reflecting on feelings of moral guilt  triggered  by 
the realisation that we have intentionally caused harm to another person (e.g. Eisenberg, 
2000). Addressing each of these limitations is essential if we are to characterise how our 
brains process personal moral transgressions in everyday life. 
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Previous studies, from both clinical and community samples, have shown that 
individual differences in psychopathic personality traits are associated with atypical neural 
activity during moral judgement and moral decision making, especially in vmPFC and 
amygdala (Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009; Harenski, Harenski, Shane, & Kiehl, 2010; Marsh 
& Cardinale, 2012; Marsh et al., 2011; Pujol et al., 2012). This atypical activity has been 
hypothesised to be a reflection of the emotional and interpersonal impairments of the 
psychopathic personality (Glenn, et al., 2009; Harenski, et al., 2010; Marsh & Cardinale, 
2012; Marsh et al, 2011). However, these studies have either used visual stimuli comprising 
third person or abstract actions (Haresnki et al., 2010; Marsh et al., 2012) or have been 
confounded by emotionality, with the scenario implicated in the moral transgression 
typically being characterised by higher levels of emotional content (Glenn, Raine & Schug, 
2009; Marsh & Cardinale, 2012). The fact that the contrasted scenarios were not equated 
for emotional saliency makes it unclear to discern whether psychopathic traits are 
associated with atypical moral specifically or with emotional processing in general. 
Furthermore previous studies have not investigated how individual differences in 
psychopathic traits can account for variation in neural processing of everyday personal 
moral transgressions.  
    
1.3. Summary and current thesis  
 
In summary, although psychopathy is considered to be a disorder of affect, empathy 
and morality, some questions remain unanswered. Empathy and morality are complex and 
multidimensional constructs, and although lack of empathy and immoral behaviour are 
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considered core features of the psychopathic personality (Blair, et al., 2005), little is known 
about how specific dimensions of these constructs are associated with variation of 
psychopathic traits in the general population. As argued by Carré et al. (2013), if 
psychopathy is a dimensional construct, than we may expect that subclinical levels of 
variability in psychopathic traits map onto behavioural and neural processes found to be 
dysfunctional in criminal psychopaths. 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, a comprehensive study is described where we employed 
several paradigms concurrently to investigate how different features of the psychopathic 
personality are associated with distinct components empathy and morality described above. 
We put together an extensive battery of questionnaires and experimental tasks probing 
emotional recognition ability, affective empathic response to different types of emotional 
facial expressions and emotional-eliciting stories, empathic concern and other moral 
emotions such as guilt and anger, and moral decision-making. We collected data from a 
sample of healthy males from the general population and conducted correlational analyses, 
correcting for multiple comparisons, to investigate which of these specific constructs were 
associated with psychopathic traits; and further tested whether the associations found were 
unique to any of the psychopathy facets.  
In Chapter 3, we extend the findings of Chapter 2 to a female sample to probe the 
consistency of atypical functioning found in Chapter 2. In women, experimentally tested 
empathic and moral processing correlates have seldom been studied in relation to 
psychopathic traits. We collected data from a sample of females from the general 
population, and employed the same battery of paradigms and statistical tests used in 
Chapter 2, to investigate how different dimensions of psychopathic personality traits in 
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women relate to empathic and moral processing. Additionally, statistical tests were 
performed to verify whether these associations were similar across sexes using male data 
from the previous study. 
In chapter 4, we describe a study conducted to identify the neural structures involved 
in empathic responses to different types of emotional facial expressions. Diminished 
empathic response to emotional faces was identified to be associated with high levels of 
affective and interpersonal traits of psychopathy both in males and females. Our goal was 
to verify whether this weakened response to other people’s emotional facial expressions 
would also be apparent at the neural level and help elucidate the nature of the behavioural 
association. We adapted the affective empathy for emotional faces task used in the 
behavioural studies described in Chapter 1 and 2 to an event-related functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) design. We predicted that psychopathic traits would be 
associated with diminished neural activity in regions previously identified to subserve 
empathic processing, in particular those that are associated with affective arousal or sharing 
(e.g. amygdala) and emotion awareness and understanding (e.g. anterior insula cortex). 
In chapter 5, we describe a study conducted to identify the neural structures and 
circuits involved in processing everyday personal moral transgressions and how activity in 
these structures and circuits are associated with individual differences in psychopathic 
traits. Our aims were two-fold. First, we wanted to identify the neural structures that 
subserve moral cognition in everyday personal moral transgressions. We developed a 
novel, more realistic and rigorously controlled task that comprised scripts of everyday 
moral scenarios, written in the second person. To control for other cognitive processes that 
might be necessary for moral cognition but are not specific to it, we included control scripts 
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matched for intentionality, causality, emotional valence and arousal, and mentalising 
requirements. We predicted that by equating these confounding factors in our task design, 
we would observe a more circumscribed set of brain areas than those identified in previous 
studies. We also predicted that we would observe partially separable and overlapping 
neural circuits recruited during the initial appraisal of the moral transgressions and during 
the later effortful reflection on feelings of guilt resulting from the transgression. By 
equating emotional saliency and mentalising requirements, our second aim was to test 
whether individual differences in neural responses specific to everyday moral (rather than 
emotional or mentalising) processing were associated with inter-individual variability in 
psychopathic traits in the general population. We further explored the associations found 
between the magnitude of neural response during everyday moral processing and individual 
differences in psychopathic traits, by conducting exploratory psychophysiological 
interaction (PPI) analyses. These analyses allowed us to elucidate whether individual 
differences in psychopathic traits modulate the functional integration that occurs between 
brain regions (Friston et al., 1997) during processing of everyday moral transgressions. 
In short, this thesis set out to investigate how individual differences in psychopathic 
traits in the general population are associated with variability in distinct components of 
empathy and morality. On a first stage, we set out to identify these associations at a 
behavioural level (Chapters 2 and 3); and on a second stage, investigated how these 
associations are reflected at the neural level, in order to shed more light to how these 
processes might be atypical for people with high levels of psychopathic traits (Chapters 4 
and 5). In chapter 6, we summarise the findings from these empirical studies and discuss 
possible implications.  
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CHAPTER 2: Behavioural correlates of empathy and morality 
in a sample of males from the general population 
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2.1. Chapter Introduction 
 
As set out in the introduction of this thesis, lack of empathy and immoral behaviour 
are considered core features of the psychopathic personality (Blair et al., 2005). However, 
little is known about how specific dimensions of empathy and morality are associated with 
psychopathic traits in the general population. In the current chapter we describe a study 
where several paradigms were employed concurrently to investigate these associations.   
 
2.1.1. Dimensions of psychopathic personality 
 
As described earlier, the syndrome of psychopathy can be diagnosed in forensic 
settings when an individual scores high on two dimensions of the Psychopathy Checklist – 
Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003). One, traditionally referred to as Factor 1, is characterized by 
affective and interpersonal facets such as reduced guilt, empathy and attachment to 
significant others, along with deceptive, manipulative interactions. The other, Factor 2, 
relates to facets involving impulsivity, poor behavioural control and antisocial behaviour 
(Hare, 2003; Hare & Neumann, 2008). The presence of dysfunctional affective-
interpersonal features is considered to be the core characteristic of psychopathy, 
distinguishing individuals who are psychopathic from those who are antisocial but not 
psychopathic (Blair, et al., 2005). Evidence from forensic and community samples also 
suggest that the two dimensions of psychopathy present distinct associations with various 
criterion measures of personality, emotionality and behaviour, particularly when their 
shared variance is controlled (Hicks & Patrick, 2006; Patrick et al., 2007; Uzieblo et al., 
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2010). For example, the affective-interpersonal dimension presents negative associations 
with emotional correlates such as fearfulness, distress and emotional reactivity, whlist the 
lifestyle-antisocial dimension presents positive associations with these correlates (e.g. 
Hicks & Patrick, 2006; Uzieblo, Verschuere, van den Bussche, & Crombez, 2010). The two 
dimensions appear to present distinct contributions to psychopathy, and so it is important to 
inspect the contribution of each dimension to relevant correlates in order to provide a more 
comprehensive map of the psychopathy construct.  
 
2.1.2. Emotional empathy, morality and psychopathy 
 
Although there isn’t complete agreement regarding the precise definition of empathy 
and its constitutive components (Batson, 2009) empathy is normally understood as an 
affective state caused by sharing the emotions of another person (Eisenberg, 2000; 
Hoffman, 2000; Singer, 2006). Emotional empathy, or simply empathy, can be defined by 
the subject’s emotional state resulting from the observation or imagination of another 
person’s state; the subject’s emotional state is isomorphic but the subject is aware that it is 
vicariously elicited by the emotional state of the other person (Singer, 2006).  
Empathy and morality have long been conceptually linked (Eisenberg, 2000; 
Hoffman, 2000), and empathy is thought to play a crucial role in moral behaviour. 
However, empathy is not considered to be pro-social per se. Only with further cognitive 
processing, empathic response may develop into empathic concern, guilt or a combination 
of the two. These prototypical moral emotions are thought to provide the motivational force 
to ‘do good’ and avoid ‘doing bad’ (Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007), and function as an 
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emotional moral barometer, providing immediate and salient feedback on behaviour 
(Tangney et al., 2007). Actual behaviour is not necessary for this barometer to function, as 
people can anticipate their likely emotional reactions when considering behavioural 
alternatives. Emotional empathy can thus be regarded as a necessary step in a chain that 
begins with affect recognition and emotional contagion, and is followed by understanding 
another person’s feelings; this understanding provides the basis for experiencing moral 
emotions, such as concern and guilt that in turn motivate moral behaviour.  
Past research has found that adults and children with high levels of psychopathic traits 
have a selective impairment in the recognition of others’ distress, particularly fear and 
sadness (e.g. Blair et al., 2001; Blair et al., 2004; Blair et al., 2002; Montagne et al., 2005). 
However, this impairment does not appear as consistent in community samples (Del Gaizo 
& Falkenbach, 2008). Adults and children with psychopathic traits have also shown 
reduced autonomic response to stimuli associated with distress in others (Blair, 1999; Blair, 
et al., 1997) and, in a community sample, adults with high traits of  dysfunctional affective-
interpersonal features have shown blunted affective empathic responses to the emotional 
displays of others (Ali, et al., 2009).  
There is no consistent evidence that adults who score highly on measures of 
psychopathy show a different pattern of responses to moral dilemmas when compared to 
controls (Cima et al., 2010; Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009; Glenn, Raine, Schug, Young, & 
Hauser, 2009; Koenigs et al., 2011). However, they do show reduced amygdala activity 
when responding to the same moral dilemmas, and those with particularly high scores of 
callousness show further reduced activity in several regions considered to be part of the 
moral circuitry (Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009). Some researchers have argued these 
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individuals are able to distinguish between right and wrong but do not care (e.g. Cima, et 
al., 2010) as their moral knowledge appears to be intact but their moral emotions appear 
deficient failing to motivate moral behaviour. 
 
2.1.3. The current study 
 
In the current study we employed several paradigms concurrently to investigate how 
different features of the psychopathic personality are associated with distinct components 
of affect, empathy and morality described above. Based on previous research, we predicted 
that affective-interpersonal features would be associated with lower scores on various 
measures of affect, empathy and morality.  
 
2.2. Material and Methods 
 
2.2.1. Participants 
 
One-hundred-twenty-four adult males from western English speaking countries with 
ages between 18 and 48 (M= 26.23; SD= 7.07), and estimated IQ between 79 and 137 (M= 
115.81; SD= 13.14), were recruited from the University College London Psychology 
Subject Pool and through online advertisement. Participants provided written informed 
consent and were compensated with £10 for their time. 
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2.2.2. Procedure 
 
All tasks and questionnaires, apart from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999), were presented on a computer using Psytools 
software (Delosis Limited). All tasks were presented randomly across participants and were 
followed by the questionnaires.  
 
2.2.3. Materials 
 
2.2.3.1. Assessment of General ability 
The WASI (Wechsler, 1999) Full-Scale IQ Two-Subtest (FSIQ-2) was used to produce 
an estimate of general cognitive ability. 
 
2.2.3.2. Assessment of psychopathic traits 
 
Psychopathic traits were assessed with the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Short Form 
(SRP-SF; Paulhus, Neumann & Hare, in press), a 29-item scale designed to measure 
psychopathic attributes in non-institutionalised samples. The SRP-SF assesses psychopathic 
traits, organised in four facets – interpersonal, affective, lifestyle and antisocial — 
consistent with recent research on the PCL-R. However, like the PCL-R, the four facets can 
be modelled in terms of the traditional two-factor dimensions. The SRP has been shown to 
have good construct validity and is strongly correlated with the PCL-R (e..g. Lilienfeld & 
Fowler, 2006; Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, in press), 
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To verify the scale integrity of the SRP in our sample, scale reliability analyses were 
conducted. Mean inter-item correlations for the SRP Interpersonal (0.23), Affective (0.24), 
Lifestyle (0.28), and Antisocial (0.21) scales suggested item homogeneity indicating that 
they were unidimensional indicators of their respective factors. Alpha for the total SRP 
scale was good (0.85), and similarly for the items used to form composite scores of the 
traditional Factor 1 (0.79) and F2 (0.73) dimensions. The Factor 1 and Factor 2 composites 
were significantly correlated (r = 0.62, p < 0.001). To verify the adequacy of the two-factor 
model of the SRP-SF, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted using Mplus, 
Version 6.1 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2010). Using the Interpersonal and Affective scale 
scores as indicators of Factor 1, and Lifestyle, Antisocial scales as Factor 2 indicators, the 
2-factor solution of the SRP showed good model fit (Model fit: X
2
(1) = 2.82, p > 0.05, CFI 
= 0.987, SRMR = 0.021). 
 
Figure 2.1. CFA model of the 2-factor solution in our sample 
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2.2.3.3. Measures of Affect, Empathy and Morality 
 
Emotion Multimorph Task 
 
The Emotion Multimorph task, previously used by Blair et al. (2004) and Rogers et al. 
(2006), is a measure of sensitivity to recognise emotional facial expressions. The stimuli 
used in this task are taken from the empirically validated pictures of facial affect series 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Three identities were prepared for four basic emotions (sadness, 
fear, anger and happiness) by gradually morphing a neutral affect expression into the 
prototypical emotional expression in 20 stages of 2 seconds each. Before the beginning of 
the task, participants read instructions on a computer screen. They were instructed that they 
would be presented with facial expressions; the expressions would start out looking neutral, 
but would slowly change in steps to reveal one of four emotions: sadness, fear, anger or 
happiness; below the each facial expression four buttons would be presented, labelled with 
one of each emotion. Participants were asked to watch each expression and to press the 
corresponding button as soon as they thought they knew what it was without merely 
guessing. Participants were also informed that the face would continue to change even after 
they had made their response, and that they could alter their response at any time during the 
presentation. Participants were presented with the 12 test stimuli in random order (three 
identities per emotion). Presentation order of stimuli was randomized across participants. 
Mean expression recognition stage scores were computed following the procedure 
used in Blair et al. (2004). Stage scores were scored according to the number of stages that 
were required before successful expression recognition took place For example, successful 
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recognition for the prototypical expression would score 1 point; successful recognition on 
the penultimate stage would score 2 points; successful recognition 2 stages before the last 
would score 3 points and so on. A failure to recognize the expression at all scored 0 points. 
A mean expression recognition score for each of the three emotions was obtained by 
collapsing the score for the three trials of each emotion. The last response given was 
considered to be the target response, regardless of the validity of earlier answers. 
 
Figure 2.2. Examples of different stages of a morph trial 
 
Notes: Trial starts with a neutral affect expression into a prototypical emotional expression of fear. 
 
 
Empathy for emotional facial expressions task (SAM-Faces) 
 
Based on Ali et al. (2009), this task estimates participants’ emotional response to 
emotional faces using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) methodology. The SAM has 
strong psychometric properties and is widely used to measure affective response (Bradley 
& Lang, 1994). In the present task, participants were asked to rate their affective state when 
watching images depicting a person showing a sad, fearful, angry, happy or neutral 
expression. The valence scale ranges from a low-spirited manikin to a widely smiling one, 
going through a middle neutral stance; low ratings on the manikin mean negatively 
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valenced affective responses and high ratings mean positively valenced affective responses. 
This task includes realistic and naturalistic stimuli, and is thought to tap into the emotional 
empathy construct as it not only estimates participants’ vicarious response to emotional 
stimuli, but also comprises elements of self-awareness (participants have to evaluate their 
emotional response) and self/other distinction (participants are asked how the stimulus 
makes them feel).  
 
Figure 2.3. Examples of three different trials of the SAM-Faces task 
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To create the image set for this task, 30 pictures for each emotion were selected from 
gettyimages_database, istockphoto and other public sources. Each picture consisted of one 
person, whose face was the focal point of the image. Eight postgraduates rated each picture 
according to what emotion was displayed, its valence and arousal. From the initial set, 8 
images were selected for each emotion (4 female and 4 male). Criteria for selection were 
complete inter-rater agreement over emotion portrayed, and consistency of valence and 
arousal ratings. 
The selected images were randomised for each participant and displayed individually 
on a computer screen. Participants were instructed to look at each image and rate their 
affect on the Self-Assessment Manikin’s valence scale. Once they completed the rating the 
next image was displayed. In the current study, Cronbach’s α for the valence scales were 
.82 for fearful faces, .88 for happy faces, .89 for sad faces, and.72 for angry faces. 
Examples of the stimuli used can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
Empathy-Eliciting Short Stories task (SAM-Stories) 
 
The SAM-Stories was designed to assess participants’ emotional response to 
emotional short stories also using the SAM methodology. Participants were presented with 
12 short stories portraying one of three target emotions: sadness, anger and happiness. The 
stories were randomised across participants and shown one-by-one on the computer screen. 
Participants were instructed to read each story and to rate how reading the story made them 
feel on the Self-Assessment Manikin’s valence scale. Once they completed the rating the 
next story was displayed. As in the previous one, this task is thought to tap into the 
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emotional empathy construct as it not only estimates the participant’s vicariously response 
to an emotional stimuli, but also comprises the elements of self-awareness and self/other 
distinction. 
An example of a sadness-eliciting story would be: “It was a harsh winter evening and 
Michael was driving home after picking up his youngest son, Tom, from school. It was 
raining heavily and the visibility was rather poor. Tom was in the back seat happily talking 
about his day at school: about what he had learnt in his History lesson and about a joke 
that he told on the playground that made everyone laugh. Suddenly, a huge truck came 
from nowhere and everything turned black. When Michael woke up he was in the hospital, 
his wife by his side crying. Help had arrived too late and Tom had died from his injuries.” 
Other examples of the stories can be found in Appendix 3. 
For the present task, 24 original short stories were created: 8 portraying sadness, 8 
portraying anger and 8 portraying happiness. Eight postgraduates were asked to rate each 
story according to what emotion was portrayed and its intensity. From the initial set of 
stories, 12 were selected, 3 portraying each target emotion. The criteria for selection were 
the inter-rater agreement over the emotion portrayed, and the consistency and coherence on 
intensity ratings. The stories were randomised across each participant, with no more than 
two stories portraying the same emotion in a row. In the current study, Cronbach’s α for the 
valence scales were .79 for anger eliciting stories, .83 for happy stories, and .78 for sad 
stories. 
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Empathic Concern Scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) 
 
The IRI is a 28-item self-report scale designed to measure both cognitive and 
emotional components of empathy, and consists of 4 subscales. The perspective taking (PT) 
scale measures the tendency to spontaneously adopt the point of view of others in everyday 
life, akin to the “Theory of Mind” construct ("I sometimes try to understand my friends 
better by imagining how things look from their perspective"). The empathic concern (EC) 
scale assesses the tendency to experience feelings of sympathy and compassion for others 
("I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me"). The personal 
distress (PD) scale relates to the tendency to experience distress and discomfort in response 
to extreme distress in others or in stressful situations ("Being in a tense emotional situation 
scares me"). The fantasy (FS) scale measures the tendency to imaginatively transpose 
oneself into fictional situations ("When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine 
how I would feel if the events in the story were happening to me"). As the main focus of 
the present study was investigating the relationship between affect, emotional empathy, 
other-oriented moral emotions and morality, only the Empathic Concern scale was used in 
the analyses. 
 
Moral emotions task 
 
Adapted from Kédia et al. (2008), this task comprised the presentation of brief stories 
depicting prototypical moral situations, i.e. “an agent harms a victim”. Depending on 
whether the agent and the victim are the self or other, these stories would elicit four kinds 
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of moral emotions: Guilt, Compassion, Self-Anger and Other-Anger. The harmful action is 
performed unintentionally in all stories to prevent possible interferences from other 
cognitive processes likely involved in moral judgement. In the original task 20 different 
scenarios were used, with 6 possible endings each. In order to make the task less extensive, 
18 scenarios were chosen, with 3 possible endings each: two portraying a harmful action 
and one neutral. Participants were asked to read each story and rate to what extent they 
would experience each emotion on a 7-point scale (1=not at all; 4=fairly; 7=extremely). 
Mean ratings of each moral emotion were created after subtracting neutral ratings from 
target ratings within each scenario. 
 
Figure 2.4. Example of one scenario of the Moral Emotions task with its 6 possible endings 
 
 
Moral dilemmas task 
 
Based on previous published work (e.g. Greene et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001; 
Koenigs et al., 2007), this task is a scenario-based measure of moral decision comprising 
moral dilemmas. These moral dilemmas are modified versions of classical moral dilemmas 
developed by philosophers to explore our intuitions about the permissibility of harming and 
Scenario:
Self Other Neutral
Self-Anger Guilt Neutral-Self
You misjudge your steering and ram the 
front of your new car against a pole
You misjudge your steering and ram the 
front of your boss's new car
You get out of the car and, after greeting 
him, start discussing the day's workload
Other-Anger Compassion Neutral-Other
Your boss misjudges his steering and rams 
the front of your new car
Your boss misjudges his steering and rams 
the front of his new car against a pole
He gets out of the car and, after greeting 
you, starts discussing the day's workload
You park at the same time as your boss outside your office
Possible 
endings:
Victim
Se
lf
O
th
er
A
ge
n
t
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duty to help others. Participants were asked to make decisions on a series of 8 moral 
dilemmas, selected and adapted from Greene et al. (2004; 2001), and previously used in 
Cima, et al. (2009). All dilemmas selected portrayed a choice of whether or not to sacrifice 
one person’s life in order to save the lives of a group of others and differ on whether there 
is direct physical contact with the victim (Personal dilemmas) or not (Impersonal 
dilemmas).  
An example of a Personal dilemma would be: “A runaway trolley is heading down the 
tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. 
You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five 
workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be very large. The 
only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and 
onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you 
do this, but the five workmen will be saved. Would you push the stranger on to the tracks in 
order to save the five workmen?”; whilst an example of an Impersonal dilemma would be: 
“You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the 
tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On the tracks extending to 
the right is a single railway workman. If you do nothing, the trolley will proceed to the left 
causing the deaths of the five workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen 
is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, 
causing the death of the single workman. Would you hit the switch in order to avoid the 
deaths of the five workmen?”. 
Participants were asked to answer if they ‘Would do… in order to…?’ and to rate the 
difficulty of the decision on a 10-point scale. 
60 
 
2.3. Data analyses 
 
Pearson and Spearman correlational analyses were conducted using SPSS, version 
13.0 for Windows. Preliminary analyses showed that estimated IQ was significantly 
correlated with some of the measures. Therefore, two sets of analyses were conducted. 
First, estimated IQ was entered as a control variable in order to adjust for the influence of 
cognitive ability on the relationships. Second, to examine the unique variance of each 
dimension in relation to criterion variables, each dimension of SRP was also partialled out 
from one another. 
Benjamini and Hochberg False Discovery Rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) was 
used to control for the probability of making a Type I error on multiple comparisons. 
Corrected p-values are presented. 
Where distinct associations between the two SRP dimensions and a given criterion 
variable were identified, Steiger’s Z-tests (two-tailed) were conducted to test if the 
difference between the correlations was significantly different. 
 
2.4. Results  
 
Descriptive statistics are presented on Table 2.1. A complete correlational table for all 
experimental paradigms is also presented in Table 2.2 for illustrative purposes, and will 
only be briefly discussed in this section. 
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Table 2.1. Participants’ and criterion variables descriptive statistics 
Outcome variables Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Age 26.23 7.07 18 48 
IQ 115.81 13.14 79 137 
     
SRP-4-SF 
    Total 61.84 13.28 33 102 
Emotional dimension 32.15 7.98 14 56 
Behaviour dimension 28.56 6.57 16 45 
     
Multimorph: Recognition stage score 
    Sad faces 9.38 0.32 0 17.33 
Fearful faces 10.90 0.26 3.67 17.67 
Angry faces 11.10 0.34 1 19 
Happy faces 14.65 0.27 2 19.33 
     
SAM-Faces: Valence ratings 
    Valence sad faces 2.88 0.92 1 5.13 
Valence fearful faces 3.63 1.07 1 6 
Valence angry faces 4.01 1.20 1 6.63 
Valence neutral faces 5.16 0.65 2 6.63 
Valence happy faces 6.53 1.12 2.13 9 
     
SAM-Stories: Valence ratings 
    Sad stories 2.31 1.13 1 8.5 
Anger stories 3.62 1.16 1 6.5 
Happy stories 7.12 1.21 2.25 9 
     
IRI: Empathic concern 18.40 4.87 5 28 
     
Moral Emotions task: Ratings 
    Compassion 2.55 1.61 -2.25 5.25 
Guilt 4.14 1.23 0.44 6 
Other-Anger 3.54 1.24 -0.3 6 
Self-Anger 3.90 1.24 0 6 
     
Moral dilemmas: Action endorsement 
    Impersonal dilemmas 3.38 1.04 0 4 
Personal dilemmas 1.27 0.99 0 4 
     
Moral Dilemmas: Difficulty ratings 
    Impersonal dilemmas 5.67 2.33 1 10 
Personal dilemmas 4.97 2.24 1 10 
          
 
62 
 
Table 2.2. . Correlations between all criterion variables 
 
Notes: 
1
Pearson correlation coefficients are reported; 
2
 Spearman correlation coefficients are reported; ***p< 0.001, **0.001<p<0.01, *0.01<p<0.05 (2-tailed). 
Values in bold indicate significant associations across measures.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Estimated IQ
Multimorph: Recognition stage score1
2. Sad faces .26**
3. Fearful faces .40*** .41***
4. Angry faces .23** .50*** .53***
5. Happy faces .35*** .49*** .51*** .59***
SAM-Faces: Valence ratings1
6. Sad faces .06 -.02 .00 -.02 .01
7. Fearful faces .12 .12 .06 .06 .09 .64***
8. Angry faces .05 .11 .01 .09 -.01 .52*** .75***
9. Neutral faces -.05 -.02 -.16 -.12 -.09 .14 .31*** .30***
10. Happy faces -.17* -.03 -.12 -.15 -.02 -.34*** -.16 -.12 .50***
SAM-Stories: Valence ratings1
11. Sad stories .11 .04 .07 .08 .10 .55*** .28** .15 -.30** -.40***
12. Anger stories .07 .08 .06 .09 .04 .48*** .39*** .31*** -.14 -.34*** .65***
13. Happy stories -.26** -.08 -.15 -.09 -.13 -.40*** -.32*** -.20* .14 .48*** -.48*** -.47***
14. IRI: Empathic concern1 -.04 -.01 -.10 -.06 -.09 -.18* -.13 -.07 .08 .18* -.24** -.11 .29***
Moral Emotions task: Ratings1
15. Compassion .29** .08 .12 .11 .04 -.08 .04 .02 .00 -.01 -.01 .01 .16 .24**
16. Guilt .00 .05 .17 .16 -.03 -.33*** -.17 -.05 .08 .26** -.35*** -.32*** .45*** .25** .41***
17. Other-Anger -.09 .02 .06 -.05 -.05 -.20* -.12 -.02 .03 .07 -.23** -.28*** .26** .02 .16 .38***
18. Self-Anger -.18* .03 .07 .03 -.11 -.29*** -.13 -.01 -.03 .07 -.26** -.27** .33*** .02 .23** .62*** .59***
Moral dilemmas: Action endorsement2
19. Impersonal dilemmas .27** .02 .14 .05 .08 .12 .07 .06 .07 .03 .05 .00 -.06 .02 .09 -.11 -.07 -.16
20. Personal dilemmas -.17 .12 -.06 .02 -.04 .04 .02 -.03 .06 -.02 -.04 -.02 -.05 -.01 -.18* -.17 .05 -.05 .25**
Moral Dilemmas: Difficulty ratings1
21. Impersonal dilemmas -.03 .02 -.04 -.06 -.02 -.24** -.26** -.16 -.15 .05 -.15 -.13 .18* .19* -.07 .21* .06 .12 -.29** -.21*
22. Personal dilemmas -.02 .14 .08 -.03 -.05 -.01 -.14 -.10 -.03 -.03 -.10 -.18* .12 .10 -.10 -.02 -.03 -.04 .05 .29** .46***
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As can be observed on the Table 2.2, all affect recognition stage score variables from 
the Emotion multimorph task presented significant positive correlations between 
themselves, but none with other criterion variables. These results might indicate that 
emotional recognition is a distinct process from affective empathy and that caution should 
be used when using affect recognition as a proxy of affective empathy. All valence ratings 
variables from the SAM-Faces and SAM-stories tasks showed significant correlations 
between themselves; and all, except the valence ratings of angry and happy faces, showed 
significant correlations with guilt ratings from the moral emotions task (correlations with 
guilt ratings were positive for positively valenced stimuli and negative for negatively 
valenced stimuli, i.e. more positive emotional responses to positive stimuli and more 
negative responses to negative stimuli correspond to higher ratings of feelings of guilt). 
Valence ratings for sad and happy faces were also correlated with ratings on the empathic 
concern scale (correlations were positive for positively valenced stimuli and negative for 
negatively valenced stimuli); and valence ratings of fearful and sad faces showed an 
additional significant negative correlation with difficulty in making decisions in impersonal 
dilemmas. The empathic concern scale, from the IRI, showed additional significant positive 
correlations with the moral emotions’ ratings of compassion and guilt, with difficulty 
ratings in making decisions in impersonal moral dilemmas, and with valence ratings of 
happy stories. Compassion and guilt ratings, from the moral emotions task, had an 
additional significant positive correlation with difficulty ratings on on impersonal moral 
dilemmas. These findings seem to confirm a link between empathic responding and the 
propensity to feel moral emotions, in particular guilt, and are in line with theories that 
postulate that guilt is directly linked to empathic abilities (e.g. Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 
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2000). The results also suggest a link between affective empathy and guilt proneness and 
difficulty in making decisions regarding hypothetical moral behaviour, but not with the 
type of decisions (i.e. endorsement of utilitarian actions). In sum, these results seem to 
confirm the conceptual links between affective empathy and propensity to feel moral 
emotions, and between affective empathy, moral emotions and moral processing (though 
not with moral decisions per se). 
 
Associations between psychopathic traits and measures of affect, empathy and morality 
 
Pearson and Spearman’s correlation coefficients and False Discovery Rate adjusted 
p-values between SRP dimensions and all measures used are reported in Table 2.3. Z and p-
values of difference between regression coefficients are also presented. After correcting p-
values for multiple comparisons, no significant associations between the dimensions of 
SRP and variables of Multimorph and Moral emotions tasks were found. Both SRP 
dimensions showed significant associations with less negative empathic responses to 
fearful faces and the affective-interpersonal dimension showed an additional significant 
association with less positive emotional responses to happy stories. Significantly different 
and opposite associations between the SRP dimensions and propensity to feel empathic 
concern were found. The affective-interpersonal dimension was negatively associated with 
the propensity to feel empathic concern, whilst lifestyle-antisocial dimension showed the 
opposite direction when the overlap between the two dimensions was accounted for. There 
were no significant associations between SRP dimensions and endorsement of actions on 
the moral dilemmas task, but both dimensions showed negative associations with perceived 
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difficulty in making those decisions. However, the associations with lifestyle-antisocial 
dimension ceased to be significant when affective-interpersonal was kept constant. 
 
Table 2.3. Correlations between SRP scores and criterion variables 
SRP scale Total    
Affective-
Interpersonal (AI) 
  
Lifestyle-Antisocial 
(LA) 
Control variables IQ 
 
IQ IQ & LA 
 
IQ IQ & AI 
  r   r r   r r 
Multimorph: Stage Scores
a               
Sad Faces -.02 
 
.00 .03 
 
-.04 -.05 
Fearful Faces .09 
 
-.16 -.18 
 
-.03 .09 
Angry Faces .10 
 
.00 .10 
 
-.12 -.16 
Happy Faces .01 
 
.01 .01 
 
-.01 -.01 
        SAM-Faces: Valence Ratingsa        
Sad Faces .18 
 
.18 .13 
 
.13 .02 
Fearful Faces .31* 
 
.25* .07 
 
.32* .22 
Angry Faces .20 
 
.15 .02 
 
.22 .16 
Happy Faces .03 
 
.01 -.01 
 
.04 .04 
        SAM-Stories: Valence Ratingsa 
       
Sad Stories .09 
 
.12 .13 
 
.02 -.06 
Anger Stories .10 
 
.11 .08 
 
.07 .00 
Happy Stories -.20 
 
-.26* -.26*† 
 
-.09 .09† 
        IRI: Empathic Concern Scalea -.27* 
 
-.40** -.46**† 
 
-.06 .26*† 
        Moral Emotions Task: Ratings 
       
Compassion
a .09 
 
.04 -.05 
 
.13 .13 
Guilt
b -.15 
 
-.17 -.15 
 
-.08 .03 
Self-Anger
a .19 
 
.22 .19 
 
.12 -.02 
Other-Anger
a .09 
 
.13 .14 
 
.04 -.06 
        Moral Dilemmas: Endorsementb        
Impersonal Dilemmas -.04 
 
-.06 -.07 
 
-.01 .03 
Personal Dilemmas .09 
 
.06 -.01 
 
.11 .08 
        Moral Dilemmas: Difficulty Ratingsa        
Impersonal Dilemmas -.38** 
 
-.39** -.30* 
 
-.28* -.05 
Personal Dilemmas -.27* 
 
-.28* -.20 
 
-.20 -.04 
  
              
Notes:. 
1
 Pearson and 
2 
Spearman partial correlation coefficients are reported. (2-tailed); * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01 (2-tailed; FDR corrected); † Significantly different correlations with criterion variables between SRP 
dimensions (Z > 1.96; p < .05; 2-tailed). 
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2.5. Discussion 
 
This study examined the associations between multiple measures of affect, empathy 
and morality with different features of the psychopathic personality, in a community 
sample of males. Overall, our findings indicate that in the general population, both 
dimensions of psychopathy are associated with weaker empathic responses to fearful faces; 
but that there also appears to be some specificity between the two dimensions of 
psychopathy and domains of empathic and moral processing: the unique variance of the 
SRP affective-interpersonal dimension was associated with weaker empathic response to 
happy stories, lower propensity to feel empathic concern and less difficulty to make 
decisions in moral dilemmas; in contrast, the unique variance of the SRP lifestyle-antisocial 
dimension was associated with greater propensity to feel empathic concern. 
Although difficulties in recognising sad and fearful facial affect have been reported in 
previous studies (e.g. Blair, et al., 2004; Montagne, et al., 2005), no significant correlations 
between the dimensions of the SRP and sensitivity to recognise facial affect survived 
correction for multiple comparisons in the present study. Previous research with a 
community sample has reported similar negative results (Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008). It 
is possible that impairments in emotional recognition are present only in clinical cohorts of 
psychopathy, which would explain the lack of consistent findings in studies using 
community samples. 
Similar to Ali et al. (2009), our findings indicated an association between 
psychopathic traits and less negative emotional responses to fearful faces in the SAM-Faces 
task. Both dimensions of psychopathy were related to less negative emotional responses to 
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fearful faces. However, these associations ceased to be significant once the shared variance 
was removed, suggesting that the variance shared by the dimensions of psychopathy drives 
the reduced emotional response to fearful faces. On the other hand, only the affective-
interpersonal dimension of the SRP was significantly correlated with less positive 
emotional responses to happy stories, even when the variance overlap with the lifestyle-
antisocial dimension was accounted for. This finding might indicate that affective-
interpersonal features of psychopathy are associated with diminished empathic 
responsiveness to positive, as well as negative emotions. 
Although no significant correlations with the moral emotions task variables survived 
correction for multiple comparisons, we did find opposite significant correlations between 
both SRP dimensions and propensity to feel empathic concern. Empathic concern is 
considered to be a prototypical moral emotion (Eisenberg, 2000), and thus to function as a 
moral barometer motivating behaviour. The unique variance associated with affective-
interpersonal features was correlated with lower propensity to feel concern for others, 
whereas the unique variance associated with lifestyle-antisocial was correlated with greater 
propensity to feel concern for the distress of others. Similar effects revealing opposing 
associations have been reported previously, with evidence from forensic and community 
samples suggesting that the two dimensions of psychopathy have opposite relationships 
with emotion and emotional reactivity. For example, previous studies have shown that after 
controlling for the overlap between the two dimensions, the affective-interpersonal 
dimension is negatively associated with constructs such as emotional distress, fearfulness, 
trait negative affect, whilst the impulsive-antisocial behaviour dimension is positively 
associated with these constructs (Hicks & Patrick, 2006).  
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Our results also indicate that neither SRP dimension is associated with increased 
endorsement of actions in the moral dilemmas task, replicating previous data from forensic 
(Cima, et al., 2010) and community samples (Glenn, Raine, Schug, et al., 2009). 
Nonetheless, affective-interpersonal features appear to diminish the level of difficulty that 
making these decisions represent. To our knowledge this is the first study exploring 
perceived difficulty in making decisions on moral dilemmas in relation to psychopathic 
traits. The perceived ease with which those individuals high on affective-interpersonal 
features made moral decisions could merely reflect a general ease in decision making, 
rather than anything circumscribed to moral decision making. But, it could also specifically 
reflect ease in making decisions about emotionally aversive dilemmas which, taken 
together with the other findings, suggest some level of emotional disengagement when 
making these kind of decisions. This later hypothesis would be in line with previous studies 
that indicate that this type of moral dilemmas evoke activity in the amygdala and other 
brain structures implicated in emotional processing (Greene et al., 2001) and that this 
activity is atypical in subjects scoring higher in psychopathy traits (Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 
2009). Unfortunately, these alternative hypotheses cannot be tested with the current data.  
Some limitations of this research should be noted. Although our results suggest that 
the different features of the psychopathy have at least partially divergent associations with 
certain domains of emotional, empathy and moral processing (as evidenced by statistically 
significant differences in the correlation coefficients), research on larger samples is 
required to reliably test the difference between the correlations of the SRP dimensions and 
the criterion variables. It should also be noted that a number of potentially interesting 
associations did not survive correction for multiple comparisons in these exploratory 
69 
 
analyses.  These negative results should be interpreted with caution due to restricted 
statistical power afforded by our sample. This was the first study to administer a large 
battery of affect, empathy, and morality tasks and relate these to different features of 
psychopathy. The preliminary findings from this study suggest that both dimensions of 
psychopathy make some distinct contributions to empathy and affective aspects of moral 
processing. Research on larger samples from community and forensic settings is required to 
probe the precise extent to which different features of psychopathy have distinct 
associations with particular empathic and moral features.  
 
2.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter describes a behavioural study where we investigated how specific 
dimensions of empathy and morality were associated with psychopathic traits in the general 
population. We employed several paradigms probing emotional recognition ability, 
affective empathic response to different types of emotional facial expressions and 
emotional-eliciting stories, empathic concern and other moral emotions such as guilt and 
anger, and moral decision-making; conducted correlational analyses, correcting for multiple 
comparisons; and further tested whether the associations found were unique to any of the 
psychopathy facets. Our findings indicate that both core affective-interpersonal, as well as 
lifestyle-antisocial features of psychopathy are associated with weaker empathic responses 
to fearful faces. However, only the unique variance of the affective-interpersonal features is 
associated with weaker empathic response to happy stories, lower propensity to feel 
empathic concern and less difficulty in making decisions on moral dilemmas. In contrast, 
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the unique variance of the lifestyle-antisocial features is associated with greater propensity 
to feel empathic concern. These preliminary findings extend previous research and suggest 
that, while the joint variance between affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial 
features might drive some deficits associated with psychopathy, there also appears also to 
be unique deficits associated with the core affective-interpersonal features, particularly in 
relation to affective aspects of moral cognition. 
In the next chapter, Chapter 3, an extension of this study with a female sample will be 
presented to probe the consistency of these findings across genders.  
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CHAPTER 3: Behavioural correlates of empathy and morality 
in a sample of females from the general population 
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3.1. Chapter Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we presented a study where we identified associations between 
specific dimensions of empathy and morality and psychopathic traits in a sample of males 
from the general population. In the present chapter we extend the study of these 
associations to a sample of females from the general population. 
Although a number of experimental studies to date has demonstrated that atypical 
empathic and moral processing are central features of psychopathic personality in males 
(e.g. Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009; Blair, 1999; Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 
2009), and a growing number of studies has investigated psychopathic personality in 
females (e.g. Nicholls & Petrila, 2005; Rogstad & Rogers, 2008), we know very little about 
how individual differences in psychopathic traits in females are associated with variability 
in empathy and moral processing and whether these associations are similar or distinct to 
the ones found in males. Only one study to date has reported that females with higher levels 
of psychopathic traits show reduced empathic concern for others (Rutherford, Cacciola, 
Alterman, & McKay, 1996) 
 
3.1.1. Dimensions of psychopathic personality 
 
As described in the previous chapter, evidence from forensic and community male 
samples suggest that the two dimensions of psychopathy (affective-interpersonal and 
lifestyle-antisocial behavior) present distinct associations with various criterion measures of 
personality, emotionality and behavior, particularly when their shared variance is controlled 
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for. For example, the affective-interpersonal dimension presents negative associations with 
emotional correlates such as fearfulness, distress, and empathic concern, whlist the 
lifestyle-antisocial dimension presents positive associations with these correlates (e.g. 
Hicks & Patrick, 2006; Uzieblo, et al., 2010). The two dimensions thus seem to present 
distinct contributions to psychopathy. Affective-interpersonal traits are hypothesized to 
represent the distinct personality traits defining psychopathy in that their presence 
distinguishes individuals who are psychopathic from those who manifest antisocial 
characteristics but who are not psychopathic (Blair, et al., 2005). Research so far indicates 
that emotional and personality correlates of psychopathy such as glibness, grandiosity, lack 
of empathic concern are akin across genders, but similarities in behavioural correlates, such 
as criminal behaviour and type of aggression, seem to be less consistent (see Verona & 
Vitale, 2006, for a review). It has been suggested that differences found across genders are 
mainly differential expressions of the same underlying construct (Nicholls & Petrila, 2005), 
and that the same personality traits may confer risk for different forms of behaviour for 
women versus men (Verona, Sprague, & Javdani, 2012). 
 
3.1.2.  Individual differences in empathic and moral processing  
 
Past research with male samples has used a variety of paradigms to study how 
individual differences in psychopathic personality relate to individual differences in 
emotion recognition, empathy and morality. Some studies have reported that psychopathic 
individuals have a selective impairment in recognizing other people’s fear and sadness (e.g. 
Blair et al., 2004; Blair et al., 2002); although similar findings have not been consistently 
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replicated in community samples (e.g. Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008). Psychopathy has 
also been associated with reduced autonomic response to distress in others (Blair, 1999; 
Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997). Individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits also 
report blunted affective empathic responses to emotional displays of others (Ali et al., 
2009). In respect to moral decision-making, while some studies have found psychopathy to 
be associated with more utilitarian responses in moral dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2011), 
others have not found such different patterns of responses (Cima et al., 2010; Glenn, Raine, 
Schug, et al., 2009). In the previous chapter, we administered a wide battery of 
experimental tasks and questionnaires to thoroughly investigate which of the specific 
constructs considered above, i.e. emotional recognition, affective empathy, moral emotions 
and moral decision making, were associated with the two underlying dimensions of 
psychopathy. We found that both affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial dimensions 
of psychopathy were associated with weaker empathic responses to fearful faces. However, 
only the unique variance of the affective-interpersonal dimension was associated with 
weaker empathic response to happy stories, lower propensity to feel moral emotions (i.e. 
empathic concern) and less self-reported difficulty in making decisions on moral dilemmas. 
We also found that the lifestyle-antisocial dimension was uniquely associated with greater 
propensity to feel empathic concern, when controlling for the affective-interpersonal 
dimension. These preliminary findings suggested that, while the joint variance between 
affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial dimensions might drive some deficits 
associated with psychopathy, others appear to be uniquely associated with affective-
interpersonal dimension. 
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3.1.3. The current study 
 
In women, experimentally tested empathic and moral processing correlates have 
seldom been studied in relation to psychopathic traits. So far only diminished ability to 
categorize briefly presented sad faces (Eisenbarth, Alpers, Segrè, Calogero, & Angrilli, 
2008) and feel empathic concern (Rutherford et al., 1996) have been reported in forensic 
samples of women (as compared with control participants). In the current study we 
employed the same battery of paradigms presented in the previous chapter to investigate 
how different dimensions of psychopathic personality traits in women relate to empathic 
and moral processing. A new set of data from a female sample was collected, and statistical 
tests were performed to verify whether the associations found in this new dataset were 
similar to the ones previously found in male data.   
 
3.2. Material and Methods 
 
3.2.1. Participants 
 
One-hundred healthy adult females from western English speaking countries, with 
no history of psychiatric disorder, aged 18-56 (M=22.68; SD=6.64), and estimated IQ 
between 85 and 134 (M=112; SD=11), were further recruited from the community through 
the University College London Psychology Subject Pool. Participants provided written 
informed consent and were compensated with either one course credit or £6 for their time. 
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3.2.2. Procedure 
 
All tasks and questionnaires were presented on a computer using Psytools software 
(Delosis Limited). All tasks were presented randomly across participants and were followed 
by the questionnaires. Further details of each task can be found in the previous chapter. 
 
3.2.3. Materials 
 
3.2.3.1. Assessment of General ability 
The WASI (Wechsler, 1999) Full-Scale IQ Two-Subtest (FSIQ-2) was used to produce 
an estimate of general cognitive ability. 
 
3.2.3.2. Assessment of psychopathic traits 
 
Psychopathic traits were assessed with the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 4 Short 
Form (SRP-SF; Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, in press), a 29-item scale designed to measure 
psychopathic attributes in non-institutionalized samples. The SRP-SF assesses 
psychopathic traits, organized in four facets – interpersonal, affective, lifestyle and 
antisocial – consistent with recent research on the PCL-R. Like the PCL-R, the four facets 
can be modeled in terms of the traditional two-factor dimensions. 
To verify the scale integrity of the SRP in our sample, scale reliability analyses 
were conducted. Mean Inter-Item Correlations (MICs) for the SRP Interpersonal (.38), 
Affective (0.22), Lifestyle (0.25), and Antisocial (0.37) scales suggested scale homogeneity 
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among these four SRP facets, indicating that they were unidimensional indicators of their 
respective SRP psychopathy factors. Alpha for the total SRP scale was good (0.87), and 
similarly for the items used to form composite facet scores of the traditional affective-
interpersonal (0.84) and lifestyle-antisocial (0.75) dimensions. The MICs for the SRP total, 
affective-interpersonal, and lifestyle-antisocial scales were also good (0.22, 0.29 and 0.24, 
respectively). To verify the adequacy of the two-factor model, confirmatory factor analysis 
was conducted using Mplus, Version 6.1 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2010). Using the 
Interpersonal and Affective SRP scale scores as indicators of affective-interpersonal, and 
Lifestyle and Antisocial SRP scales as lifestyle-antisocial indicators, the 2-factor solution 
showed excellent model fit (Figure 3.1; Model fit: X
2
(1) = .76, p < 0.05, CFI = 1.00, SRMR 
= 0.003), and fit significantly better than a one-factor scale-based model via a chi-square 
difference test between the two model (x
2
(1) = 6.65, p < 0.05). 
 
Figure 3.1. CFA model of the two-factor solution in our sample 
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3.2.3.3. Measures of Affect, Empathy and Morality 
 
 Emotion Multimorph Task 
 
The Emotion Multimorph, previously used by Blair et al. (2004), is a measure of 
sensitivity to recognize emotional facial expressions. This task consists of identities that 
gradually morph from a neutral affect expression into each prototypical emotional 
expression (sadness, fear, anger and happiness) in 20 stages. Mean expression recognition 
stage scores were computed following the procedure used in Blair et al. (2004) to 
characterize participants’ sensitivity to recognize each emotional facial expression type. 
 
Empathy for emotional facial expressions task (SAM-Faces) 
 
Based on Ali et al. (2009), this task estimates participants’ emotional response to 
emotional faces using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). 
Participants were asked to rate their affective state on the valence scale of the SAM when 
watching images depicting a person showing a sad, fearful, angry, happy or neutral 
expression. The valence scale ranges from a low-spirited manikin (‘1’) to a widely smiling 
one (‘9’), going through a middle neutral stance (‘5’); low scores thus represent negatively 
valenced affective responses and high scores represent positively valenced affective 
responses. This task includes realistic and naturalistic stimuli, and is thought to tap into the 
affective empathy construct as it not only estimates participants’ vicarious response to 
emotional stimuli, but also comprises elements of self-awareness and self/other distinction.  
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Empathy-Eliciting Short Stories task (SAM-Stories) 
 
The SAM-Stories described in the previous chapter was used to assess participants’ 
emotional response to emotional short stories using the SAM valence scale. Participants 
were presented with 12 short stories portraying sadness, anger or happiness, and asked to 
rate their affective response on the SAM.  
 
Affective Empathy Scale of the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE; 
Reniers, Corcoran, Drake, Shryane, & Völlm, 2011) 
 
This scale was added to the battery of experimental tasks and questionnaires for this 
study as it was not yet published when the previous study was designed. The QCAE is a 
newly developed measure of empathy that assesses affective and cognitive components of 
empathy. In this study we used the affective component which is composed of three 
different scales: emotion contagion (e.g. “It worries me when others are worrying and 
panicky.”); peripheral responsivity (e.g. “I often get deeply involved with the feelings of a 
character in a film, play, or novel”); and proximal responsivity (e.g. “I often get 
emotionally involved with my friends’ problems”). 
 
Empathic Concern Scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) 
 
This scale assesses the tendency to experience feelings of sympathy and compassion 
for others (e.g. “I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.”). 
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Moral emotions task 
 
Adapted from Kédia et al. (2008), this task comprised the presentation of brief 
stories depicting prototypical moral situations, i.e. “an agent harms a victim”. Depending 
on whether the agent and the victim are the self or other, these stories elicit four kinds of 
moral emotions: Guilt, Compassion, Self-Anger and Other-Anger. The harmful action is 
performed unintentionally in all stories to prevent possible interferences from other 
cognitive processes likely involved in moral judgment. In the study described in the 
previous chapter, nine scenarios per emotion were presented to participants and each 
scenario was rated for all possible moral emotions. Based on participant feedback regarding 
that previous version, this task was shortened and simplified for the present study. The 
present task contained six scenarios per emotion and participants were asked to rate to what 
extent they would experience only the target emotion on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 = not at all; 
4 = fairly; 7 = extremely). 
 
Moral dilemmas task 
 
Based on previous published work (e.g. Greene et al., 2001), this task is a scenario-
based measure of moral decision. Participants were asked to make decisions on a series of 8 
moral dilemmas portraying a choice of whether or not to sacrifice one person’s life in order 
to save the lives of a group of others, differing on whether there is direct physical contact 
with the victim (Personal) or not (Impersonal). Participants were asked to answer if they 
‘Would do… in order to…?’ and to rate the difficulty of the decision on a 10-point scale. 
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3.3. Data analyses 
 
Pearson and Spearman correlational analyses were conducted using SPSS 20 for 
Windows. Preliminary analyses indicated that estimated IQ was significantly correlated 
with some of the criterion variables. Therefore, two sets of analyses were conducted. First, 
to adjust for the influence of cognitive ability on the relationships between SRP scores and 
criterion variables, estimated IQ was entered as a control variable. Subsequently, to 
examine the influence of the unique variance of each SRP dimension on criterion variables, 
the other SRP dimension was entered as a second control variable. Benjamini and 
Hochberg False Discovery Rate (FDR; 1995) was used to control the probability of making 
a Type-I error on multiple comparisons. Corrected p-values are presented. Steiger’s Z-tests 
(two-tailed) were conducted to assess the significance of the difference between 
associations of the two SRP dimensions and criterion variables. Fisher’s Z-tests were 
conducted to assess the significance of the difference between the correlations in the 
present female sample and correlations in the male sample. Because of small alterations on 
the Moral emotions task, female versus male comparisons were not conducted on that task. 
 
3.4. Results 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented on Table 3.1. A complete correlational table for all 
experimental paradigms is also presented in Table 3.2 for illustrative purposes. A similar 
pattern of results as to the one found in the previous chapter was observe and therefore will 
not be further discussed.  
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Table 3.1. Participants’ and criterion variables descriptive statistics. 
  Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
     Age 22.68 6.64 18 56 
Estimated IQ 111.81 10.54 85 134 
     
SRP-4-SF 
    
SRP Total 51.12 12.70 31 90 
Affective-Interpersonal Dimension 25.46 8.23 14 50 
Lifestyle-Antisocial Dimension 24.59 6.10 14 44 
     
Multimorph: Recognition Stage 
    
Sad Stage Score 9.73 4.15 0 18 
Fear Stage Score 11.84 2.78 1 17.67 
Anger Stage Score 11.05 3.30 0 18 
Happy Stage Score 13.97 3.74 1 19.33 
     
SAM-Faces: Valence ratings 
    
Sad faces 18.03 7.32 8 46 
Fearful faces 25.09 8.04 8 46 
Angry faces 26.93 8.84 8 56 
Happy faces 58.19 7.50 43 72 
     
SAM-Stories: Valence ratings 
    
Sad stories 7.17 2.97 4 19 
Anger stories 13.86 3.36 6 20 
Happy stories 30.18 3.72 19 36 
     
QCAE: Affective Empathy 36.60 5.66 17 48 
     
IRI: Empathic Concern 20.60 4.84 2 28 
     
Moral Emotions task: Ratings 
    
Compassion 30.45 5.65 13 41 
Guilt 36.68 4.44 20 42 
Self-Anger 30.50 6.17 14 42 
Other-Anger 29.97 6.31 15 42 
     
Moral Dilemmas: Action Endorsement 
    
Impersonal dilemmas 3.17 1.09 0 4 
Personal dilemmas 0.92 0.85 0 4 
     
Moral Dilemmas: Difficulty ratings 
    
Impersonal dilemmas  7.14 2.29 1 10.00 
Personal dilemmas 6.09 2.08 1 10.00 
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Table 3.2. Correlations between all criterion variables 
 
Notes: Correlations between all criterion variables. 
1
Pearson correlation coefficients are reported; 
2
 Spearman correlation coefficients are reported; ***p<0.001, 
**0.001<p<0.01, *0.01<p<0.05 (2-tailed). Values in bold indicate significant associations across measures.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Multimorph: Recognition Stage b
1. Sadness
2. Fear .25*
3. Anger .14 .29**
4. Happiness .38** .34** .26**
SAM-Faces: Valence Ratings a
5. Sad faces -.13 .03 .02 .04
6. Fearful faces -.07 .04 .23* .10 .68**
7. Angry faces .04 .13 .11 .10 .53** .71**
8. Happy faces .11 -.04 -.12 .05 -.70** -.62** -.57**
SAM-Stories: Valence ratings a
9. Sad stories -.05 -.01 .16 -.11 .45** .38** .30** -.46**
10. Anger stories .06 .17 .37** .08 .28** .29** .25* -.32** .52**
11. Happy stories .16 .00 -.08 .14 -.40** -.44** -.30** .55** -.53** -.38**
12. QCAE: Affective empathya .23* .07 .07 .17 -.43** -.24* -.18 .33** -.34** -.23* .38**
13. IRI: Empathic concerna .11 .22* .11 .14 -.23** -.20* -.12 .36** -.36** -.16 .37** .62**
Moral Emotions task: Ratings
14. Compassiona .09 .20* .02 .10 -.38** -.26** -.13 .31** -.37** -.24* .20* .48** .49**
15. Guiltb .25* .07 -.01 .12 -.20* -.09 .00 .22* -.23* -.31** .09 .31** .31** .53**
16. Self-Angera -.05 -.15 -.02 .11 -.12 -.10 -.07 .11 -.24* -.28** -.01 .14 .01 .19 .43**
17. Other-Angera .00 -.25* -.12 -.12 -.14 -.09 -.07 .16 -.20* -.30** .05 .02 -.05 .15 .33** .74**
Moral dilemmas: Action endorsementb
18. Impersonal Dilemmas .08 -.09 -.22* -.01 -.02 -.11 .07 .04 -.09 -.13 .06 -.10 -.08 .03 .02 .04 .14
19. Personal Dilemmas -.05 .02 .01 -.01 .02 -.03 -.02 -.05 .08 -.05 .03 -.03 -.07 -.05 .02 -.09 -.11 .19
Moral dilemmas: Difficulty ratings a
20. Impersonal Dilemmas .11 .25* .11 .09 -.18 -.08 -.19 .16 -.27** -.21* .22* .32** .32** .40** .17 .04 .13 -.07 -.07
21. Personal Dilemmas .12 .06 -.06 .08 -.23* -.12 -.19 .25* -.42** -.26** .42** .30** .25* .26** .13 .03 .07 .13 .26* .62**
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Associations between psychopathic traits and measures of affect, empathy and morality 
 
Pearson and Spearman’s correlation coefficients and FDR adjusted p-values 
between SRP dimensions and all measures used are reported in Table 3.3. No significant 
associations between the dimensions of SRP and variables of Multimorph were found. 
While none of the associations between the lifestyle-antisocial dimension and criterion 
variables survived FDR correction, the affective-interpersonal dimension was significantly 
correlated with several criterion variables. Higher scores on this dimension were associated 
with and lower scores of affective empathy in the QCAE and less negative emotional 
responses to sad and fearful faces, and sad stories; lower scores of empathic concern and 
compassion; higher utilitarian responses on personal dilemmas and lower difficulty in 
making decisions on impersonal dilemmas. Partialing out each SRP dimension from the 
other yielded similar findings.  
Fisher’s Z-tests indicated that the pattern of correlations observed in the present 
study and in our study with a male sample was extremely similar. Statistically significant 
differences between genders were only observed in the associations between the affective-
interpersonal dimension and endorsement of personal moral dilemmas. Contrary to men, 
women presented positive associations between the affective-interpersonal dimension and 
endorsement of utilitarian responses to personal moral dilemmas (controlling for IQ: 
Z=2.50, p<.05; controlling for IQ & LA: Z=2.47, p<.05). An additional marginally 
significant difference was observed between the lifestyle-antisocial dimension and 
empathic response to fearful faces where, contrary to men, women did not present a 
significant association between these variables (controlling for IQ: Z=1.92, p<.06). 
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Table 3.3. Correlations between SRP scores and criterion variables 
SRP scale Total    
Affective-
Interpersonal (AI) 
  
Lifestyle-
Antisocial (LA) 
Control variables IQ 
 
IQ IQ & LA 
 
IQ IQ & AI 
  r   r r   r r 
Multimorph: Stage Scores
a               
Sad Faces -.07  
-.11 -.12 
 
-.01 .06 
Fearful Faces -.02  
-.02 -.02 
 
-.01 -.00 
Angry Faces -.03  
.05 .11 
 
-.11 -.15 
Happy Faces -.05  
.00 .05 
 
-.08 -.09 
 
       
SAM-Faces: Valence Ratings
a        
Sad Faces .26*  
.25* .14 
 
.22 .12 
Fearful Faces .19  
.25* .25* 
 
.07 -.08 
Angry Faces .13  
.2 .23 
 
-.01 -.13 
Happy Faces .16  
-.19 -.18 
 
-.07 .03 
 
       
SAM-Stories: Valence Ratings
a        
Sad Stories .24*  
.24** .22 
 
.15 .01 
Anger Stories -.02  
-.02 -.02 
 
-.01 .01 
Happy Stories -.09  
-.17 -.23 
 
.05 .16 
 
       
QCAE: Affective Empathy
a -.28*  
-.35**† -.35**† 
 
-.10† .11† 
 
       
IRI: Empathic Concern Scale
a -.28*  
-.42**† -.49**† 
 
.00† .28† 
 
       
Moral Emotions Task: Ratings        
Compassion
a -.39**  
-.43**† -.37**† 
 
-.22† .00† 
Guilt
b -.25*  
-.22 -.14 
 
-.21 -.12 
Self-Anger
a -.2  
-.09 .07 
 
-.29 -.29 
Other-Anger
a -.13  
-.02 .12 
 
-.24 -.26 
 
       
Moral Dilemmas: Endorsement
b        
Impersonal Dilemmas -.01  
.04 .09 
 
-.08 -.12 
Personal Dilemmas .29*  
.31* .27* 
 
.16 .00 
 
       
Moral Dilemmas: Difficulty Ratings
a        
Impersonal Dilemmas -.21  
-.24* -.22 
 
-.10 .03 
Personal Dilemmas -.12  
-.15 -.15 
 
-.05 .04 
  
              
Notes: 
a 
Pearson partial correlation coefficients are reported; 
b 
Spearman partial correlation coefficients are 
reported; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed; FDR corrected); † Significantly different correlations with criterion 
variables between SRP dimensions (Z>1.96; p<.05; 2-tailed). 
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3.5. Discussion 
 
This study examined the associations between multiple measures empathic and 
moral processing with psychopathic traits in a community sample of females. Overall, our 
findings indicate that in females from the general population affective-interpersonal traits 
are associated with selective lower affective empathy to sadness and fear, lower propensity 
to feel other-oriented moral emotions, higher endorsement of utilitarian responses in 
dilemmas involving direct harm, and lower self-reported difficulty in making decisions in 
moral dilemmas involving indirect harm.  
Although impairments in the ability to recognize emotional distress in others have 
been reported in clinical male and female samples (e.g. Blair et al., 2004; Eisenbarth et al., 
2008) the existence of such impairments in community samples has not yet been confirmed 
(e.g. Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008). In the present study, neither of the dimensions of 
psychopathy was associated with lower sensitivity to recognize emotional expressions. It is 
possible that impairments in emotional recognition are present only in clinical cohorts of 
psychopathy. 
Our findings did however indicate a clear negative association between levels of 
affective-interpersonal traits and affective empathy as measured by the Questionnaire of 
Cognitive and Affective Empathy (Reniers et al., 2012). This association was further 
corroborated and specified by the results from the affective empathy tasks where 
participants indicated their feelings using the SAM, where higher levels of affective-
interpersonal traits were selectively associated with less negative empathic responses to 
both observed and imagined displays of fear and sadness. Contrary to men, where lifestyle-
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antisocial traits were also associated with diminished empathic responses to fear, in women 
only the specific affective-interpersonal dimension was associated with it. However, the 
difference between genders in the associations of lifestyle-antisocial traits with empathic 
responses to fearful faces was only marginally significant and therefore the current data 
does not afford a strong interpretation with regard to gender differences. Nevertheless, the 
current findings suggest that this association could be explored further, possibly within 
clinical samples. Affective empathy is considered to be necessary for the development of 
moral emotions such as guilt and compassion. In fact, high levels of affective-interpersonal 
traits were not only associated with diminished affective response to sad and fear emotions 
in others, but also with diminished propensity to feel these moral emotions. The affective-
interpersonal dimension was characterized by reduced ability to feel other-oriented moral 
emotions as demonstrated by its negative associations with the empathic concern scale, 
compassion and guilt ratings on the moral emotions task. These moral emotions are thought 
to function as moral barometers and motivate prosocial and inhibit antisocial behaviors. 
Impairments in processing such emotions might thus underlie a possible emotional 
disengagement in moral decision making that might be associated with high levels of 
affective-interpersonal psychopathic traits. 
Affective-interpersonal psychopathic traits were indeed negatively associated with 
higher endorsement of highly emotional harmful actions to others and with less difficulty in 
making moral decisions. Females with higher levels of affective-interpersonal traits were 
more willing to endorse direct harm to a single victim in order to save the lives of many. 
This result is significantly different from our previous male sample where no such 
association was found. However, it is not yet clear whether in males psychopathy is 
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associated with a different pattern of responses to these dilemmas or not. While most 
studies so far have reported negative findings (e.g. Cima et al., 2010; Glenn et al. 2009), 
one has reported higher utilitarian responses in personal dilemmas in a group of low-
anxious psychopaths in comparison to controls (Koenigs et al., 2011). Similarly to Koenigs 
et al. (2011), in the present study, higher levels of affective-interpersonal traits were 
associated with higher endorsement of utilitarian responses in more extreme and emotional 
demanding scenarios where direct contact with the potential victim is necessary. A pattern 
of higher endorsement of personal dilemmas has also been reported in relation to individual 
differences in cognitive style, such as higher “need for cognition” and higher “working 
memory capacity”, and it is thought that the endorsement of utilitarian responses in such 
dilemmas requires overdriving a strong, countervailing emotional response. Higher levels 
of affective-interpersonal traits were also associated with less difficulty in making decisions 
on impersonal moral dilemmas but not on personal ones (which are in general deemed less 
difficult in terms of decision making due to their extreme aversiveness). Taken together, 
our findings suggest that affective-interpersonal traits of psychopathy might be associated 
with some level of emotional disengagement and higher involvement of controlled 
cognition when processing moral decisions.  
 
3.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter describes a behavioural study where we investigated whether the 
associations previously found in males between individual differences empathy and moral 
processing and individual differences in psychopathic traits would also be present in 
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females. We employed the same battery of paradigms employed in the study describe in the 
previous chapter. This battery included paradigms probing emotional recognition ability, 
affective empathic response to different types of emotional facial expressions and 
emotional-eliciting stories, moral emotions, and moral decision-making. We conducted 
correlational analyses and further tested whether the associations found were unique to any 
of the psychopathy dimensions to investigate whether variability in these empathy and 
moral processing constructs was associated with individual differences in psychopathic 
traits in females; and further tested whether these associations were similar or distinct to the 
ones found in males. 
To our knowledge, this was the first study to investigate how different dimensions 
of psychopathic personality in women are associated with distinct correlates of empathic 
and moral processing and further directly compare to results from a male sample. Overall, 
our findings suggest that, in women, psychopathic personality traits present the same 
underlying empathic and moral biases found in men. Furthermore, these biases were 
specific of the affective-interpersonal dimension of psychopathy, strengthening the views 
that the two dimensions of psychopathy encompass distinct contributions to emotional and 
moral processing; and that while psychopathy might be manifested differently in females 
and males, either due to gender-role socialization or biological differences (e.g. Nicholls & 
Petrila, 2005), its central characteristics appear to be similar. Future work with larger 
samples from community and forensic settings should further probe the generalizability of 
these important preliminary findings and the precise extent to which different components 
of psychopathy present distinct associations with particular empathic and moral processes. 
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In the present and previous chapter, we identified an association between empathic 
response to emotional faces and levels of affective and interpersonal psychopathic traits. In 
the next chapter, Chapter 4, a study designed to identify the neural structures involved in 
empathic responses to different types of emotional facial expressions will be presented. We 
adapted the SAM-Faces task to an event-related functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI) design in order to verify whether the observed weakened response to other people’s 
emotional facial expressions would also be apparent at the neural level. 
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CHAPTER 4: Neural correlates of affective empathy for facial 
expressions and associations with psychopathic traits in a 
sample of males from the general population 
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4.1. Chapter Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters we describe two studies where we identified associations 
between specific dimensions of empathy and morality and psychopathic traits in the general 
population. We have found that individual differences in psychopathic traits in men and 
women are associated with weaker affective responses to emotional facial expressions, in 
particular to sad and fearful facial expressions. In the present chapter, a study conducted to 
identify the neural structures involved in empathic responses to emotional facial 
expressions is presented. Despite the extensive literature available on the neural basis of 
empathic response for pain and disgust, little is still known about the brain regions that 
subserve empathic response to other people’s emotional facial expressions. The first aim of 
this study was thus to identify the brain regions that subserve affective response to different 
types of emotional facial expressions, and whether these include the neural structures that 
have been consistently associated with empathic responding to pain and disgust  (i.e. AI, 
dACC and IFG) and with detecting emotional saliency (i.e. amygdala). The second aim of 
this study was to verify how the atypical response to other people’s emotional facial 
expressions observed at the behavioural level for individuals with high levels of 
psychopathic traits, is also observed at the neural level.  
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4.1.1. Neural basis of affective empathy for emotional faces 
 
Although theorists are not in complete agreement regarding the precise definition of 
empathy and its constitutive components (see Batson, 2009, for a comprehensive review), 
most agree that empathy is a multidimensional phenomenon, which involves the 
understanding of another person's experience through the sharing of their emotional states 
(Davis, 1983; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009; 
Hoffman, 2000). As described in the general introduction of this thesis, at present, and 
mostly due to the critical contribution of social neuroscience (e.g. Adolphs, 1999; Blair, 
2005; Decety, 2011; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Singer, 2006; Singer & Lamm, 2009), much 
of the empathy literature distinguishes between cognitive and emotional aspects of empathy 
and further distinguishes affective empathy from emotional contagion and empathic 
concern. Whilst cognitive empathy is regarded as the ability to understand other people’s 
intentions, desires or beliefs, through cognitive reasoning (Frith & Frith, 2003), affective 
empathy is generally understood as the experience of an affective or sensory state that is 
similar to that the one shown by another person, but where one is aware as that the source 
of the state is the other person. Although the observer’s emotional state is isomorphic with 
the other person’s, the subject is aware that his or her own affective state is elicited by the 
emotional state of the other person (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). Affective empathy is 
distinct from emotional contagion, which denotes the predisposition to “catch” other 
people’s emotions (Hatfield et al., 2009) but without the elements of self-awareness and 
self-other distinction that are present in affective empathy; and from empathic concern, 
which refers to affective changes that are induced in the observer in response to the 
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perceived or imagined affective state of another person, but which are not necessarily 
isomorphic with those experienced by the other. 
In recent years, the field of social neuroscience has begun to shed light on the neural 
underpinnings of affective empathy. These studies suggest that observing or imagining 
another person in a particular emotional state automatically activates a representation of 
that state in the observer (e.g. Decety & Ickes, 2009; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Singer, 
2006; Singer & Leiberg, 2009). However, it should be noted that these studies also suggest 
that the experience of empathy is not necessarily purely automatic and sensory-driven, but 
that top-down cognitive processes can also play a role in the empathic experience (e.g. 
Decety, 2011; Singer & Lamm, 2009b).  
Recent meta-analyses (Fan et al., 2011; Lamm et al., 2011) indicate that empathy 
tasks systematically elicit robust activation in anterior insula (AI), extending into the 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex / anterior medial cingulate 
cortex (dACC/aMCC). Although these regions are deemed to be involved in empathic 
responding to other people’s affective states, and although previous studies have utilised a 
wide range of different experimental tasks and stimuli to probe the neural basis of empathy 
(see Fan, et al., 2011, for a comprehensive review), to our knowledge no study has used an 
experimental task probing empathic response to basic emotions, in particular emotional 
facial expressions. Yet, emotional facial expressions constitute important cues to others’ 
emotional states. Facial expressions can be readily perceived and thus are fundamental to 
the empathic experience. Moreover, emotional facial expressions are thought to have 
specific communicatory functions, conveying specific information about the observed 
person to the observer (Blair, 2005). In that sense, it has been suggested that emotional 
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empathy acts as the translation of the communication of the emotional expressions of the 
observed person by the observer (Blair & Fowler, 2008). 
 
4.1.2.  Individual differences in affective empathy 
 
Identifying the neural substrates involved in the empathic response to emotional facial 
expressions is of particular interest for the understanding of psychopathic traits and 
antisocial behaviour. Psychopathy is deemed to be marked by profound impairments in 
empathy, in particular in affective empathy. It is thought that the absence of a robust 
empathic response to the distress cues of others leads to an impaired moral development, 
making individuals high in psychopathic traits more prone to engage in antisocial behaviour 
(Blair et al, 2005). Precursors of psychopathic traits in children (i.e. callous-unemotional 
traits) are associated with aberrant neural functioning in the amygdala, ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior insula and caudate (Jones 
et al., 2009; Marsh et al., 2011; Marsh et al., 2008; Sebastian et al., 2012; Viding et al., 
2012; White et al., 2012); brain areas that are involved in processing basic emotional 
salience, and emotion regulation. More specifically, children with high levels of callous-
unemotional traits show reduced amygdala response to other’s distress (e.g. Jones et al. 
2009; Marsh et al. 2008; White et al. 2012), even when the stimuli are presented below 
conscious awareness (Viding, Sebastian et al., 2012) and reduced functional coupling 
between amygdala and OFC when viewing fearful facial expressions (Marsh et al. 2008). 
Two recent studies have also reported that, when observing pictures of others in pain, 
children with high levels of callous-unemotional traits present reduced neural response 
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within regions associated with empathy for pain (Lockwood et al., 2013; Marsh et al., 
2013), namely reduced response in AI (Lockwood et al., 2013), dACC (Lockwood et al, 
2013; Marsh et al., 2013) and amygdala (Marsh et al., 2013).  
In adults, while there is evidence that psychopathic traits are associated with atypical 
affective response to others’ emotions at the behavioural level (as demonstrated in Chapters 
2 and 3), there is so far less evidence of how this impairment is reflected at the neural level. 
Although a recent study has shown a negative association between psychopathic traits and 
amygdala reactivity to fearful faces (Carré et al., 2013), to our knowledge, only one other 
study has addressed empathic processing directly in adults with psychopathy. In that study, 
contrary to findings in children with high levels of callous traits (Lockwood et al. 2013; 
Marsh et al., 2013), Decety et al. (2013) found that, when observing body parts in painful 
situations and when observing facial expressions of pain, the neural activity of incarcerated 
men with high levels of psychopathy (score of >30 on the Psychopathy Checklist Revised 
(PCL-R; Hare, 2003) was significantly higher in a number of regions, including bilateral 
anterior insula, dACC and IFG, than the neural activity of incarcerated men with low levels 
of psychopathy (score >20 on the PCL-R).  The increased activity in these regions was 
associated with both dimensions of psychopathy (affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-
antisocial). The source of inconsistency between these studies remains to be investigated, 
but could reflect differences in developmental stage, task variables, as well as differences in 
samples (no healthy comparison group was included in the adult study).  
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4.1.3. The current study 
 
Despite the role that empathic processing of emotional expressions is thought to have 
in psychopathic traits, to our knowledge, no study so far has investigated whether the 
atypical empathic response to distinct basic emotional facial expressions that is observed at 
the behavioural level is also reflected at the neural level. The current study had two main 
aims. The first aim was to identify the neural structures involved in empathic responses to 
emotional facial expressions, and whether these would include the neural structures that 
have been consistently associated with empathic responding in previous studies (i.e. AI, 
dACC and IFG). Although the amygdala has been less consistently reported in previous 
studies of empathy (Fan et al., 2011; Lamm et al., 2011), due to its putative role in 
detecting emotional saliency (Adolphs, 2010) and, more importantly, in the etiology of 
psychopathy (Blair, 2007, 2008b), we were also interested in exploring its involvement in 
affective responding to emotional facial expressions. To accomplish this aim, we adapted 
the Empathy for emotional facial expressions task introduced in the previous behavioural 
chapters. This task includes realistic and naturalistic stimuli, and is thought to tap into the 
affective empathy construct as it not only estimates participants’ vicarious response to 
emotional stimuli, but also comprises elements of self-awareness (participants have to 
evaluate their emotional response) and self/other distinction (participants are asked how the 
stimulus makes them feel). Our second aim was to test whether variability in affective 
response to emotional faces would also relate to individual differences in psychopathic 
traits at the neural level, particularly in the above mentioned regions. In the studies 
described in the previous chapters, we have found that individual differences in 
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psychopathic traits were associated with weaker self-reported affective responses to 
emotional facial expressions of others. We predicted that the atypical response to other 
people’s emotional facial expressions observed at the behavioural level for individuals with 
high levels of psychopathic traits would also be observed at the neural level.  
 
4.2. Materials and Methods 
 
4.2.1. Participants 
 
Thirty-one right-handed male participants with no reported history of psychiatric 
disorder were recruited for this study. Of these, one was excluded prior to fMRI analyses 
due to excessive response failure (>50%) and movement artefact. Following exclusion, data 
from 30 participants (mean age: 26.9, range: 20-40; mean estimated IQ:  110, range: 85-
125) were analysed. All participants provided written informed consent according to the 
guidelines approved by UCL Division of Psychology and Language Sciences Ethics 
Committee who provided local ethics approval for this study. 
 
4.2.2. Materials 
 
4.2.2.1. Assessment of General ability 
The Matrix Reasoning subscale of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was administered to estimate level of general intellectual ability. 
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4.2.2.2. Assessment of psychopathic traits 
 
Psychopathic traits were assessed with the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 4 Short 
Form (SRP-SF; Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, in press), a 29-item scale designed to measure 
psychopathic attributes in non-institutionalized samples. The SRP-SF assesses 
psychopathic traits, organized in four facets – interpersonal, affective, lifestyle and 
antisocial – consistent with recent research on the PCL-R. Like the PCL-R, the four facets 
can be modelled in terms of the traditional two-factor dimensions. The SRP has been 
shown to have clear latent structure, good construct validity in male and female samples 
(Neumann et al., 2012) and is strongly correlated with the PCL-R (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 
2006; Paulhus et al., in press).  
 
4.2.2.3. Assessment of Anxiety 
 
Participants also completed the State-Trait Anxiety Index (STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, & Luschene, 1970). The STAI comprises two subscales, one for measurement of 
trait anxiety (STAI-T) and the other for measurement of state anxiety (STAI-S). 
 
4.2.2.4. Empathy for emotional facial expressions task 
 
For the present study, we adapted the SAM-Faces task introduced in the previous 
behavioural chapters. As described before, this task, based on Ali et al. (2009), estimates 
participants’ emotional response to emotional faces using the Self-Assessment Manikin 
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(SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). This task includes realistic and naturalistic stimuli, and is 
thought to tap into the affective empathy construct as it not only estimates participants’ 
vicarious response to emotional stimuli, but also comprises elements of self-awareness 
(participants have to evaluate their emotional response) and self/other distinction 
(participants are asked how the stimulus makes them feel). Participants are asked to rate 
their affective state on the valence scale of the SAM when watching images depicting a 
person showing a sad, fearful, angry, happy or neutral expression. The valence scale ranges 
from a low-spirited manikin to a widely smiling one, going through a middle neutral stance. 
For the present study, we adapted this task to an event-related functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) design. To prevent possible confounding effects at the neural 
level of presenting expressive manikins (that contain emotional facial expressions) 
alongside the emotional stimuli of interest (emotional facial expressions), the valence scale 
of the SAM was replaced by a sliding scale, ranging from -4 (---) to +4 (+++). We included 
the stimuli described in the previous chapters, i.e. 8 images per type of emotion (sadness, 
fear, anger, neutral, and happiness) depicting one person, whose face is the focal point of 
the image.   
Immediately prior to scanning, participants were familiarised with the task and 
instructions. Stimuli used during practice were not used in the scanning session. Inside the 
scanner, before the beginning of the task, participants were reminded of the instructions for 
14.875 s, corresponding to the 5 dummy scan volumes discarded prior to analysis (see 
below). Participants were presented with a total of 120 trials in two runs, corresponding to 
the 40 different stimuli repeated 3 times, and were instructed to rate how the picture made 
them feel on the sliding rating scale. Each trial started with the presentation of the stimuli. 
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After 2 s, the sliding scale appeared on the screen, below the stimuli. Participants made 
their ratings using three keys on a keypad. Two keys moved the cursor (initially positioned 
in the centre of the scale) to left or right on the sliding scale, and a third key ‘marked’ the 
answer. After marking their ratings, participants received visual confirmation of their 
answer for 1 s. Participants had a maximum of 4 s to make their ratings. If a rating was not 
made within that time, the trial was considered an error. A fixation cross appeared on the 
screen for 1.5 s before the next trial started. Twenty-four fixation cross null trials, with a 
duration of 8.5 s, were also included. Trials were presented in a pseudorandom order to 
prevent presentation of more than two consecutive trials of the same type and more than 
one consecutive null trial.  
Examples of the stimuli used can be found in Appendix 2. 
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Figure 4.1. Affective empathy for emotional facial expressions task 
 
Notes: A) Task timeline and examples of three trials (from fearful, neutral and happy conditions). Participants were presented with each trial over two 
screens consisting in the presentation of the stimuli for 2 s, followed by presentation of the sliding scale where they rated how the image made them feel 
(0-4 s); B) Manipulation check. All conditions elicited significantly different levels of emotional response (F(1, 29) = 423.27, p < 0.001; all pairwise 
comparisons p < 0.03, corrected). 
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4.2.3. Magnetic resonance imaging acquisition 
 
Images were acquired using a Siemens Avanto 1.5 T MRI scanner at the Birkbeck-
UCL Centre for Neuroimaging with a 32-channel headcoil.  A 5.5 min 3D T1-weighted 
anatomical scan, and multislice T2*-weighted echo planar images (EPIs) with BOLD 
contrast were acquired. The T2* EPI sequence used the following acquisition parameters: 
35 2 mm slices acquired in a descending trajectory with a 1 mm gap; echo time = 50 ms; 
repetition time = 2.975 s; slice tilt = -30
o
 (T > C); flip angle = 90
o
; field of view = 192 mm; 
matrix size = 64 x 64. Functional data were acquired in a single run. Field maps (phase and 
magnitude images) were also acquired for use in the unwarping stage of data preprocessing. 
Stimulus presentation and response collection were presented in Cogent, running in Matlab 
2011b (http://mathworks.com). 
 
4.3. Data analyses 
 
4.3.1. Behavioural analysis 
 
All behavioural analyses were conducted with SPSS 20 for Windows. To confirm that 
the stimuli in the different types of experimental conditions elicited significantly stronger 
emotional responses than the stimuli in the neutral condition, we conducted a one-way 
ANOVA on valence ratings, as well as post-hoc pairwise comparisons, with Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons. Pearson correlational analyses between valence ratings 
and dimensions of psychopathic traits were conducted to check the replicability of our 
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previous findings at the behavioural level in the present sample. Two sets of analyses were 
conducted. First, we entered estimated IQ and anxiety as control variables to adjust for the 
influence these variables on the relationships between psychopathic traits and criterion 
variables. Second, the other SRP dimension was entered as an additional control variable to 
examine the influence of the unique variance of each SRP dimension on criterion variables. 
 
4.3.2. Image processing and analyses 
 
EPI data were analysed using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first five 
volumes were discarded, and the data were realigned to the sixth volume, unwarped using a 
fieldmap, normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute template resampling to a voxel 
size of 2x2x2 mm, and smoothed with an 8 mm full width at half-maximum Gaussian filter. 
Data were high-pass filtered at 128 s to remove low-frequency drifts, and the statistical 
model included an AR(1) autoregressive function to account for autocorrelations.  
An initial set of event-related analyses was conducted to compare neural responses 
associated with each type of emotional facial expression in relation to neutral faces. Onsets 
of interest were time-locked to the presentation of the stimuli, and durations included the 
presentation of the stimuli and the duration of the rating on the sliding scale (2-6 s). 
Regressors of interest were created by convolution of these onsets with a canonical 
hemodynamic response function. Other regressors modelled in the analysis included null 
trials and errors (error rate > 5% for all participants). The six realignment parameters were 
modelled as parameters of no interest. For two participants, an extra regressor was included 
to model corrupted images resulting from excessive motion. These images were removed 
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and the adjacent images interpolated in order to prevent distortion of the between-subjects 
mask. First-level contrast images were calculated by applying appropriate linear contrasts 
to the parameter estimates of regressors of interest and entered into second-level analyses. 
Second-level analyses were conducted by performing one-sample t-tests on each of these 
contrasts using the summary-statistics approach to random-effects analysis. Whole-brain 
analyses were conducted using a threshold of p < 0.05, FWE corrected at the voxel level, 
after applying an inclusive grey matter mask (segmented from the group average 
anatomical scan). Additional exploratory whole-brain analyses were conducted using a 
cluster forming threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected, cluster size > 20) after applying an 
inclusive grey matter mask (segmented from the group average anatomical scan), and 
clusters surviving FWE correction (p<.05) were considered statistically significant. ROI 
analysis in bilateral amygdala was conducted using the Pickatlas toolbox. A single ROI was 
anatomically defined using masks from the automated anatomical labelling (AAL) atlas. A 
cluster forming threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected) was applied and clusters surviving 
FWE correction (p < 0.05) were considered statistically significant. 
To test whether individual differences in hemodynamic response in the brain areas 
previously implicated in empathic processing were associated with individual differences in 
psychopathic traits, we used the Marsbar toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 
2002) to extract average contrast estimates from 8 mm spheres centred on activation peaks 
in the AI, dACC, IFG and amygdala (identified in the whole-brain and ROI analyses). Note 
that these correlation analyses were orthogonal to the contrast used to define the regions of 
interest. To ensure that our results were due to our personality constructs of interest 
(distinct dimensions of psychopathy), we ran partial-correlation analyses including 
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estimated IQ and trait Anxiety as covariates to control for the influence of these variables. 
Subsequently, to examine the influence of the unique variance of each SRP dimension on 
criterion variables, the other SRP dimension was entered as a third control variable. 
 
4.4. Results  
 
Demographic and personality statistics are presented in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1. Participants’ demographic and personality  statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
Age 20 40 26.90 5.99 
WASI matrices 41 68 56.83 6.04 
STAI Trait 22 58 39.00 9.64 
SRP Total 31 109 58.07 18.18 
SRP Affective-Interpersonal 14 61 29.23 10.89 
SRP Lifestyle-Antisocial 15 47 27.70 8.73 
 
4.4.1. Behavioural findings 
 
Manipulation check 
 
To confirm that the stimuli in the different types of experimental conditions elicited 
significantly stronger emotional responses than the stimuli in the neutral condition, we 
conducted a one-way ANOVA on valence ratings and found a main effect of valence (F(1, 
29) = 423.27, p < 0.001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons, with Bonferroni correction, 
confirmed that there were significant differences between valence ratings of all stimuli 
107 
 
types (all p < 0.001, except for sad > fear: p < 0.03), with the pattern sad > fearful > angry 
> neutral > happy (Figure 4.1) 
 
Relationship between psychopathic traits and affective response to emotional facial 
expressions 
 
Pearson partial correlations controlling for trait anxiety and intelligence revealed that 
psychopathic traits, in particular affective-interpersonal traits, were significantly associated 
with less positive emotional responses to happy faces. The associations with other 
emotional expressions had correlation coefficients of similar magnitude to the ones 
reported in the previous chapters (i.e. less negative emotional responses to negative 
emotional facial expressions), but failed to reach significance likely due to the lower N of 
the imaging study (Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2. Correlations between SRP scores and valence ratings of emotional response to 
facial expressions 
SRP scale Total    
Affective-
Interpersonal (AI) 
  
Lifestyle-Antisocial 
(LA) 
Control variables 
IQ & 
ANX 
 
IQ & 
ANX 
IQ, ANX 
& LA 
 
IQ & 
ANX 
IQ, ANX 
& AI 
  r   r r   r r 
 
       
Valence Ratings        
Sad Faces .09  .16 .24  -.01 -.19 
Fearful Faces .25  .28 .25  .16 -.07 
Angry Faces .26  .30 .27  .17 -.09 
Neutral Faces -.16  -.13 -.02  -.16 -.10 
Happy Faces -.44
*  -.47* -.36  -.34 .02 
  
              
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. * p < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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4.4.2. fMRI findings 
 
Neural response to each type of emotional facial expression 
 
At a conservative cluster forming threshold of p < 0.05, FWE corrected at voxel level, we 
identified a single significant cluster of activation within the lingual gyrus during the 
observation and rating of one’s own affective response to fearful faces in comparison to 
neutral faces. At an initial threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected, cluster extent > 20 voxels), 
we identified significant clusters of activation (FWE cluster corrected) within the lingual 
gyrus during the observation and rating of one’s own affective response to sad and fearful 
faces in comparison to neutral faces. No other clusters survived correction at the cluster 
level (Table 4.3). ROI analyses within the amygdala (bilaterally) did not identify significant 
cluster of activation for any type of emotional facial expression. It is possible that the lack 
of activation in areas that have been consistently reported in tasks involving affective and 
empathic processing is due to lack of power in our task to detect differential neural 
activation between emotional and neutral conditions. Alternatively, it is possible that the 
processing demands (reflecting on one’s emotional state) in emotional and neutral 
conditions are similar and, therefore, no differential activity can be identified. These 
alternative explanations will be further discussed in the Discussion section. We conducted a 
second set of exploratory post-hoc analyses to identify neural activity associated with 
performing the task. 
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Table 4.3. Peak cluster activations during empathic response to emotional facial expressions 
in comparison to neutral facial expressions 
  Peak   Cluster 
Brain regions L/R x y z t Z   Extent (k) p (FWE) 
          
Sad > Neutral          
Lingual gyrus L -12 -76 -11 5.72 4.64  105 .001 
Middle temporal gyrus R -51 11 -32 4.96 4.19  37 .285 
Inferior temporal gyrus R 48 14 -35 4.89 4.14  64 .068 
Posterior cingulate cortex L -9 -49 7 4.76 4.06  31 .392 
          
Fear > Neutral          
Lingual gyrus L -21 -88 -14 6.50 5.06  153 .002 
Parahippocampal gyrus L -27 -31 14 4.39 3.81  35 .350 
          
Angry  > Neutral          
Lingual gyrus L -18 -73 -11 4.06 3.58  22 .578 
          
Happy > Neutral          
Thalamus L -15 -22 1 4.73 4.04  20 .668 
Lingual gyrus L 9 -79 -11 4.06 3.58  29 .434 
                    
Notes:  Whole-brain analyses within grey matter mask, reported at a threshold level of p < 0.001 
(uncorrected), cluster size > 20 voxels. Spatial coordinates (x, y, z) are in Montreal Neurological Institute 
space. R = Right; L = Left. 
 
 
 
Post-hoc analyses 
 
Neural response to emotional facial expressions task 
A second set of exploratory post-hoc analyses was conducted in order to identify 
neural activity associated with performing the task. In this second set, we contrasted neural 
responses associated with all conditions in relation to null trials (fixation). Whole-brain 
analyses were conducted using a conservative cluster forming threshold of p < 0.05 (FWE 
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corrected) after applying an inclusive grey matter mask (segmented from the group average 
anatomical scan).  
Performing the task, i.e. explicitly resonating with others' facial expressions, evoked 
responses in regions that have been consistently identified to be associated with affective 
empathy: inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) extending to anterior insula (AI) bilaterally, and 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). Further activation was also observed in 
supramarginal gyrus (SMG), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), thalamus and cerebellum, 
extending to fusiform gyrus (Table 4.2, Figure 4.2). ROI analysis in bilateral amygdala 
identified two significant clusters of activation within the right and left amygdala (Table 
4.3, Figure 4.2). No regions exhibited the opposite pattern of activity.  
 
Table 4.4. Peak activations in brain regions during empathic response to faces 
 Peak Cluster 
Brain regions L/R x y z t Z Extent (k) p (FWE) 
         
Inferior frontal gyrus, opercular part R 54 11 7 13.63 7.56 659 < .001 
Extending  to Anterior insula R 45 5 1 10.05 6.55   
Cerebellum L 24 -49 -32 12.52 7.29 3583 < .001 
Extending to Fusiform gyrus L 39 -58 -14 12.01 7.15   
Thalamus L -12 -22 10 12.28 7.22 268 < .001 
Inferior frontal gyrus, opercular part L -45 -25 16 12.22 7.21 1302 < .001 
Extending. to Anterior insula L -42 -1 1 11.59 7.03   
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex R -3 14 34 11.66 7.05 235 < .001 
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex R 6 14 40 11.34 6.96 205 < .001 
Supramarginal gyrus L 45 -40 40 8.38 5.93 140 < .001 
Middle frontal gyrus R 36 41 25 8.22 5.86 176 < .001 
         
Notes: Whole-brain analysis within grey matter mask, reported at a threshold level of p < 0.05 (FWE 
corrected, cluster size > 20 voxels). Spatial coordinates (x, y, z) are in Montreal Neurological Institute space. 
R = Right; L = Left. 
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Table 4.5. Peak cluster activations in amygdala during empathic response to faces 
 Peak Cluster 
Brain regions L/R x y z t Z p (FEW) Extent (k) 
         
Amygdala L -27 -4 -17 5.95 4.77 .014 8 
Amygdala R 24 2 -11 3.62 3.26 .038 1 
Notes: ROI analysis using AAL mask, reported at a threshold level of p < 0.001 (uncorrected). Spatial 
coordinates (x, y, z) are in Montreal Neurological Institute space. R = Right; L = Left. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Neural correlates of empathic response to facial expressions. 
 
Notes: Results from whole-brain and amygdala ROI analyses illustrating clusters of voxels in IFG extending 
to anterior insula (top panel), dACC (middle panel) and amygdala (bottom panel). Overlays are displayed at p 
< 0.05 (FWE corrected) for whole brain analysis and at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) for amygdala ROI analysis. 
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Associations between neural responses and psychopathic traits 
 
Next, we tested whether responses elicited during the performance of the task, i.e. 
all conditions relative to fixation, in IFG, AI, dACC and amygdala regions were associated 
with individual differences in psychopathic traits. During the performance of the task, the 
magnitude of neural response in the anterior insula, bilaterally, was significantly negatively 
associated with levels of lifestyle-antisocial psychopathic traits (Right AI: r = -0.38, p = 
0.05; Left AI: r = -0.43, p = 0.02), and at trend with affective-interpersonal traits (Right AI: 
r = -0.31, p = 0.10; Left AI: r = -0.33, p = 0.08). The magnitude of response in right 
amygdala also presented significant negative associations with both affective-interpersonal 
traits (r = -0.38, p = 0.03) and lifestyle-antisocial behaviour (r = -0.37, p = 0.05). Partialing 
out each SRP dimension from the other, weakened correlation coefficients and increased p-
values of these associations rendering them non-significant, indicating that the shared 
variance between psychopathy facets was responsible for the associations. We found no 
significant correlations between psychopathic traits and response in lingual gyrus during 
the observation and rating of one’s own affective response to sad and fearful faces in 
comparison to neutral faces. 
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Figure 4.3. Association between neural response and psychopathic traits 
   
   
   
   
Notes: Regression plots depicting associations between task elicited anterior insula (8 mm sphere centred at peak coordinates [45 5 1; -42 -1 1]) and 
amygdala (8 mm sphere centred at peak coordinates [24 2 -11]) response and levels of psychopathic traits. Raw scores are presented for illustrative 
purposes. 
r = 0.31 r = 0.31 r = 0.36 
r = 0.39 r = 0.43 r = 0.29 
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4.5. Discussion 
 
The aims of the study described in this chapter were two-fold.  First, we wanted to 
identify the neural structures that subserve empathic response to emotional facial 
expressions, and whether these include the neural structures that have been consistently 
associated with empathic responding to pain and disgust (i.e. AI, dACC and IFG). Second, 
we wanted to verify whether the atypical response to other people’s emotional facial 
expressions observed at the behavioural level for individuals with high levels of 
psychopathic traits was also reflected at the neural level. Although we were not able to 
comprehensively identify neural substrates involved in empathic response to different types 
of emotions, we were able to confirm that the neural structures that are most consistently 
reported to be involved in empathy for pain and disgust (i.e. AI, dACC and IFG) and in 
detecting emotional saliency (i.e. amygdala) were robustly recruited during the 
performance of our task, i.e., when participants explicitly resonated with others’ facial 
expressions. Moreover, we were able to confirm that variability in hemodynamic response 
in AI and amygdala during the performance of our task was negatively associated with 
individual differences in psychopathic traits.  
Unfortunately, we were not able to disentangle possible distinct neural circuits 
involved in the affective response to different types of emotions. On reflection, we 
speculate that due to the limited number of trials per condition, and perhaps more 
importantly to the limited number of different stimuli per emotion type which might have 
caused repetition effects, this task was not optimally powered to obtain separate parameter 
estimates for all emotion types (each condition had 40 trials but these were comprised of 8 
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different stimuli repeated three times). Future improved versions of this task should include 
more trials per condition, and should not include stimuli repetitions in order to avoid 
habituation effects. Another possible explanation for the lack of differential neural 
activation between emotional and neutral conditions in our task would be that there are no 
differential processing demands between the conditions. That is, explicitly resonating with 
others’ emotional or neutral facial expressions would recruit the same psychological 
processes and therefore would not elicit differential neural activation.    
Nonetheless, our post-hoc analyses focusing on all trials vs. fixation baseline, allowed 
us to explore brain regions recruited during empathic response to facial expressions in 
general. When participants observed and rated their affective responses to facial 
expressions, BOLD response was observed in the IFG, AI and dACC, as well as in the 
amygdala. These regions are thought to play important roles in the experience of empathy. 
The amygdala is involved in detecting emotional saliency (Adolphs, 2010) and in 
experiencing emotional arousal in face of emotional stimuli (Decety, 2011); the AI is 
proposed to be critical for sensory integration (Critchley et al, 2004), and interoceptive 
awareness (Craig, 2009); and the dACC in emotional appraisal (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 
2011). These regions therefore play a crucial role in emotion awareness and understanding 
(Decety, 2011). The IFG, on the other hand, is thought to be important for emotion 
regulation (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 
2008). Recent meta-analyses have shown that indeed empathy tasks systematically recruit 
robust activation in these regions (Fan et al., 2011; Lamm et al., 2011). However, though 
previous studies have employed a wide range of different experimental tasks and stimuli to 
probe the neural basis of empathy, to our knowledge, no study before had used an 
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experimental task probing empathic response to different facial expressions. Although we 
can only make tentative conclusions based on our post-hoc analyses, our findings are in line 
with previous studies that implicate the amygdala, AI, IFG and dACC in affective empathic 
processing and suggest that these regions are recruited not only when we incidentally 
process other people’s pain or disgust, but also when we actively observe and introspect our 
own affective responses to other people’s emotions. 
In the previous chapters we demonstrate that, in the general population, variability in 
self-reported empathic response to emotional faces is associated with individual differences 
of psychopathic traits. Now, our present findings suggest that this association is also 
apparent at the neural level. We found that activity in those regions that are thought to be 
responsible for detecting emotional saliency and generating emotional arousal (amygdala), 
and for sensory integration and interoceptive awareness (anterior insula) was negatively 
associated with both dimensions of psychopathic traits. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study suggesting that neural correlates of empathic processing for facial expressions are 
associated with levels of psychopathic traits. Three previous studies have investigated 
associations between neural correlates of empathy for pain and levels of psychopathic 
traits. Two of those studies report similar results to ours in children with differing levels of 
callous-unemotional traits: when observing others in pain, children with high levels of 
callous-unemotional traits present reduced neural response within AI (Lockwood et al., 
2013; Marsh et al., 2013) and amygdala (Marsh et al., 2013). However, another study with 
adults (Decety et al., 2013) presented opposite results: when observing body parts in 
painful situations and facial expressions of pain, incarcerated men with high levels of 
psychopathy presented increased neural response within the AI when compared with 
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incarcerated men with low levels of psychopathy. Although, the source of inconsistency 
between child and adult studies remains to be investigated, our results seem to indicate that 
these different findings are not a reflection of differences in developmental stage. Further 
studies are necessary to clarify these inconsistencies, for example where forensic groups 
can be compared with a healthy comparison group. Nonetheless, our findings provide 
further evidence that psychopathy is marked by profound impairments in empathy, and that 
atypical amygdala and AI function represent neural markers of disrupted emotional and 
empathic processing for individuals with high levels of these traits.  
 
4.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter described an event-related fMRI study designed to identify brain regions 
involved in processing empathic response to emotional facial expressions and how activity 
in these structures are associated with individual differences in psychopathic traits. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to identify neural substrates involved in empathic response 
to different types of emotions, possibly due to design issues. Nonetheless, we were able to 
confirm that the neural structures that are most consistently reported to be involved in 
empathy for pain and disgust (i.e. AI, dACC and IFG) and in detecting emotional saliency 
(i.e. amygdala) are also robustly recruited when subjects are instructed to resonate with 
others’ facial expressions.  
We further tested whether individual differences in hemodynamic response in these 
regions were associated with levels of psychopathic traits. As described in the previous 
behavioural chapters, we have found that individual differences in psychopathic traits were 
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associated with weaker affective responses to emotional facial expressions of others. Here 
we demonstrated that variability in affective response to emotional faces also mapped onto 
individual differences in psychopathic traits at the neural level, particularly in amygdala 
and anterior insula, regions that are thought to be responsible for detecting emotional 
saliency and generating emotional arousal, and for sensory integration and interoceptive 
awareness. Our findings are in line with previous theoretical and empirical work suggesting 
that psychopathy is marked by profound impairments in empathy, that atypical amygdala 
and AI function represents neural markers of disrupted emotional and empathic processing 
for individuals with high levels of these traits, and that subclinical levels of variability in 
psychopathic traits map onto behavioural and neural processes typically found to be 
dysfunctional in criminal psychopaths.  
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CHAPTER 5: Neural correlates of everyday moral processing 
and associations with psychopathic traits in a sample of males 
from the general population 
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5.1.  Chapter Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters we describe two studies where we identified associations 
between specific dimensions of empathy and morality and psychopathic traits in the general 
population, as well as a study designed to identify the neural structures and circuits 
involved in empathic responses to different types of emotional facial expressions. In the 
present chapter, we present a study conducted to identify the neural structures and circuits 
involved in processing everyday personal moral transgressions and how activity in these 
structures and circuits are associated with individual differences in psychopathic traits. 
Despite recent advances in identifying the neural bases of human morality, relatively 
little is known about the neural substrates implicated in everyday and real-life moral 
cognitive processes. Delineating the neural circuitry implicated in everyday moral 
processing is essential if we are to further our understanding of individual differences in 
moral cognition and behaviour. Our aims were two-fold. First, we wanted to identify the 
neural structures that subserve moral cognition in everyday personal moral transgressions; 
and second, we wanted to test whether individual differences in neural responses specific to 
everyday moral processing (independent of emotional saliency and mentalising content) 
were associated with inter-individual variability in psychopathic traits in the general 
population. 
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5.1.1. Neural basis of everyday moral processing 
 
The question of why humans engage in behaviour that harms others even when they 
know it is wrong has long preoccupied and intrigued philosophers (e.g. Descartes, 1649; 
Hume, 1739-1740; Smith, 1759). In the past decade numerous studies have reported on the 
neural correlates of human morality (Greene et al., 2004; Moll, Zahn, et al., 2005). These 
studies have advanced our understanding of the processes involved in moral cognition, and 
motivated a paradigm shift where human morality is no longer conceptualised as a product 
of pure logic but rather as emerging from an interaction of reasoning, emotion and 
motivation.  
Despite recent advances in identifying the neural bases of human morality, relatively 
little is known about the neural substrates implicated in everyday and real-life moral 
cognitive processes. Extant studies have identified a consistent network of brain regions 
implicated in moral cognition, including  prefrontal cortex (PFC), insular cortex, amygdala, 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), precuneus, temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) (see Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Young & Dungan, 2012, 
for recent reviews). These regions are engaged by emotional, social as well as cognitive 
information processes (Bzdok et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the majority of these studies have 
been limited in elucidating everyday moral processing of personal transgressions in at least 
three respects. First, they have typically employed extreme scenarios and/or a third-person 
perspective (e.g. Greene et al., 2004; Heekeren et al., 2003; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moll, De 
Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, et al., 2002), making it difficult to generalise findings to personal 
moral transgressions in everyday life. For example, we are seldom faced with the dilemma 
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of sacrificing one person’s life to save many. But we might be tempted to behave 
immorally when facing situations where doing what is morally correct comes at a cost to 
oneself, and inflicting harm to another person is necessary to achieve our desired goal.  
Second, even when more realistic first-person scenarios have been employed (for example 
to identify the neural correlates of personal transgressions and of moral guilt) these studies 
have been problematic to interpret either because the emotional content of experimental and 
control scenarios has not been equated (e.g. Sommer et al., 2010), or because the intention 
to transgress has not been clear – yet, intention is a key factor when judging the morality of 
an action (Cushman, 2008). Specifically, previous studies have utilised scripts comprising 
actions that are either unintentional (e.g. Kédia et al., 2008), or where the intent is difficult 
to ascertain unambiguously (e.g. Green et al., 2010; Moll et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 
2004). It is important to control for these factors if we are to disentangle neural substrates 
that are involved in moral cognition (Christensen & Gomila, 2012). Third, the structure of 
the tasks employed in these studies precludes the separation of different processes that are 
likely involved when we evaluate the morality of our actions. These include an initial 
appraisal phase during which we make meaning out of and understand the morality of a 
particular course of action; and subsequent processes involved in reflecting on feelings of 
moral guilt which are triggered by the realisation that we have intentionally caused harm to 
another person (e.g. Eisenberg, 2000). Addressing each of these limitations is essential if 
we are to characterise how the brain process personal moral transgressions in everyday life. 
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5.1.2.  Individual differences in moral processing  
 
Delineating the neural circuitry implicated in everyday moral processing is essential if 
we are to further our understanding of individual differences in moral cognition. In 
particular if we want to understand why some individuals routinely present with 
irresponsible and immoral behaviour. The study of psychopathic traits can be particularly 
helpful in this regard. As described in previous chapters, psychopathy is a personality 
disorder characterised by a constellation of personality and behavioural traits, including 
blunted affect and lack of remorse as well as marked irresponsible lifestyle and antisocial 
behaviour (e.g. R. D. Hare & Neumann, 2008). Evidence from both clinical and community 
samples has shown that individual differences in psychopathic personality traits are 
associated with atypical neural activity during moral judgement and moral decision making, 
especially in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and amygdala (Glenn, Raine, & 
Schug, 2009; Harenski et al., 2010; Marsh & Cardinale, 2012; Marsh et al., 2012; Pujol et 
al., 2012). This atypical activity is thought to reflect the emotional and interpersonal 
impairments of the psychopathic personality (Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009; Harenski et al., 
2010; Marsh et al., 2012; Marsh & Cardinale, 2012). However, these studies have either 
used visual stimuli comprising third person or abstract actions (Harenski et al., 2010; Marsh 
et al., 2012) or have been confounded by emotionality, with the scenario implicated in the 
moral transgression typically being characterised by higher levels of emotional content 
(Glenn, Raine & Schug, 2009; Marsh & Cardinale, 2012). It remains therefore unclear 
whether psychopathic traits are associated with atypical moral or atypical emotional 
processing when it comes to processing personal moral transgressions.  
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5.1.3. The current study 
 
The current study had two main aims. The first aim was to identify the neural 
structures that subserve moral cognition in everyday personal moral transgressions. We 
developed a novel, more realistic and rigorously controlled task that comprised scripts of 
everyday moral scenarios, written in the second person. In the condition of interest (harm-
to-other), these scripts described scenarios in which the protagonist achieved a personal 
goal, but harmed another person. To control for other cognitive processes that might be 
necessary for moral cognition but are not specific to it, we included control scripts (harm-
to-self). These were matched for intentionality, causality, mentalising requirements, 
emotional valence and arousal, and entailed achieving the same goal as in the harm-to-other 
condition, but at a cost to the protagonist.  
We predicted that by equating these confounding factors in our task design, we would 
observe a more circumscribed set of brain areas than those identified in previous studies. 
For example, we expected that regions such as the amygdala, which is thought to play a 
crucial role in detecting emotional saliency (Adolphs, 2010; Vuilleumier, 2005), and  the 
right temporo-parietal junction, which is consistently engaged when we think about other 
people’s intentions (Van Overwalle, 2009), would not be activated specifically during 
harm-to-other scenarios. We also predicted that we would observe partially separable and 
overlapping neural circuits recruited during the initial appraisal of the moral transgressions 
and during the later effortful reflection on feelings of guilt resulting from the transgression.  
Our second aim was to test whether individual differences in neural responses specific 
to everyday moral (rather than emotional or mentalising) processing were associated with 
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inter-individual variability in psychopathic traits in the general population. We further 
explored the associations found between the magnitude of neural response during everyday 
moral processing and individual differences in psychopathic traits, by conducting 
exploratory psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses. These analyses allowed us 
elucidate whether individual differences in psychopathic traits modulate the functional 
integration between brain regions (Friston et al., 1997) during processing of everyday moral 
transgressions. 
 
 
5.2. Materials and Methods 
 
5.2.1. Participants 
 
Thirty-two right-handed male participants with no reported history of psychiatric 
disorder were recruited for this study. Of these, three were excluded prior to fMRI analyses: 
one for excessive response failure (>50%) and excessive MR signal artefact, one due to 
excessive MR signal artefact, and one for being identified as an univariate outlier on the 
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Short-Form SRP-SF (SRP-SF; Paulhus et al., in press) and 
a multivariate outlier on analyses involving the SRP-SF. Following exclusions, data from 
29 participants (mean age: 26.6, range: 20-40; mean estimated IQ: 110, range: 85-125) 
were analysed. All participants provided written informed consent according to the 
guidelines approved by UCL Division of Psychology and Language Sciences Ethics 
Committee who provided local ethics approval for this study. 
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5.2.2. Materials 
 
5.2.2.1. Assessment of General ability 
 
The Matrix Reasoning subscale of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was administered to estimate level of general intellectual ability. 
 
5.2.2.2. Assessment of psychopathic traits 
 
Psychopathic traits were assessed with the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 4 Short 
Form (SRP-SF; Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, in press), a 29-item scale designed to measure 
psychopathic attributes in non-institutionalized samples. The SRP-SF assesses 
psychopathic traits, organized in four facets – interpersonal, affective, lifestyle and 
antisocial – consistent with recent research on the PCL-R. Like the PCL-R, the four facets 
can be modeled in terms of the traditional two-factor dimensions. The SRP has been shown 
to have clear latent structure, good construct validity in male and female samples 
(Neumann et al., 2012) and is strongly correlated with the PCL-R (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 
2006; Paulhus et al., in press).  
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5.2.2.3. Assessment of Anxiety 
 
Participants also completed the State-Trait Anxiety Index (STAI; Spielberger et al., 
1970). The STAI comprises two subscales, one for measurement of trait anxiety (STAI-T) 
and the other for measurement of state anxiety (STAI-S). 
 
5.2.2.4. Moral Vignette task 
 
To develop this task, we initially created twenty-eight scenarios with two possible 
endings. These scenarios comprised descriptions of a personal goal, each with two possible 
outcomes to achieve the goal: causing harm to another person; or harm to oneself. These 
two outcomes thus represented either a moral transgression or a morally neutral (but still 
unpleasant) situation respectively. The scenarios’ outcomes were matched for a number of 
factors, including: participant perspective and consequent experience of agency; clarity 
about the intentionality and causality of the action in evaluation; recruitment of mentalising 
abilities (including number of characters); emotional arousal; order of presentation of 
relevant information; vocabulary (which can cause expression style and word framing 
effects); and word number. A two-phase pilot study was conducted to select the 15 best 
scenarios for the fMRI task. Forty participants read the stories and were asked to rate how 
guilty and how upset they would feel, and how morally wrong the action in the story was. 
The scenarios chosen were those in which the two possible outcomes were best matched for 
emotional valence and arousal (i.e. those with the least and no significant difference 
between means of upset ratings on the two possible outcomes), but only the moral 
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transgression outcome would elicit guilt (i.e. those with the greatest difference between 
means of guilt ratings on the two possible outcomes). Additionally, the moral transgression 
outcome (harm-to-other) had to be judged as clearly morally wrong (i.e. with mean ratings 
above the median point of the moral judgement scale). 
Immediately prior to scanning, participants were familiarised with the task and 
instructions. Scenarios used during practice were not used in the scanning session. Before 
the beginning of the task, participants were reminded of the instructions for 14,875 ms, 
corresponding to the 5 dummy scan volumes discarded prior to analysis (see below). 
Participants were presented with 30 trials, corresponding to 15 different scenarios, each 
with two outcomes, in which they were instructed to imagine themselves in each situation 
and rate how guilty they would feel. Trials comprised three stages: 1) presentation of the 
personal goal (‘setup’; 4 s); 2) presentation of the outcome, i.e. harm to other (moral 
transgression) or harm to self (morally neutral) to achieve the goal (‘outcome’; 6 s); and 3) 
rating of subjective guilt on a sliding scale from 1 (‘Not at all’) to 7 (‘A lot’) after a prompt 
question ‘How guilty would you feel?’. Participants made their ratings using three keys on a 
keypad. Two keys moved the cursor (initially positioned in the centre of the scale) to left or 
right on the sliding scale, and a third key ‘marked’ the answer. After marking their ratings, 
participants received visual confirmation of their answer for 1 s before the next trial started. 
Participants had a maximum 4 s to make their ratings. If a rating was not made within that 
time the trial was considered an error. Fifteen null trials, where the sentence ‘This is a small 
break, please keep still’ appeared on the screen for 10 s, were also included. Trials were 
presented in a pseudorandom order to prevent presentation of more than two consecutive 
trials of the same type and more than one consecutive null trial. After scanning, participants 
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read the scenarios for a second time and rated how upset they would feel in the imagined 
situation. 
Examples of the scenarios can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Moral vignettes task 
 
Notes: A) Task timeline for two non-consecutive trials. Participants were presented with each scenario over 
three screens, representing each phase of the trial: 1) presentation of the personal goal (‘Setup’; 4 s); 2) 
presentation of the outcome, i.e. harm-to-other or harm-to-self (‘Outcome’; 6 s); 3) rating of subjective guilt 
on a sliding scale (‘Rating’, 0-4 s); B) Manipulation check results. Ratings of guilt and upset in harm-to-other 
and harm-to-self trials. Both types of scenarios elicited similar levels of negative emotional state (t(28) = -
0.09; p = 0.93), but differed in terms of levels of guilt (t(28) = 9.23; p < 0.001). 
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5.2.3. Magnetic resonance imaging acquisition 
 
Images were acquired using a Siemens Avanto 1.5 T MRI scanner at the Birkbeck-
UCL Centre for Neuroimaging with a 32-channel headcoil.  A 5.5 min 3D T1-weighted 
anatomical scan, and multislice T2*-weighted echo planar images (EPIs) with BOLD 
contrast were acquired. The T2* EPI sequence used the following acquisition parameters: 
35 2 mm slices acquired in a descending trajectory with a 1 mm gap; echo time = 50 ms; 
repetition time = 2975 ms; slice tilt = -30
o
 (T > C); flip angle = 90
o
; field of view = 192 
mm; matrix size = 64 x 64. Functional data were acquired in a single run. Field maps 
(phase and magnitude images) were also acquired for use in the unwarping stage of data 
preprocessing. Stimulus presentation and response collection were presented in Cogent, 
running in Matlab 2011b (http://mathworks.com). 
 
5.3. Data analyses 
 
5.3.1. Behavioural analysis 
 
All behavioural analyses were conducted with SPSS 20 for Windows. To confirm that 
the stimuli in the experimental (harm-to-other) condition elicited significantly stronger 
moral guilt than the stimuli in the neutral condition (harm-to-self); but that both conditions 
elicited a similar negative emotional state, one-sample t-tests were conducted. Multiple 
regression analyses were conducted to inspect associations between psychopathic traits and 
the intensity of subjective feelings of guilt during the harm-to-other scenarios. First, trait 
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anxiety and intelligence were included as covariates to control for the influence of these 
variables on the relationships. Subsequently, to examine the influence of the unique 
variance of each dimension of psychopathic traits on subjective feelings of guilt, the other 
SRP dimension was entered as a third control variable.  
 
5.3.2. Image processing and analysis 
 
EPI data were analysed using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first five 
volumes were discarded, and the data were realigned to the sixth volume, unwarped using a 
fieldmap, normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute template resampling to a voxel 
size of 2x2x2 mm, and smoothed with an 8 mm full width at half-maximum Gaussian filter. 
Data were high-pass filtered at 128 s to remove low-frequency drifts, and the statistical 
model included an AR(1) autoregressive function to account for autocorrelations.  
An event-related analysis was conducted to compare neural responses associated with 
moral transgression (harm-to-other) and morally neutral (harm-to-self) scenarios. Onsets of 
interest were time-locked to the appraisal phase of the trial and to the guilt-rating phase of 
the trial, for both harm-to-self and harm-to-other scenarios, with durations of 6 s for the 
appraisal phase and variable duration (0-4 s) for the guilt-rating phase. Regressors of 
interest were created by convolution of these onsets with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function.  Other regressors modelled in the analysis included: goal presentation 
(pooled across all scenarios); null trials; and errors. The six realignment parameters were 
modelled as parameters of no interest in both analyses. For one participant, an extra 
regressor was included to model 3 corrupted images resulting from excessive motion. 
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These images were removed and the adjacent images interpolated in order to prevent 
distortion of the between-subjects mask. First-level contrast images were calculated by 
applying appropriate linear contrasts to the parameter estimates of regressors of interest and 
entered into second-level analyses. Second-level analyses were conducted by performing 
one-sample t-tests on each of these contrasts using the summary-statistics approach to 
random-effects analysis. Whole-brain analyses were conducted using a threshold of p < 
0.05, FWE corrected at the voxel level, after applying an inclusive grey matter mask 
(segmented from the group average anatomical scan). To identify regions that were 
commonly active during the moral appraisal and guilt reflection, a mask was created at a 
liberal threshold of p < .001, uncorrected, for the two contrasts of interest (appraisal of 
harm to other>appraisal of harm to self (AHO > AHS), and reflection on guilt for harm to 
other>reflection on guilt for harm to self (RHO > RHS). We then ran each contrast using an 
inclusive mask derived from running the other contrast with a cluster-forming threshold of 
p<.001 (uncorrected), cluster size 20 voxels), using a threshold of p<0.05 corrected for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster-level within the mask. 
To identify associations between individual differences in psychopathic traits and 
individual differences in hemodynamic response during moral and guilt processing, we 
used the Marsbar toolbox (Brett et al., 2009) to create regions of interest (ROIs) and 
extracted average contrast estimates across these ROIs based on significant peaks identified 
from the above whole-brain analyses (ROIs defined as 8 mm spheres with peaks of 
significant clusters as centre coordinates). Note that these correlation analyses are 
orthogonal to the contrast used to define the ROI. To ensure that our results were due to our 
personality constructs of interest (distinct dimensions of psychopathy), we ran multiple 
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regression analyses including trait anxiety and intelligence as covariates to control for these 
variables. Subsequently, to examine the influence of the unique variance of each SRP 
dimension on criterion variables, the other SRP dimension was entered as a third control 
variable. Adjustment using the Benjamini and Hochberg False Discovery Rate procedure 
(FDR; Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) was used to control the probability of making a 
Type-I error across multiple regions. 
To further clarify the associations found between the magnitude of mOFC response 
during guilt reflection and psychopathy lifestyle and antisocial personality traits, we carried 
out a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis, which can elucidate whether 
functional integration occurs between regions, as well as how this integration changes as a 
function of different psychological contexts (Friston et al., 1997). The PPI analysis consists 
of a design matrix with three regressors: the psychological variable, which represents the 
experimental task (here, the contrast RHO>RHS); the physiological variable, which 
represents the neural response in the seed region (here, the mOFC); and a third variable 
representing the interaction between the first and the second variables. The coordinates of 
the seed region corresponded to the peak activation within the mOFC cluster detected in 
RHO>RHS contrast. For each individual, the principal eigenvariate across the fMRI time-
series was extracted from a sphere of 8 mm radius centred on the peak height coordinates 
(physiological variable). This was multiplied by the RHO>RHS contrast (psychological 
variable) to create a third variable representing the interaction between the time-series and 
the psychological variable (PPI variable). Following estimation, subject-specific contrast 
images were then entered into two random-effects analyses using one-sample t-tests: the 
first using the physiological variable to estimate the direction of the coupling of the mOFC 
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seed region with other regions; and the second using the PPI variable to identify which 
regions had increased coupling with the mOFC during guilt reflection (RHO relative to 
RHS). Whole-brain analyses were conducted with a cluster-forming threshold of p<.001 
(uncorrected) and cluster size of 20 voxels after applying an inclusive grey matter mask. 
Regions surviving FWE cluster level correction (p<.05) across the whole brain were 
considered statistically significant. To examine whether the increased coupling identified 
during RHO was associated with individual differences in psychopathic traits, we extracted 
PPI estimates using the Marsbar toolbox (Brett et al., 2002) as described above for the 
categorical fMRI analysis.  
 
5.4. Results  
 
Demographic and personality statistics are presented on Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1. Participants’ demographic and personality statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
Age 20 40 26.31 5.51 
WASI matrices 41 68 56.83 6.12 
STAI Trait 22 58 39.79 9.49 
SRP Total 31 80 55.24 14.09 
SRP Affective-Interpersonal 14 39 27.38 7.75 
SRP Lifestyle-Antisocial 15 46 26.72 7.85 
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5.4.1. Behavioural Findings 
 
Manipulation check 
 
Both types of scenarios (harm-to-other and harm-to-self to achieve a personal goal) 
elicited a negative emotional state: upset. Importantly upset ratings were similar between 
the conditions (t(28) = -.09;  p = .93). By contrast, guilt was elicited significantly more 
strongly during moral transgression (i.e. the harm-to-other scenarios) compared with harm-
to-self (t(28)=9.23; p<.001) (Figure 5.1). 
 
Relationship between psychopathic traits and moral guilt feelings 
 
Multiple regression analyses controlling for trait anxiety and intelligence revealed 
that the intensity of subjective guilty feeling during the harm-to-other scenarios was 
significantly negatively associated with individual differences in affective-interpersonal 
traits (r = -0.41; p < 0.05), and at trend with lifestyle-antisocial behaviour traits (r = -0.35; p 
= 0.07). After partialing out each psychopathic traits dimension from the other these 
associations became weaker and non-significant (r = -0.26; -0.16). 
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5.4.2. fMRI Findings 
 
Separable neural circuits engaged during the appraisal of and guilt reflection on everyday 
moral transgressions  
 
Our fMRI paradigm allowed us to distinguish between the processes involved in 
appraising the moral transgression (during the presentation of each scenario) and in 
reflecting on feelings of guilt elicited by that transgression (rated immediately after each 
scenario). We constructed a single statistical model in which the onsets of the regressors of 
interest were time-locked to (1) the appraisal phase of the trial and (2) to the guilt-rating 
phase of the trial. Appraising one’s own moral transgression (harm- to-other scenario) 
relative to morally neutral scenarios (harm-to-self scenario), evoked responses in vmPFC 
(superior rostral gyrus and superior frontal gyrus, medial part) regions, dlPFC (superior 
frontal gyrus, lateral part), bilateral anterior insula and posterior cingulate cortex (Figure 
5.2; Table 5.2), all of which survived whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons at 
the voxel level. No regions exhibited the opposite pattern of activity at this threshold, or at 
the more lenient threshold level of p < .001 (uncorrected), cluster size > 20 voxels. Guilt 
reflection during harm-to-other relative to harm-to-self scenarios evoked responses in 
posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) and cerebellum, both of which survived whole-
brain correction for multiple comparisons at the voxel level (Figure 2; Table 1). No regions 
exhibited the opposite pattern of activity at this threshold, or at the more lenient threshold 
level of p < .001 (uncorrected), cluster size > 20 voxels. 
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Table 5.2. Peak cluster activations in brain regions during appraisal of one’s own moral 
transgression 
  Peak   Cluster 
Brain regions L/R x y z t Z   
Ext. 
(k) 
p 
(FWE) 
          Appraisal  moral transgression 
(AHO>AHS)        
 
 
Superior rostral gyrus L -9 53 10 7.89 5.68 
 
1004 <.001 
Superior frontal gyrus, lateral part L -27 47 31 7.47 5.5 
 
248 <.001 
Anterior insula L -30 -17 -14 6.62 5.09 
 
294 <.001 
Anterior insula R 36 5 4 6.44 5.00 
 
111 .006 
Superior temporal gyrus L -57 -28 16 4.88 4.11 
 
81 .025 
Superior frontal gyrus R -9 49 16 5.89 4.71 
 
50 .128 
Thalamus L -15 -19 -2 5.3 4.37 
 
29 .415 
Middle frontal gyrus R -33 50 1 4.83 4.08 
 
48 .143 
Superior parietal lobule L 66 -31 40 4.71 4.00 
 
22 .596 
Hippocampus L -27 -10 -20 4.7 4.00 
 
21 .625 
Supramarginal gyrus L -60 -28 -20 4.66 3.98 
 
31 .372 
Posterior cingulate gyrus L -6 -28 28 4.57 3.91 
 
58 .082 
Middle temporal gyrus L 51 -58 7 4.13 3.62 
 
27 .462 
Supramarginal gyrus L 48 -28 22 4.11 3.61 
 
24 .54 
 
      
  
 
Guilt reflection (RHO>RHS) 
  
Posterior middle temporal gyrus  R 51 -55 -8 6.74 5.15 
 
67 .059 
Cerebellum L -6 -55 -11 6.58 5.07 
 
434 <.001 
Medial orbital gyrus (mOFC) L -9 47 -8 5.26 4.35 
 
102 <.001 
Medial frontal gyrus R 3 53 -5 4.92 4.14 
 
64 .069 
Putamen R -18 14 -2 4.59 3.93 
 
43 .209 
                    
Notes: Whole-brain analyses within grey matter mask, reported at a threshold level of p < 0.001 
(uncorrected), cluster size > 20 voxels for descriptive purposes. Spatial coordinates (x, y, z) are in Montreal 
Neurological Institute space. R = Right; L = Left. AHO = appraisal harm-to-other; AHS=appraisal harm-to-
self; RHO = reflection harm-to-other; RHS=reflection harm-to-self. 
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Overlapping neural circuits during moral appraisal and guilt reflection 
 
To identify regions that were active during both moral appraisal and guilt reflection 
we created two masks, each including all voxels activated in each contrast using a threshold 
of p < .001 (uncorrected). We then ran the appraisal contrast inside the reflection contrast 
mask and vice versa, correcting for multiple comparisons at the cluster level within the 
respective masks. These analyses revealed a common cluster of activation encompassing 
voxels within the vmPFC (superior rostral gyrus) and mOFC (Figure 5.2; Table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3. Commonly activated brain regions during appraisal of moral transgressions and 
reflection on guilt 
  Peak  Cluster 
Brain regions L/R x y z t Z 
 Ext. 
(k) 
p 
(FWE) 
       
 
  
Appraisal  moral transgression (AHO>AHS) 
      
 
  
Superior rostral gyrus L -6 53 7 7.54 5.53  67 .001 
          
Guilt reflection (RHO>RHS) 
      
 
  
Medial orbital gyrus   L -9 47 -8 5.26 4.35  67 .003 
Notes: Analyses within the corresponding contrast activation mask; initial cluster-forming threshold of p < 
0.001 (uncorrected), k > 20. Spatial coordinates (x, y, z) are in Montreal Neurological Institute space. R = 
right; L = left. AHO = Appraisal harm-to-other; AHS = Appraisal harm-to-self; RHO = Reflection harm-to-
other; RHS = Reflection harm-to-self. 
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Figure 5.2. Neural correlates for the appraisal of and guilt reflection on everyday moral 
transgressions 
 
Notes: Results from whole-brain analyses illustrating clusters of voxels in anterior insula and dlPFC during 
moral appraisal (blue: AHO > AHS); and the common cluster of activation in mOFC/vmPFC during moral 
appraisal and guilt reflection (red: RHO > RHS; white: overlap). Overlays are displayed at p < 0.001 
(uncorrected) for illustrative purposes. 
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Associations between neural responses and psychopathic traits 
 
Next, we tested whether above described responses elicited by the appraisal of the 
personal moral transgression and by subsequent guilt reflection were associated with 
individual differences in psychopathic traits. After FDR correction for multiple regions, 
none of the responses elicited during the appraisal phase were associated with any of the 
psychopathic traits dimensions. However, the magnitude of neural response in the 
commonly activated mOFC region, during the reflection phase, was significantly positively 
associated with levels of lifestyle-antisocial behaviour (LA; r = 0.50; p = 0.03, corrected) 
(Figure 5.3; Table 5.5). Partialing out each SRP dimension from the other yielded similar 
findings and, although the association between response in mOFC and LA traits did not 
survive correction for multiple comparisons, it was nominally significant (r = 0.48, p = 
0.01). 
 
Figure 5.3. Association between neural response in vmPFC/mOFC and psychopathic traits 
 
Notes: Regression plot depicting the association between guilt-elicited mOFC response and levels of lifestyle-
antisocial behaviour traits. Raw scores are presented for illustrative purposes. RHO = Reflection Harm-to-
Other; RHS = Reflection Harm-to-Self. 
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Table 5.4. Associations between neural response during moral appraisal and guilt reflection 
and psychopathic traits 
   Unique variance 
Con. Clusters' peak activations SRP-AI SRP-LA SRP-AI SRP-LA 
      
  Whole brain         
A
H
O
>
A
H
S
 
Superior rostral gyrus .37 .35 .21 .19 
Superior frontal gyrus, medial part  .30 .30 .16 .16 
SFGlp .29 .42 .07 .31 
Left anterior insula .33 .30 .19 .15 
Right anterior insula .00 .17 -.13 .21 
Perigenual anterior cingulate .31 .34 .14 .21 
Posterior cingulate .21 .18 .14 .07 
Within RHO>RHS mask         
Superior rostral gyrus .29 .28 .16 .14 
            
R
H
O
>
R
H
S
 Whole brain         
Posterior middle temporal gyrus .46 .43 .28 .23 
Within AHO>AHS mask         
Medial orbitofrontal cortex .32 .55* -.01 .48 
Notes: Partial correlation values (after controlling for IQ and anxiety) and FDR corrected p-values are 
presented. * p < 0.05; AI = Affective-Interpersonal traits; LA = Lifestyle-Antisocial Behaviour traits; AHO = 
Appraisal Harm-to-Other; AHS = Appraisal Harm-to-Self; RHO = Reflection Harm-to-Other; RHS = 
Reflection Harm-to-Self. 
 
 
Functional coupling of the mOFC during guilty reflection 
 
To further clarify the associations between the magnitude of mOFC response during 
guilt reflection and psychopathy lifestyle and antisocial personality traits, we carried out a 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis, which can elucidate whether functional 
integration occurs between regions, as well as how this integration changes as a function of 
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different psychological contexts (Friston et al., 1997). The mOFC seed region (8mm sphere 
centred at coordinate showing highest activation during moral reflection) was significantly 
(whole brain, cluster-level corrected) coupled with the posterior insula (peak coordinate: 39 
-22 1; Z = 6.34; p < 0.001), pMTG (peak coordinate: -15 -67 7; Z = 6.83; p < 0.001) and 
inferior frontal gyrus, orbital part (peak coordinate: -30 50 4; Z = 5.74; p < 0.001) 
extending to lateral middle frontal gyrus, with increased coupling during guilt reflection in 
harm-to-other trials vs. harm-to-self trials (posterior insula: Z = 4.62; p < 0.01; pMTG: Z = 
4.60, p < .001; inferior frontal gyrus: Z = 4.32; p < 0.01) (Table 5.5). 
 
Table 5.5. Psychophysiological interaction analysis of mOFC region during guilt reflection 
 
Peak  Cluster 
Brain regions L/R x y z t Z 
 Ext. 
(k) 
p 
(FWE) 
          
Posterior insula R 39 -22 1 5.73 4.62  103 .008 
Posterior middle temporal gyrus L -15 -67 7 5.7 4.6  493 <.001 
Inferior frontal gyrus, orbital part L -30 50 4 5.22 4.32  138 .002 
Cerebellum R 36 -49 -32 4.45 3.84  97 .011 
Notes: Whole-brain analyses with grey matter mask; initial cluster-forming threshold of p < 0.001 
(uncorrected), k > 20. Spatial coordinates (x, y, z) are in Montreal Neurological Institute space. R = Right; L 
= Left.  
 
 
We then examined whether the increased coupling during harm-to-other trials was 
associated with individual differences in psychopathic traits, and found a negative 
association between the magnitude of modulation of mOFC coupling with posterior insula 
and levels of lifestyle-antisocial traits (r = -0.46; p < 0.05, corrected) (Figure 5.4). 
Partialing out each SRP dimension from the other yielded similar findings and, although 
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the association between the magnitude of modulation of mOFC coupling with posterior 
insula and LA traits did not survive correction for multiple comparisons, it was nominally 
significant (r = -0.41, p = 0.04). 
 
Figure 5.4. Association between mOFC-PI connectivity and psychopathic traits 
 
Notes: Regression plot depicting the negative association between the magnitude of modulation of mOFC 
coupling with posterior insula and levels of lifestyle-antisocial traits. Overlay is displayed at p < 0.001 
(uncorrected), and raw scores are presented for illustrative purposes. RHO = Reflection Harm-to-Other; 
RHS=Reflection Harm-to-Self. 
 
 
 
Post-Hoc Analyses 
 
Finally, we wanted to probe whether the associations found between the mOFC 
response and connectivity during guilt reflection with lifestyle and antisocial traits were 
driven by lifestyle traits, by antisocial behaviour, or both. We conducted a new set of 
multiple regression analyses with these two facets, following the methods described for the 
initial analyses with the two dimensions (affective-interpersonal; lifestyle-antisocial). Both 
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lifestyle (r = 0.41, p = 0.03) and antisocial (r = 0.54, p > 0.01) facets were significantly 
positively associated with mOFC response; whilst only the lifestyle facet was negatively 
associated with functional connectivity with posterior insula (r = -0.46, p = 0.02; antisocial 
behaviour: r = -0.23, p = 0.25) (Figures 5.5 and 5.6). Behaviourally, only the lifestyle facet 
was negatively associated with the intensity of subjective feelings of guilt during the harm-
to-other scenarios (r = -.41; p = 0.03; antisocial behaviour: r = -0.27, p = 0.17). 
 
Figure 5.5. Associations between neural response in vmPFC/mOFC and psychopathic traits 
 
Notes: Regression plot depicting the association between guilt-elicited mOFC response and levels of lifestyle 
and antisocial behaviour traits. Raw scores are presented for illustrative purposes. RHO = Reflection Harm-
to-Other; RHS=Reflection Harm-to-Self. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Associations between mOFC-PI connectivity and psychopathic traits 
Notes: Regression plots depicting associations between the magnitude of modulation of mOFC coupling with 
posterior insula and levels of lifestyle and antisocial traits. Overlays are displayed at p<.001 (uncorrected) and 
raw scores are presented for illustrative purposes. RHO = Reflection Harm-to-Other; RHS=Reflection Harm-
to-Self. 
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5.5. Discussion 
 
The study described in this chapter had two main goals: 1) to identify the neural 
structures that subserve moral cognition in everyday personal moral transgressions; and 2) 
to test whether individual differences in neural responses specific to everyday moral 
processing (independent of emotional saliency and mentalising content) were associated 
with inter-individual variability in psychopathic traits in the general population. We were 
able to delineate a network of brain regions engaged when people envisage the kinds of 
personal moral transgressions that might be encountered in everyday life. We also 
disambiguated the initial appraisal of the scenario from subsequent reflection on feelings 
of guilt that arise following a moral transgression. While these processes were underpinned 
by two largely separable neural circuits, a cluster in the ventral prefrontal cortex (superior 
rostral gyrus and mOFC), was commonly activated across both. We also demonstrated 
associations between individual differences in psychopathic traits and neural response to 
everyday moral transgressions. Notably, mOFC response during guilt reflection was 
positively associated with individual differences in lifestyle traits antisocial behaviour. 
Additionally, weaker guilt-elicited functional coupling of mOFC and posterior insula was 
positively associated with lifestyle characteristics of psychopathic personality. 
Our task design enabled us to disentangle neural circuits that are likely to be involved 
during different stages of moral processing. We identified partially separable and 
overlapping brain regions recruited during the initial appraisal of a transgression and the 
effortful reflection on subsequent feelings of moral guilt. Appraising one’s own moral 
transgressions evoked activation in vmPFC, dlPFC, mOFC, anterior insula and posterior 
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cingulate cortex. These regions have been reported to be involved in the cognitive and 
affective evaluation of self and others and in decision-making subserving moral judgement. 
For example, the anterior insula has been found to be involved not only in making negative 
judgments in economic, social and emotional contexts, but also in making negative (but not 
positive) moral judgments (Borg et al., 2008).  The dlPFC has been functionally implicated 
in norm-related behaviour (Sanfey et al, 2003), and has been speculated to play a pivotal 
role in cost-benefit analyses (Greene et al, 2001). Finally, vmPFC is the area most 
consistently implicated in moral judgment and moral decision-making (e.g. Greene et al, 
2001; Moll et al., 2002a; Fumagalli and Priori, 2012), and lesions to this region have been 
reported to result in deficits in social and moral behaviour (Damasio et al., 1994; Koenigs 
and Tranel, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007). Reflecting on feelings of moral guilt elicited 
activity in the mOFC and in the right posterior middle temporal gyrus. While the mOFC 
has been previously reported to participate in moral emotion processing (Moll et al, 2005b), 
our task design enabled us to verify that activation in this region is indeed evoked by 
processing of moral guilt, rather than other possible negative emotional states that might 
result from unpleasant scenarios, but which do not unambiguously involve a moral 
transgression as they lack clear intentionality.  
The processes of appraising a moral transgression and reflecting on subsequent guilt 
shared an overlapping neural substrate in vmPFC/mOFC, which have been consistently 
reported in studies of moral cognition, independent of task used (e.g. Greene et al., 2004; 
Moll et al., 2002a; Moll et al., 2002b). This part of the ventral PFC has also been 
hypothesised to integrate different types of neural information in order to influence 
decision-making (Wallis, 2007). In particular, it has been hypothesised to integrate positive 
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and negative reward signals into a representation of the overall expected value or utility of 
a decision (Knutson et al., 2006; Wallis, 2007; Hare et al., 2010). This region is 
consistently recruited during economic decision-making, including the valuation of both 
appetitive and aversive goals (Plassman et al., 2010), and also during more complex social 
decisions, such as deciding to donate money to charities (Hare et al., 2010). More 
importantly, it has been found to be associated with the “expected moral value” of a 
decision on moral dilemmas where one has to consider sacrificing the life of one person to 
save the life of many (Shenhav et al., 2010). In our task a cluster within these regions was 
activated both during the appraisal of the moral transgression and during the reflection on 
resulting feelings of guilt. We speculate that this vmPFC/mOFC region subserves the 
integration of information from the other cognitive and emotional evaluative mechanisms, 
allowing the identification and assignment of value to a moral transgression, and thus 
enabling the experience of moral guilt.  
Our study identified a relatively circumscribed set of brain areas; we did not, for 
example, observe activations in the amygdala, rTPJ and pSTS, regions that have been 
consistently reported to relate to moral processing (Fumagalli and Priori, 2012; Young and 
Dungan, 2012). We equated the emotional and mentalising demands between experimental 
conditions and this may explain the absence of differential activation in these regions. For 
example, the amygdala is known to respond to emotional stimuli and is thought to play a 
crucial role in detecting emotional saliency (Adolphs, 2005), while regions such as rTPJ are 
thought to play a central role in inferring and representing another people’s beliefs and 
mental states (Schultz et al., 2005; Young et al., 2007). Regions such as rTPJ no doubt 
contribute to moral cognition (for example, to ascertain the intention of an action (Young 
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and Saxe, 2009)), but may not play a specific role in processing moral content and, in 
particular, in processing personal transgressions. 
 We found a positive association between hemodynamic response in this same 
vmPFC/mOFC region during the reflection of feelings of guilt following one’s own 
everyday moral transgressions and lifestyle and antisocial psychopathy traits. A previous 
study investigating social norm violations (Prehn et al., 2008) reported a similar negative 
association between response in an adjacent cluster and “moral judgement competence”, 
measured by the Moral Judgment Test, which assesses the ability to apply moral 
orientations and principles in a consistent and differentiated manner in varying social 
situations (Lind, 2007). Taken together, these findings are consistent with an interpretation 
in terms of cortical efficiency (Rypma et al., 2006), i.e. that greater activation in 
vmPFC/mOFC reflects increased recruitment of less efficient neurocognitive resources for 
computing the moral value of a situation. In other words, the circuitry subserving the ability 
to reflect on moral choices, and compute the moral value of a situation, may operate less 
efficiently in individuals who are more prone to poor behavioural control and more likely to 
engage in antisocial behaviour. Alternatively, greater mOFC activity may not reflect  
reduced efficiency, but instead may reflect the  additional recruitment of this region to 
make a value comparison (Rushworth et al., 2012, McNamee et al., 2013) between the 
simultaneously aversive and appetitive outcomes present in everyday moral scenarios. 
Morally charged situations are characterised by the conflict between opposing values. In 
our task, the outcome of the harm-to-other scenario has the reward of achieving a desired 
goal but also the cost of feeling guilt when faced with harm to another person. Perhaps, for 
individuals with high levels of lifestyle-antisocial traits, whose behaviour is often described 
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as being driven by immediate or hedonistic goals, the comparison between these two values 
is more finely balanced, possibly necessitating increased mOFC recruitment to effect a 
value comparison. In either case, our results appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that 
atypical functioning in the vmPFC/mOFC plays a critical role in psychopathy/disruptive 
behaviour disorders (Blair, 2008a; White et al., 2013), and contributes to the disordered 
lifestyle and antisocial behaviour exhibited by individuals with high levels of these traits. 
However, it should be noted that fMRI is not able to establish a causal relationship between 
neural and questionnaire responses.  
Our findings also indicate that lifestyle traits, but not antisocial behaviour, are 
negatively associated with self-reports of guilt following the moral transgressions, and with 
the coupling of the mOFC with a cluster in the posterior insula. Previous studies suggest 
that the posterior insula is activated during the processing of moral disgust (but not non-
moral disgust) (Borg et al., 2008; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, et al., 2005). One tentative 
explanation is that the posterior insula codes an automatic subjective emotion of disgust, or 
moral indignation, which calibrates the mOFC deliberative process of computing the value 
of an action. However, it is also plausible that a top-down process is in play where the 
computation of the value in the mOFC determines the subjective feeling of moral 
indignation coded in the posterior insula. In either case, it is conceivable that two processes 
are at play and contribute differentially to lifestyle and antisocial aspects of psychopathy. It 
is possible that a dysfunctional computation of the moral value of a situation contributes to 
higher levels of antisocial behaviour; whilst dysfunction of the computation of the moral 
value combined with weaker coding of moral disgust contributes to higher levels of 
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irresponsible and impulsive lifestyle traits (and, in turn, to lower levels of feelings of guilt 
after a moral transgression).  
 
5.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter describes an event-related fMRI study conducted to identify the neural 
structures and circuits involved in processing everyday personal moral transgressions and 
how activity in these structures and circuits are associated with individual differences in 
psychopathic traits. We developed a novel, more realistic and rigorously controlled task 
that comprised scripts of everyday moral scenarios, written in the second person. By 
equating emotional saliency and mentalising requirements, we were able to test whether 
individual differences in neural responses specific to everyday moral (rather than emotional 
or mentalising) processing were associated with inter-individual variability in psychopathic 
traits in the general population. We further explored the associations found between the 
magnitude of neural response during everyday moral processing and individual differences 
in psychopathic traits, by conducting exploratory psychophysiological interaction (PPI) 
analyses. These analyses allowed us elucidate whether individual differences in 
psychopathic traits modulate the functional integration that occurs between brain regions 
(Friston et al., 1997) during processing of everyday moral transgressions.  
In this chapter, we demonstrated that the appraisal of personal everyday moral 
transgressions and reflection on subsequent feelings of guilt elicit responses in two partially 
separable neural circuits, while a portion of the vmPFC/mOFC cortex is commonly 
activated during both. We also identified associations between the neural correlates of 
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moral reflection after everyday moral transgressions and individual differences in 
psychopathic traits. Importantly, our highly controlled task allowed us to show that these 
associations are not due to more general impairments in emotional or mentalising processes 
but are specific to moral cognition. It is possible that different aspects of moral processing 
are differentially affected by the various dimensions comprising psychopathic traits. While 
individuals high in psychopathic traits may in part show little concern for the needs of 
others because of reduced emotional responsivity, our findings suggest that dysfunction in 
circuits subserving the ability to reflect on moral choices may be equally important in 
accounting for antisocial and irresponsible patterns of behaviour in these individuals. 
In the next chapter we will summarise the findings from the present and previous 
empirical chapters and will discuss the implications of these findings. 
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CHAPTER 6: General Discussion  
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6.1. Overview  
 
Psychopathy is a personality disorder that can be defined by profound disturbances in 
empathic response to others and repeated engagement in immoral behaviour (Cleckley, 
1976; Hare, 2003; Blair et al, 2005). However, empathy and morality are complex 
phenomena. They are ambiguous constructs, have numerous different definitions and 
conceptualizations, and are multidimensional in nature. Therefore, it is not only crucial to 
define these phenomena carefully if we are to better understand them, but also to 
systematically identify and isolate its distinct processes and components if we are to 
comprehend the role they play in other complex constructs such as psychopathic traits. 
Investigating individual differences in levels of psychopathic traits within the general 
population can be valuable for furthering our understanding of psychopathy and the 
underlying processing atypicalities that give rise to its constellation of personality traits and 
behaviour. At present, we still know little about how behavioural and neural substrates of 
distinct dimensions of empathy and morality are associated with variation of psychopathic 
traits. In this thesis, we have employed behavioural and neuroimaging methods to 
investigate how variability in correlates of distinct components of empathy and morality is 
reflected in psychopathic traits in the general population. 
 
6.2. Research questions 
 
The current thesis set out to investigate how variability in distinct components of 
empathy and morality are associated with individual differences in psychopathic traits in 
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the general population. The research presented here endeavoured to answer to five 
outstanding research questions: 1) Given the complexity and multidimensionality of the 
constructs of empathy and morality, which specific dimensions of these constructs are 
associated with psychopathic traits at the behavioural level? 2) Are behavioural correlates 
of empathy and morality in psychopathic traits specifically associated with the affective-
interpersonal dimension, with the lifestyle-antisocial dimension, or with both? 3) Are these 
associations consistent across genders? 4) Are associations between psychopathic traits and 
empathic processing reflected at the neural level? and, finally, 5) Are associations between 
psychopathic traits and moral processing reflected at the neural level? Each of these will be 
addressed in the sections below.  
 
6.2.1. Which specific dimensions of these constructs are associated with 
psychopathic traits at the behavioural level? 
 
In chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, we described two behavioural studies where we 
employed several paradigms concurrently to investigate how variability in distinct 
components of empathy and morality are associated with variability in levels of 
psychopathic traits in the general population. Overall, our findings indicate that in the 
general population, individual differences in psychopathic traits are associated with 
variability in empathic responses to emotional facial expressions and emotional-eliciting 
stories; propensity to feel moral emotions such as empathic concern and guilt; and 
difficulty to make decisions in moral dilemmas. 
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Surprisingly, and contrary to previous studies reporting that psychopathic traits are 
associated with difficulties in recognising sad and fearful facial affect (Blair et al., 2004; 
Montagne et al., 2005), we found no significant associations between these traits and 
sensitivity to recognise emotional facial expressions. Previous research with a community 
sample has reported similar negative results (Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008). It is possible 
that the measures used in ours and in previous studies to measure emotional recognition 
ability are not sensitive enough to capture what is possibly subtle variation in emotional 
recognition abilities in the general population. However, it is also possible that impairments 
in emotional recognition are present only in extreme cohorts of psychopathy, which would 
explain the lack of consistent findings in studies using community samples. Our results also 
indicate that variation in emotion recognition sensitivity is not consistently associated with 
other measures of affective empathy. This could again be due to lack of sensitivity of the 
measure used, but could also indicate that emotional recognition is a distinct process from 
affective empathy and, therefore, that caution should be used when using affect recognition 
as a proxy of affective empathy. 
Our findings did however indicate a clear negative association between levels of 
psychopathic traits and variability in affective empathy, i.e. in experiencing an affective or 
sensory state that is similar to that of another person, but where one is aware that the source 
of the state is the other person. This association was patent in the results from the Affective 
Empathy scale of the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE; Reniers 
et al., 2011), and was further corroborated and specified by the results from the affective 
empathy tasks where participants indicated their feelings using the Self-Assessment 
Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). In these tasks, higher levels of psychopathic traits 
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were associated with less negative empathic responses to both observed and imagined 
displays of fear, sadness and happiness. These results are in line with and extend previous 
results from Ali et al (2009) where they found that psychopathic traits were associated with 
empathic response to fearful faces using the same methodology. 
Appropriate affective empathic response to others’ emotions is considered to be 
necessary for the normal development of moral emotions (i.e. emotions that are linked to 
the interests or welfare of the society or of persons other than the judge or agent) such as 
guilt and empathic concern (i.e. compassion). In fact, our results show that high levels of 
psychopathic traits were not only associated with diminished affective response to others’ 
emotions, but also with diminished propensity to feel moral emotions. Higher levels of 
psychopathic traits were characterized by reduced ability to feel other-oriented moral 
emotions, as demonstrated by its negative associations with the Empathic Concern scale of 
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), and with compassion and guilt 
ratings on the Moral Emotions task. These moral emotions are thought to function as 
‘moral barometers’, motivating prosocial and inhibiting antisocial behaviours. Impairments 
in processing such emotions might thus underlie a possible emotional disengagement in 
moral judgement and decision-making in individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits 
which is translated into their (immoral) behaviour. 
Finally, our studies did not indicate a clear association between levels of 
psychopathic traits and response to moral dilemmas. In the study described in chapter 2 we 
found no such association, whilst in the study described in chapter 3 we found that 
psychopathic traits were indeed negatively associated with higher endorsement of direct 
harm to a single victim in order to save the lives of many. The nature of this difference in 
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results could lie in the characteristics of the samples (which will be discussed further in a 
following section), but could also be a reflection of other studies in the field which indicate 
that it is yet unclear whether psychopathic traits are associated with a different pattern of 
responses to these dilemmas or not. While two other studies using these dilemmas so far 
have reported negative findings (Cima et al., 2010; Glenn, Raine, Schug, et al., 2009), one 
study has reported higher utilitarian responses in personal dilemmas in a group of low-
anxious psychopaths in comparison to controls (Koenigs et al., 2011). In spite of this 
inconsistent finding, our results show a clear link between higher levels of psychopathic 
traits and less difficulty in making decisions on these moral dilemmas. Taken together with 
the findings described in the previous paragraph, these results suggest that psychopathic 
traits might indeed be associated with some level of emotional disengagement when 
making moral decisions.  
 
6.2.2. Are behavioural correlates of empathy and morality in psychopathic traits 
specific to the affective-interpersonal dimension, the lifestyle-antisocial 
dimension, or both? 
 
As discussed in the general introduction, evidence from forensic and community 
samples suggest that the two dimensions of psychopathy (i.e. affective-interpersonal traits 
and lifestyle-antisocial behavior) present distinct associations with various criterion 
measures of personality, emotionality and behavior, particularly when their shared variance 
is controlled. For example, the affective-interpersonal dimension presents negative 
associations with emotional correlates such as fearfulness and distress, whilst the lifestyle-
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antisocial dimension presents positive associations with these correlates (e.g. Hicks & 
Patrick, 2006; Uzieblo et al., 2010). This suggests that, although co-occuring, the different 
dimensions of psychopathy might tap into two separable, distinctive underlying constructs 
(Patrick et al., 2007). Inspecting the variation of each dimension in association with 
criterion variables can thus be extremely important to provide a more comprehensive map 
of the psychopathy construct. Consistent with this, data from our behavioural chapters 
(Chapters 2 and 3), suggest that the two dimensions of psychopathy present some partially 
distinct associations with components of empathy and morality.  
In respect to variance in affective empathy correlates, our findings indicate that 
variance in general affective empathy, as measured by the QCAE, is significantly 
associated with affective-interpersonal but not with lifestyle-antisocial traits. Moreover, this 
association remains significant after controlling for variance in lifestyle-antisocial, and the 
correlation coefficients of the two dimensions with this criterion variable are significantly 
different from each other. Likewise, we observe a similar pattern of associations with the 
variance of specific affective response to happy faces in males (chapter 2). In females, we 
also see a similar pattern of associations in relation to variation in response to fearful faces 
(chapter 3), although the correlation coefficients of the different dimensions with this 
variable are not significantly different. In contrast, in males, variation in affective responses 
to fearful faces is associated with both dimensions of psychopathic traits. These 
associations cease to be significant once we control for the shared variance between the two 
dimensions, suggesting that it is the shared variance of the two dimensions that drives the 
association between these responses and psychopathic traits. In females, we also observe a 
similar pattern of associations in relation to variance in affective response to sad faces 
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(although the association with lifestyle-antisocial fails to reach significance after correction 
for multiple comparisons). Although these findings are not straightforward to interpret, and 
the nature of the causal direction of statistical associations is not possible to establish in 
cross-sectional studies, we speculate that whilst an overall weaker affective empathic 
response (including, for example, affective response to positive emotions) only contributes 
to the affective-interpersonal characteristics of the psychopathic personality, a weaker 
empathic response to sad and fearful faces might contribute to both affective-interpersonal 
and lifestyle-antisocial characteristics of the construct.  
With regard to moral processing, our findings seem to indicate that it is the variance in 
affective-interpersonal traits that drives the associations between higher levels of 
psychopathy and lower propensity to feel empathic concern  and less difficulty in making 
decisions in moral dilemmas (potentially due to lower affective engagement in making 
these decisions). In fact, we found significant correlations, but in opposite directions, 
between the two dimensions of psychopathy and the propensity to feel empathic concern 
once shared variance is removed. The unique variance of affective-interpersonal features 
was correlated with lower propensity to feel concern for others, whereas the unique 
variance of lifestyle-antisocial was correlated with greater propensity to feel concern for the 
distress of others. Previous studies from forensic and community samples also suggest that 
the two dimensions of psychopathy have opposite relationships with emotional reactivity. 
For example, when the overlap between the two dimensions is controlled for, the affective-
interpersonal dimension is negatively associated with constructs such as emotional distress, 
fearfulness, and trait negative affect, whilst the lifestyle-antisocial behaviour dimension is 
positively associated with these constructs (Hicks & Patrick, 2006). Affective-interpersonal 
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traits are associated with blunted affect (e.g. diminished emotional response to others’ 
distress). In contrast, lifestyle-antisocial traits seem to encompass both low and high aspects 
of emotional reactivity (e.g. poor affective response to others’ emotional facial expressions 
but high emotional reactivity in general), which might cancel each other out. When the 
variance in affective-interpersonal traits, which might contain only representations of 
blunted affect, is partialled out from lifestyle-antisocial traits, then variance in lifestyle-
antisocial traits related to high emotional reactivity might be freed up thus revealing 
opposite associations.  
In sum, while it appears that empathic deficits are driven by the joint variance 
between affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial facets, those related to affective 
aspects of moral cognition seem to be driven by the unique variance of affective-
interpersonal facets. It should be noted though that, although the use of partial correlations 
is a powerful and informative technique to identify associations between different variables, 
in the context of personality research they pose some difficulties in the interpretation of 
results (Lynam, Hoyle, & Newman, 2006). The most important one is the difficulty in 
knowing exactly what construct is left once the variance of another highly correlated 
construct is removed (Lynam et al., 2006). Interpretations of unique associations need to be 
made carefully and with the support of theory. The replication of these findings using a 
group comparison approach, with groups being defined by differing levels of these traits, 
would provide important further validation and clarification of these results. 
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6.2.3. Are these associations consistent across genders?  
 
Overall, our data from Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that psychopathic personality traits 
present the same underlying empathic and moral correlates in men and women, and formal 
statistical tests between the two samples indicate only two differences between their 
correlates. In women, we found that affective-interpersonal traits were negatively 
associated with higher endorsement of moral dilemmas implicating direct harm to a single 
victim in order to save the lives of many. This association is significantly different from the 
one found in the male sample, where we did not find such significant association. However, 
this difference should be interpreted with caution, as it is not yet clear whether 
psychopathic traits in males are associated with greater endorsement of utilitarian choices 
in these dilemmas. While most studies so far have reported negative findings (e.g. Cima et 
al., 2010; Glenn, Raine, Schug, et al., 2009), one has reported higher utilitarian responses in 
personal dilemmas in a group of low-anxious psychopaths in comparison to controls 
(Koenigs et al., 2011). We also found that contrary to men, where diminished empathic 
response to fear was associated with both affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial 
traits, in women diminished empathic response to fear was associated only with affective-
interpersonal traits. However, the difference between genders in the associations of 
lifestyle-antisocial traits with empathic responses to fearful faces was only marginally 
significant and therefore the current data does not afford a strong interpretation with regard 
to gender differences.  
In sum, our data suggests that while psychopathy might be manifested differently in 
females and males, either due to gender-role socialization or biological differences (e.g. 
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Nicholls & Petrila, 2005), its central characteristics appear to be similar. In women, 
psychopathic personality traits present the same underlying empathic and moral biases that 
are found in men with these traits, providing further validity to the hypothesis that 
processing atypicalities in empathy and morality processing are central to the construct of 
psychopathic personality. Furthermore, these biases seem to be more specific of the 
affective-interpersonal dimension of psychopathy, strengthening the views that the two 
dimensions of psychopathy encompass distinct contributions to variance in emotional and 
moral processing.  
 
 
6.2.4. Are associations between psychopathic traits and empathic processing 
reflected at the neural level?  
 
In chapter 4 of this thesis, we verified that the performance in our Empathy for 
Emotional Faces task, i.e. when participants explicitly resonate with others’ facial 
expressions, robustly recruits the anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate, inferior frontal 
gyrus and amygdala. These regions are the most consistently reported to be recruited during 
empathy for pain and disgust (anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate and inferior frontal 
gyrus) and during detection of emotional saliency (amygdala). The results from this 
chapter, demonstrate that the association we found at the behavioural level between 
variability in empathic response to facial expressions and psychopathic traits is reflected at 
the neural level. More specifically, we found that activity in amygdala, which is involved in 
detecting emotional saliency (e.g. Adolphs, 2010) and in experiencing emotional arousal 
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(Decety, 2011), and anterior insula, which is proposed to be critical for sensory integration 
(Critchley et al., 2004), and interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2009), was negatively 
associated with both affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial psychopathic traits. 
Interestingly, these associations cease to be significant once we control for the shared 
variance between the two dimensions, suggesting that it is the shared variance of the two 
dimensions that drives the association between these responses and psychopathic traits. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to disentangle whether these associations were driven by 
specific types of facial expressions. Future research, with improved task design, should try 
to unravel whether these associations are a reflection of atypical neural response when 
resonating with facial expressions in general or whether they are driven by atypical 
response to specific emotional expressions. Nonetheless, our findings are in line with 
previous theoretical and empirical work suggesting that psychopathy is marked by 
profound impairments in affective empathy, and provide further evidence that atypical 
amygdala and anterior insula function represent neural markers of disrupted emotional and 
empathic processing for individuals with high levels of these traits. 
 
6.2.5. Are associations between psychopathic traits and moral processing reflected 
at the neural level? 
 
In chapter 5, we demonstrated that the appraisal of personal everyday moral 
transgressions and reflection on subsequent feelings of guilt elicit responses in two partially 
separable neural circuits, while a portion of the vmPFC/mOFC cortex is commonly 
activated during both. We speculate that this vmPFC/mOFC region might subserve the 
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integration of information from other cognitive and emotional evaluative mechanisms, 
which allows the identification and assignment of value to a moral transgression, and thus 
enables the experience of moral guilt. We also identified associations between the neural 
correlates of moral reflection after everyday moral transgressions and individual differences 
in psychopathic traits. We found a positive association between hemodynamic response in 
the commonly activated vmPFC/mOFC region during the reflection of feelings of guilt 
following one’s own everyday moral transgressions and the lifestyle-antisocial behaviour 
dimension of psychopathy. It is possible that the circuitry subserving the ability to reflect 
on moral choices, and compute the moral value of a situation, may operate less efficiently 
in individuals who are more prone to poor behavioural control and more likely to engage in 
antisocial behaviour. Alternatively, it is possible that for individuals with high levels of 
lifestyle-antisocial traits, whose behaviour is often described as being driven by immediate 
or hedonistic goals, the value comparison necessary to compute the ‘moral value’ of a 
situation is more finely balanced due to increased reactivity to the reward element of 
achieving a desired goal (even if at the expense of another person’s well-being). In any 
case, our results appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that atypical functioning of the 
vmPFC/mOFC plays a critical role in psychopathy and antisocial behaviour (Blair, 2008; 
White et al., 2013) and contributes to the disordered lifestyle and antisocial behaviour 
exhibited by individuals with high levels of these traits.  
Our findings also indicate that lifestyle traits, but not antisocial behaviour, are 
negatively associated with self-reports of guilt following the moral transgressions, and with 
the coupling of the mOFC with a cluster in the posterior insula. We think that it is 
conceivable that two processes are at play during moral reflection and contribute 
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differentially to lifestyle and antisocial aspects of psychopathy. It is possible that a 
dysfunctional computation of the moral value of a situation contributes to higher levels of 
antisocial behaviour; whilst dysfunction of the computation of the moral value combined 
with weaker coding of moral disgust contributes to higher levels of irresponsible and 
impulsive lifestyle traits (and, in turn, to lower levels of feelings of guilt after a moral 
transgression). However, it should be noted that fMRI is not able to establish a causal 
relationship between neural and questionnaire responses and more sophisticated 
experimental designs are necessary to probe the relationship between these atypicalities at 
the neural level and actual irresponsible lifestyle and antisocial manifestations. 
Importantly, our highly controlled task allowed us to show that these associations are 
not due to more general impairments in emotional or mentalising processes but are specific 
to moral cognition. We think that our present findings contribute to a more comprehensive 
understanding of moral processing impairments that give rise to the immoral behaviour 
observed in individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits, suggesting that distinct 
aspects of moral behaviour are differentially affected by the different dimensions 
comprising psychopathic traits. Whilst the characteristic disregard of individuals with high 
levels of psychopathic traits might arise due to an overall reduced emotional responsivity; 
their irresponsible and antisocial behaviour might also be heightened by dysfunction in 
circuits subserving the ability to reflect on moral choices. 
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6.3. Implications and future research 
 
Psychopathy is a personality construct that involves a constellation of personality and 
behavioural characteristics, including callousness, manipulativeness, impulsiveness, and 
repeated engagement in antisocial and immoral behaviour (Blair et al., 2005; Cleckley, 
1941; R. D. Hare, 2003). The prevalence of psychopathy in the general population is 
approximately 1–2% in the United States (Neumann & Hare, 2008) and 1% in the United 
Kingdom (Coid, Yang, Ullrich, Roberts, & Hare, 2009). In spite of the low prevalence of 
psychopathy in the general population, data from the United States indicates that 
psychopaths commit more than 30% of violent crimes, representing a cost of an estimated 
$250–400 billion dollars each year (Kiehl and Buckholtz, 2010). Psychopathy creates 
considerable costs for society, not only as a consequence of criminal behaviour but also in 
terms of emotional and personal cost to the people who interact with individuals with high 
levels of these traits, be they friends, family and co-workers. 
There is now good evidence that the structure of psychopathy is dimensional in nature 
and that psychopathic traits are best viewed as existing on a continuum (Hare and 
Neumann, 2008).  Individual differences in psychopathy traits in community samples have 
the same predictive value, with respect to antisocial and criminal behaviour, as they do in 
forensic populations (DeMatteo, Heilbrun, & Marczyk, 2006; Neumann & Hare, 2008), and 
recent evidence suggests that individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits in college 
and community samples show some similar underlying deficits to psychopaths in 
incarcerated samples. The findings of our thesis contribute and strengthen this perspective. 
We have employed a battery of tasks concurrently and demonstrated that variability in 
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psychopathic traits in the general population are associated with variability in empathic and 
moral processes, which are deemed to be dysfunctional in criminal psychopaths.  
Studying the construct of psychopathy in non-forensic samples is therefore not only a 
valid approach (Salekin, Trobst, & Krioukova, 2001), but also has the potential advantage 
of ruling out possible effects of incarceration, recurrent institutionalization (Lilienfeld, 
1994), as well as substance abuse and dependence and use of psychotropic medication, 
which can be high in forensic and clinical settings. The presence of these undesired effects 
may not only influence the assessment of psychopathic personality traits but also add 
significant confounds to the measurement of their correlates.  
Investigating individual differences in levels of psychopathic traits within the general 
population can thus be valuable for furthering our understanding of psychopathy and the 
underlying processing atypicalities that give rise to psychopathic traits and behaviour. Such 
research can have important implications not only for theoretical and clinical reasons but 
also for the promotion of general societal well-being. For example, recent research on the 
impact of psychopathic traits on organizations (e.g. Akhtar, Ahmetoglu, & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2013; Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010; Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, & 
Marchisio, 2011; Mathieu, Hare, Jones, Babiak, & Neumann, 2013; Stevens, Deuling, & 
Armenakis, 2012) has highlighted how problematic these traits can be in a professional 
context. Psychopathic traits appear to be associated with poor management style, failure to 
act as team player, low responsibility, failure to adhere to rules, unethical decision making 
and poor general performance (Babiak et al., 2010; Stevens et al., 2012). In spite of this, 
individuals with high levels of these traits seem to be viewed as being charismatic and 
having leadership potential, possibly as result of the ability of these individuals to 
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manipulate decision makers (Babiak et al., 2010). Understanding the specific deficits on the 
basis of these traits, and the biological vulnerabilities that contribute to them, is extremely 
important if we are to understand, prevent it and, potentially minimise their consequences. 
In addition to specific limitations and future directions approached in the sections 
above, future work could also extend the data presented in this thesis in a number of ways. 
For example, it would be interesting to add psychophysiology measures to empathy tasks to 
better elucidate and probe the empathic and moral atypicalities observed in our studies. 
This would add a more clear evidence of bottom-up deficiencies in the experience of 
empathy and in the processing of affective aspects of morality for individuals with high 
levels of psychopathic traits. Likewise, it would be interesting to probe whether and, 
perhaps more importantly, which, top-down factors can inhibit or amplify these bottom-up 
affective deficits. If the experience of empathy, or moral behaviour, can be modifiable by 
context, for example, and if we can identify how this operates in relation to these traits, 
then ultimately we might be able to contribute with important clues for intervention in 
applied settings. For example, it is possible that perceiving a higher reward component of 
empathic and moral behaviour has an important effect in modulating prosocial behaviour 
and moral decision-making for these individuals. These could have important implications 
in, for example, promoting empathic and prosocial behaviour by focusing on individual 
gains of such behaviour.   
It would also be important to generalise the present findings to developmental cohorts, 
ideally in longitudinal designs. These would allow a more precise identification of 
affective/cognitive processing styles, and of possible “neural biomarkers”, that predict 
future behavioural outcomes (Viding & McCrory, 2012).  
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Finally, on a more general note, future research on these topics should continue to be 
concerned with the development of carefully designed and ecologically valid tasks that are 
able to isolate the distinct processes and components that comprehend complex phenomena 
such as empathy and morality. Only with such tasks we are able to systematically identify 
and characterise its distinct components and understand the role they play in the emergence 
of psychopathic traits and behaviour. 
 
6.4. Conclusions 
 
In this thesis we have contributed to the identification of how behavioural and neural 
correlates of distinct components of empathy and morality are associated with psychopathic 
traits in the general population. The results from our comprehensive battery of experimental 
tasks and questionnaires demonstrate that individual differences in psychopathic traits are 
associated with variability in empathic responses to emotional facial expressions and 
emotional-eliciting stories; propensity to feel moral emotions such as empathic concern and 
guilt; and difficulty to make decisions in moral dilemmas. Our results also suggest that 
while empathic deficits are driven by the joint variance between affective-interpersonal and 
lifestyle-antisocial facets, those related to affective aspects of moral cognition seem to be 
driven by variance in affective-interpersonal facets. Furthermore, the same underlying 
empathic and moral biases seem to be similar in men and women, providing further validity 
to the hypothesis that processing atypicalities in empathy and morality processing are 
central to the construct of psychopathic personality and that the two dimensions of 
psychopathy encompass distinct contributions from variance in emotional and moral 
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processing. We developed a novel fMRI design to identify neural correlates of affective 
empathy and their association with psychopathic traits. We demonstrate, for the first time, 
that affective empathy for faces, i.e. resonating with others’ facial expressions, robustly 
elicits activation within the anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate, inferior frontal gyrus 
and amygdala. Importantly, we demonstrate that activity in amygdala, which is involved in 
detecting emotional saliency (e.g. Adolphs, 2010) and in experiencing emotional arousal 
(Decety, 2011), and anterior insula, which is proposed to be critical for sensory integration 
(Critchley et al., 2004), and interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2009), is negatively associated 
with psychopathic traits and that it appears to be the shared variance of the two dimensions 
that drives this association. These findings provide further evidence that atypical amygdala 
and anterior insula function represent neural markers of disrupted emotional and empathic 
processing for individuals with high levels of these traits. Finally, with our novel task 
probing the neural correlates of everyday moral processing, we demonstrate that the 
appraisal of personal everyday moral transgressions and reflection on subsequent feelings 
of guilt elicit responses in two partially separable neural circuits, while a portion of the 
vmPFC/mOFC cortex is commonly activated during both. Variance in neural response and 
connectivity in this region appears to be associated with variance in lifestyle and antisocial 
psychopathic traits. These results provide further evidence that that atypical functioning of 
the vmPFC/mOFC plays a critical role in psychopathy and antisocial behaviour (Blair, 
2008, White et al., 2013), and contributes to the disordered lifestyle and antisocial 
behaviour exhibited by individuals with high levels of these traits. It is possible that distinct 
aspects of empathic and moral processing contribute to and/or are differentially affected by 
the different dimensions that co-occur in this personality construct. It appears that affective-
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interpersonal traits are associated with an overall reduced emotional responsivity, including 
empathic responsivity, which might explain the characteristic disregard for other’s well-
being in individuals high on these traits. It is also possible that dysfunction in circuits that 
subserve the ability to reflect on moral choices contributes to the irresponsible and 
antisocial behaviour characteristic of the psychopathic personality. 
In sum, we consider that the findings of this thesis add important evidence for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the empathic and moral processing impairments that 
underlie psychopathic traits and give rise to the immoral behaviour normally associated 
with these traits. 
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Appendix 1: Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 
 
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Short-Form (Paulhus, Hemphill & Hare, in press) 
 
1. I’m a rebellious person 
2. I have never been involved in delinquent gang activity 
3. Most people are wimps. 
4.  I’ve often done something dangerous just for the thrill of it. 
5.  I have tricked someone into giving me money 
6. I have assaulted a law enforcement official or social worker.  
7. I have pretended to be someone else in order to get something.  
8. I like to see fist-fights.  
9. I would get a kick out of ‘scamming’ someone.  
10. It's fun to see how far you can push people before they get upset.  
11. I enjoy doing wild things.  
12. I have broken into a building or vehicle in order to steal something or vandalize. 
13.  I don’t bother to keep in touch with my family any more.   
14. I rarely follow the rules. 
15.  You should take advantage of other people before they do it to you. 
16.  People sometimes say that I’m cold-hearted. 
17.  I like to have sex with people I barely know.  
18. I love violent sports and movies. 
19.  Sometimes you have to pretend you like people to get something out of them. 
20.  I was convicted of a serious crime. 
21.  I keep getting in trouble for the same things over and over.  
22. Every now and then I carry a weapon (knife or gun) for protection.  
23. You can get what you want by telling people what they want to hear.  
24. I never feel guilty over hurting others.  
25. I have threatened people into giving me money, clothes, or makeup. 
26.  A lot of people are “suckers” and can easily be fooled.  
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27. I admit that I often “mouth off” without thinking.  
28. I sometimes dump friends that I don’t need any more. 
29. I purposely tried to hit someone with the vehicle I was driving. 
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Appendix 2: Empathy for emotional facial expressions task  
 
Stimuli examples: 
 
Sad Fearful Angry Neutral  Happy 
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Appendix 3: Empathy-eliciting short stories task  
 
Stimuli examples: 
 
Sad: “It was a harsh winter evening and Michael was driving home after picking up his 
youngest son, Tom, from school. It was raining heavily and the visibility was rather poor. 
Tom was in the back seat happily talking about his day at school: about what he had learnt 
in his History lesson and about a joke that he told on the playground that made everyone 
laugh. Suddenly, a huge truck came from nowhere and everything turned black. When 
Michael woke up he was in the hospital, his wife by his side crying. Help had arrived too 
late and Tom had died from his injuries.” 
 
Anger: “Sam was stuck in traffic for more than half an hour. It was Friday evening and he 
was on his way out of the city, heading for the country for a weekend of peace and quiet. It 
seemed everyone else on the road had had the same idea. In half an hour he managed to 
move about 1 mile. It was absolutely unbelievable and things were not improving. To make 
matters worse, a driver behind Sam started to honk his horn to express his discontent. Soon 
everyone else was doing the same. Sam thought his eardrums would burst and there was no 
escape from the traffic.” 
 
Happy: “It had been four years since Martin had last seen his brother Lawrence who lived 
abroad. Last week Lawrence finally came home. Martin went to pick him up at the airport. 
He could hardly wait for the flight to arrive. It had been such a long time and he really 
missed Lawrence. They were best friends and used to do things together all the time. When 
the flight finally arrived, and the passengers began to walk out to the airport arrival lounge, 
Martin saw Lawrence carrying his little girl; Martin’s niece who he had never met. 
Everyone hugged for a long time.” 
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Appendix 4: Moral Vignette task  
 
Stimuli examples: 
 
Tube    
Setup: You are on a crowded tube on your way home. You are very tired. All you 
want to do is sit down and read your book. Fortunately you find an empty seat and sit 
down. 
Harm-to-other: Suddenly you realise a heavily pregnant woman is standing by your 
side. You are so tired that you pretend not to see her so that you do not have to give up your 
seat. 
Harm-to-self: You realise you dropped your book by the door. You hate having 
nothing to read, but are very tired and do not want to lose the seat to the person standing 
next to you so you do not get up to fetch it. 
 
Manager   
Setup: You are hoping for a promotion in your job. During a meeting, your team 
manager praises the team’s work. He is very complimentary about a novel idea the team 
has introduced. 
Harm-to-other: He says the idea was yours. You know it was not; it was your 
colleague’s. But you don’t say anything because you don’t want to risk your promotion.  
Harm-to-self: He says the idea was your colleague’s. You know it was your idea but 
you don’t say anything because you don’t want to risk your promotion. 
 
Station 
Setup: You are running late to catch a train to see your favourite band in concert. The 
station is very crowded and there is a group of tourists blocking the entrance to the 
platform. 
Harm-to-other: They don’t seem to be moving. To get through, you shove the person 
in front of you and he falls to the ground. 
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Harm-to-self: They don’t seem to be moving. To get through, you try to go around the 
group but you trip on one of them and hurt your leg. 
 
Girlfriend 
Setup: You are on a holiday with your new girlfriend. There is a running competition 
on and you decide to enter it to impress her. 
Harm-to-other: Another competitor looks to be in very good shape. To win the race 
you trip him up; he falls down and you win first place. 
Harm-to-self: Another competitor looks to be in very good shape. You manage to 
overtake him, but push yourself too hard, end up with a strained hamstring, and need 
crutches for the rest of the holiday. 
 
Deadline   
Setup: It is late in the evening. You and your colleague are working late because you 
each have very important deadlines tonight.  
Harm-to-other: You accidently spill your coffee and damage some keys on your 
keyboard. While your colleague takes a break you switch the keyboards so you won’t risk 
missing the deadline. 
Harm-to-self: You accidently spill your coffee and damage some keys on your 
keyboard. You have to wait until your colleague finishes his work to use his keyboard so 
you won’t miss the deadline. 
 
Parking  
Setup: You have been driving for a long time looking for a place to park your car in 
the supermarket car park. 
Harm-to-other: You finally find an empty space but there is someone in a car waiting 
already and giving a signal to park. You ignore him and cut in front of him to take the 
space. 
Harm-to-self: You finally find an empty space and park. You are about to leave the 
car when you realise you forgot your wallet at home and need to go back to get it. 
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Induction 
Setup: You want to join a private club at university. You are a first year student and 
are going through the “induction”. One of the senior students sets up a task. 
Harm-to-other: You have to coerce another student to drink beer mixed with vodka 
until he throws up. You go along because you want to get into the club. He ends up passing 
out and needing his stomach pumped at the hospital. 
Harm-to-self: You have to drink beer mixed with vodka until you throw up. You go 
along with this because you want to get into the club. You end up passing out and needing 
your stomach pumped at the hospital. 
  
